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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Truth, Knowledge, and the Value of False Belief in Plato
by
Nicholas R. Baima
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Eric Brown, Chair
In this dissertation, I challenge common readings of Plato according to which epistemic vice is
either always bad, or is merely beneficial for non-philosophers. On my reading, false beliefs and
defective forms of reasoning can benefit everyone in two ways. First, there are commitments—to
care for the health of your soul, to care for the well-being of other human beings—that a person
needs to have in order to live well, and a reliably good life requires that these commitments be
entrenched and unwavering. For those people and soul-parts that lack philosophical understanding,
some falsehoods can help sustain these crucial normative commitments. I argue that this is how
the Noble Lie and the Preludes work in the Republic and the Laws, respectively. Second, there are
some questions that outstrip our ability to answer them with full justification—questions, for
instance, that concern the nature of the soul, the gods, and death. Nonetheless, sometimes the
demands of living well require us to form beliefs about these questions even though we risk error.
I argue that this occurs in Socrates’ attitude towards death and the afterlife in the Phaedo. This
interpretation has far-reaching consequences in that it reshapes how we understand the relationship
between Plato’s ethics and epistemology.

v

“Anyone unable to understand how a useful religion can be founded on lies will
not understand this book...So be it”
John/Jonah (Cat’s Cradle, Vonnegut, 2014/1962, ch. 4, pp. 5-6)

“I thought that pain and truth were things that really mattered
But you can’t stay here with every single hope you had shattered”
Big Country (“In a Big Country,” 1983)

INTRODUCTION

“What in us really wants ‘truth’...Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? and
uncertainty? even ignorance?” (Beyond Good and Evil, 1.1)

“‘Truth! Rapturous delusion of a god! What does truth matter to human beings!”
(On the Pathos of Truth, p. 12)

Nietzsche accuses philosophers of fetishizing truth and undervaluing falsehood. According to
Nietzsche, Plato is the source of this problem. Perhaps, this is voiced most directly in the Gay
Science:
But what I have in view will now be understood, namely, that it is always a
metaphysical belief on which our belief in science rests,—and that even we
knowing ones of today, the godless and anti-metaphysical, still take our fire from
the conflagration kindled by a belief a millennium old, the Christian belief, which
was also the belief of Plato, that God is truth, that the truth is divine...But what if
this itself always becomes more untrustworthy, what if nothing any longer proves
itself divine, except it be error, blindness, and falsehood;—what if God himself
turns out to be our most persistent lie? (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 3.344).1
To be clear, Nietzsche is not accusing Plato of thinking that everyone should always seek
truth and avoid falsehood. After all, Nietzsche famously congratulates Plato for making “a real lie,

1 Nietzsche quotes this passage at 3.24 in the Genealogy of Morals.
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a genuine, resolute, ‘honest’ lie” in the Republic (Genealogy of Morals 3.19).2 Rather, Nietzsche’s
charge is that Plato thinks that philosophers themselves only aim at truth and never accept
falsehood, and in doing this, they neglect the value of uncertainty, ignorance, and falsehood.
Nietzsche’s view of Plato is not eccentric; his interpretation was prevalent in antiquity as
well. It is, for instance, essential to the Academy’s turn toward skepticism. Arcesilaus extracted
from Plato’s dialogues the lesson of suspending judgment in order to avoid false belief. Moreover,
many scholars today agree that Platonic philosophy pursues the true and eschews the false. For
instance, Katja Vogt, follows in this tradition, arguing that it is a Socratic Intuition “to avoid the
acceptance of falsehoods, and that it is preferable to make no truth claims as opposed to false ones”
(Vogt 2012, p. 24). Similarly, A. J. Bartlett argues that Plato is a champion and advocate of the
importance of “an education by truths” (Bartlett 2011).
Nor is it difficult to find textual support for Nietzsche’s charge. After all, in Plato’s early
dialogues Socrates notoriously disavows knowledge and admonishes those who claim to know that
which they do not know. For example, in the Apology, Socrates tests the Oracle of Delphi’s claim
that no one is wiser than him by seeking out and challenging those who profess wisdom (20e-23c).
Upon doing this, Socrates discovers that he is wiser than those who think that they are wise because
he is cognizant of his ignorance, but they are not—they claim to know that which they do not
know, and thus they are ignorant of their ignorance. Socrates identifies this practice of selfexamination with philosophy, a divine exercise he will pursue to his death (28b-32e). From this
text, it is easy enough to see why one would think that Plato considers philosophy a skeptical
practice that is fundamentally about avoiding false belief and expelling falsehood from others.

2 “That the lie is permitted as a means to pious ends is part of the theory of every priesthood...But
philosophers, too, as soon as, with priestly ulterior motives, they form the intention of taking in hand the direction of
humanity, at once all arrogate to themselves the right to tell lies: Plato before all” (Will to Power, 141).
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Consider also the Gorgias in which Socrates is careful to distinguish philosophy from mere
rhetorical persuasion. Philosophy is concerned with truth and goodness, while rhetorical
persuasion is merely concerned with flattery and pleasure, and is indifferent to the truth. For
example, when Polus attempts to refute Socrates through rhetoric, Socrates replies, “You don’t
compel me; instead you produce many false witnesses against me and try to banish me from my
property, the truth” (472b).
Plato’s commitment to truth and resistance to falsehood is not idiosyncratic to his early
period of writing, but extends to his middle and late dialogues as well.3 The philosophers of the
Republic, for instance, are committed to truth in the same way that Socrates was in the Apology
and the Gorgias. Socrates, in the Republic, says, “They [viz., philosophers] must be without
falsehood—they must refuse to accept what is false, hate it, and have a love for the truth” (485c).
Plato’s love of truth continues into what many scholars consider his last work: the Laws. Through
the mouth of the unnamed Athenian, Plato says that “truth heads the list of all things good, for
gods and humans alike” (730c).
This interpretation, though common, nonetheless, underappreciates key passages. I argue
that there are two general ways that Plato builds false beliefs into the commitments of philosophers.
First, in the Republic and Laws, he thinks that everyone needs some false beliefs to acquire the
basic moral commitments of a decent human being, and he does not think that one sheds all of
these false beliefs upon becoming a philosopher. One example of this occurs in the Republic, where
the non-rational part of the philosopher ruler’s soul believes the “noble lie” and this false belief
harmonizes the soul by motivating virtuous activity. Second, at least in the Phaedo, Plato suggests
that philosophers should appropriately risk false belief for the sake of cultivating the best possible

3 The periodization of Plato’s dialogues is a source of contention, however, nothing substantive hangs upon
the way that I have grouped them.
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soul. For instance, upon confronting death, Socrates clings to certain beliefs about death and the
destination of soul regardless of whether or not these beliefs are true. This demonstrates that the
value of truth is limited in scope for Plato; sometimes the demands of living well require us to
abandon the pursuit of truth and knowledge. The upshot of this is that we need to reconsider the
relationship between Plato’s epistemology and his ethics—no longer can we view truth and wellbeing as inseparable.

Outline of Chapters
Anyone with a vague familiarity of the Republic likely knows that Plato’s Kallipolis is founded
upon a “noble lie” (γενναῖον ψεῦδος); because this is the most familiar useful falsehood in Plato’s
corpus, it is only fitting that the first two chapters begin here. The first chapter analyzes what kinds
of false beliefs are beneficial in the Republic. I answer this question by analyzing II.382a-d, a
passage in which Socrates cryptically distinguishes between dangerous falsehoods that he calls,
“true” or “real” falsehoods, and potentially good falsehoods that he calls, “impure” falsehoods. I
argue that true falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics—they are false beliefs
about how one should act, I call these “normative commitments.” I argue that false normative
commitments are always pernicious because they create and sustain psychological disharmony. I
argue that impure falsehoods are false claims about why certain actions or laws are unjust or just,
I call these “justifications.” False justifications are beneficial when they produce true normative
commitments and harmful when they produce false normative commitments. My reading
contributes to the secondary literature by undermining an interpretation put forth by David
Simpson and Raphael Woolf, who argue that Plato tolerates falsehoods about everything except
the Forms. The upshot of my interpretation is that the ignorance and false beliefs of non-
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philosophers is less damning because it does not constitute a “true falsehood.” Accordingly, on
my reading the non-philosophers are doing better than on the Form’s reading.
The second chapter picks up where the first chapter left off by exploring who believes the
“noble lie” in the Kallipolis. Traditionally, scholars have maintained that only the nonphilosophers truly believe the myth to the extent that the philosopher rulers only believe the moral
of the noble lie, but do not believe the myth as a literal truth. I challenge the traditional reading by
arguing that Socrates’ account of early childhood education and moral psychology demonstrate
that the non-reasoning part of the philosopher’s soul does, in fact, believe the noble lie. Moreover,
I argue that these false beliefs have positive ethical value because they produce harmony in the
soul by motivating the non-reasoning part towards virtuous activity. If this is correct, then it raises
serious problems for Nietzsche’s interpretation because it demonstrates that Plato thought it was
important to build false beliefs into the basic commitments of philosophers.
In the third and fourth chapters, I depart from discussing the Republic and turn towards the
Laws. The third chapter examines the Athenian’s discussion of preludes, which are messages that
preface the laws and make citizens more eager to obey them. In order to make sense of the preludes,
I rely upon the distinction I made in the first chapter between normative commitments and
justifications. I argue that many preludes involve false justifications that entail true normative
commitments. This chapter contributes to the secondary literature in two ways. First, it undermines
an interpretation of the preludes put forth by Christopher Bobonich, who argues that the preludes
involve “rational” persuasion. Second, it directs the debate between Bobonich and his opponents,
Richard Stalley and Glen Morrow, into new and fertile ground. Both sides agree that the preludes
instill true beliefs and give citizens good epistemic reasons for obeying the laws. I argue, however,
that both positions are mistaken to the extent that they primarily view the preludes as a source of
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epistemic reasons. I argue that the fundamental purpose of the preludes is to motivate right
action—epistemic considerations are merely a subsidiary concern.
The fourth chapter analyzes the Athenian’s discussion of drunkenness (μέθη) in the Laws.
Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness is surprisingly positive in the Laws, especially as compared
to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato maintains that
intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance, while in the Laws, Plato holds that it can produce
courage and temperance. This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind? And if so, why?
Ultimately, this chapter answers affirmatively and argues that this marks a substantive shift in
Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness, false beliefs, and anti-rational desires. This chapter argues
that the source of this change might stem from Plato losing confidence in the ability of knowledge
and reason to maintain virtuous dispositions. With the exception of Elizabeth Belfiore and a few
others, most scholars have underappreciated the significance that drunkenness has in the ethical
education of the citizens of Magnesia. Hence, this chapter contributes to the secondary literature
by engaging with important passages that are often overlooked.
The previous chapters examine Plato’s attitude towards possessing and sustaining false
beliefs; nevertheless, they say nothing about the belief formation process itself. In the fifth chapter
I analyze the belief formation process of Socrates in the Phaedo. I argue that in Socrates, we find
the position that philosophers should sometimes abandon the pursuit of truth for the sake of
cultivating the best possible soul—in certain circumstances, philosophers will be better off holding
fast to certain beliefs irrespective of their truth. This is, perhaps, the most significant evidence
against Nietzsche’s interpretation of Plato, because it is an example of a philosopher himself
directly eschewing truth for the sake of other goods.
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Methodology
My interpretation utilizes four interpretive methods. First, each chapter focuses on a single
dialogue and treats the content of the dialogue mostly on its own terms. Second, I assume the
standard chronological order of the dialogues. Third, I assume that the protagonist of the dialogue
approximates a view that Plato is sympathetic towards. Fourth, I assume that Plato believes that
false beliefs are metaphysically possible, which is to take a particular stance on philosophical
issues raised in the Sophist and Theaetetus. I do not address the metaphysical and semantic issues
concerning false beliefs raised in the Sophist and the Theaetetus because I am primarily interested
in the ethical and epistemological implications of false beliefs.
This leads into my next point of discussion—my choice of texts might strike some scholars
as odd. Hence, one might ask: Why choose the Republic, the Laws, and the Phaedo, when there
are so many other dialogues to choose from? My goal in this dissertation is to argue that not only
is Plato extremely tolerant of false beliefs, but that he views false beliefs and defective forms of
reasoning as having the power to contribute to flourishing. I have chosen the texts that make this
point most vividly. Nevertheless, I do not think that these texts are unusual in this respect. I think
that Plato’s tolerance of false belief can be found in every text in his corpus; especially, for instance
in the Apology, the Gorgias, the Ion, the Meno, the Phaedrus, the Philebus, and the Statesman. If
I had the space and the time to discuss these texts, I most certainly would. I have, however, limited
space and time, and because of this, I have had to make difficult choices regarding what texts to
discuss. I have chosen the texts that will allow me to make the most persuasive and interesting
claims concerning false beliefs in the space and time I have to write this dissertation.
Lastly, even if one accepts my choice of texts, one still might find their arrangement to be
strange since the order does not follow the traditional chronology. With respect to this, I have
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arranged the chapters such that there is a progression in Plato’s toleration for false beliefs. Hence,
the order in which I discuss the dialogues is a consequence of this progression.

Texts and Translations
The Greek texts for the Platonic corpus are from Burnet (1900-1907). The translations are my own,
however, I have leaned heavily upon several translations and commentaries in developing my
translations. For the Republic, I primarily consulted Adam (1963) and Grube/Reeve (1997). For
the Laws, I primarily utilized Pangle (1980), however, I also made use of Saunders (1997) and
England (1921). For the Phaedo, I consulted Fowler (1966), Gallop (1975), Grube (1997), and
Rowe (1993). For the Timaeus, I referred to Zeyl (1997). For the Apology I have utilized Grube
(1997) and for the Gorgias I have made use of Zeyl (1997).
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CHAPTER ONE
Republic 382a-d: On the Dangers and Benefits of Falsehood
1. Introduction
Socrates’ attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly
committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most
notably in Book III with the “noble lie” (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book V with the
“rigged sexual lottery” (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does
Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more
broadly: What can this tell us about the relationship between ethics and epistemology?
The key to answering these questions lies in an obscure and paradoxical passage in Book
II.382a-d, when Socrates distinguishes between “true falsehoods” and “impure lies.” True
falsehoods are always bad, but impure lies are sometimes beneficial. Despite Socrates’ insistence
that he is not saying anything deep, his distinction is far from straightforward. Nevertheless, in
order to determine why some falsehoods are beneficial and why some are always harmful, we must
understand what exactly true falsehoods are and how they differ from impure lies.
In this chapter, I argue that true falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics;
they are false beliefs about how one should live and what one should pursue. I refer to these beliefs
as “normative commitments.” False normative commitments are always pernicious because they
create and sustain psychological disharmony. Unlike true falsehoods, impure lies can be about
anything. Nevertheless, they are only beneficial when they help produce and sustain true normative
commitments. I argue that the upshot of this is that practical concerns have a kind of primacy over
theoretical concerns.1

1 I should note that I will not focus on the political question of whether the lies in the Republic make Plato's

2. True Falsehood and Impure Lies
The text (viz., 382a-d) is situated at the end of Book II; Socrates and Adeimantus have been
discussing the merits of the current educational system, which centers around the poems of Hesiod,
Homer, and others. Socrates assesses how the poets depict the gods and whether this account is
both true and proper for educational purposes. Socrates examines three aspects of the gods as
presented by the poets. First, the poets represent the gods as causing both badness and goodness
(379-380a). Socrates finds this objectionable, arguing that because the gods are completely good,
they can only cause goodness (379c). Second, the poets depict the gods as changing forms (380d).
Socrates finds this problematic because the gods cannot alter themselves. The gods are already in
the best condition; any alteration from that condition would be to change into something worse
(381b-c). Third, the poets represent the gods as deceiving humans by presenting themselves as
something that they are not. Socrates asks, “But may we suppose that while the gods themselves
are incapable of change, they make us believe that they appear in many shapes, deceiving and
practicing magic upon us?” (381e8-10). Adeimantus responds, “Perhaps” (381e11). Adeimantus’
response surprises Socrates and leads him to ask, “What? Would a god be willing to deceive
(ψεύδεσθαι) in either word or deed, by presenting an illusion?” (382a1-2).
When Adeimantus expresses uncertainty (382a3), Socrates attempts to identify a kind of
deception or falsehood that no god or human would accept. Socrates says, “Don’t you know that
all gods and humans hate at least the true falsehood (τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος), if one can put it
this way?” (382a4-5). 2 The paradoxical name, “true falsehood” (τό…ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) confuses

government unjust. Rather, I shall focus on the ethical and epistemic question concerning Plato's attitude towards
tolerating false beliefs. For discussions on the role of deception in the political realm see Annas (1981, pp. 106-107,
167); Brickhouse and Smith (1983); Page (1991); Popper (1966); Reeve (1988, especially chap. 4); Taylor (1999).
2 The Greek term ψεῦδος can mean “lie” or “falsehood.” Because “falsehood” is more of a neutral term than
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Adeimantus (382a6). Socrates clarifies himself by explaining that “no one willingly deceives
(ψεύδεσθαι) the most authoritative part (τῷ κυριωτάτῳ) of himself and about the most authoritative
things (περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα), but everyone most of all fears accepting it [viz., falsehood] there”
(382a7-9).3 Understandably, Adeimantus is still quite puzzled (382a10).
Socrates attributes this confusion to Adeimantus mistakenly thinking that he is saying
something profound or holy (σεμνὸν). Socrates explains that he simply means that “to deceive and
to have deceived (ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι) one’s soul about the things that are (περὶ τὰ ὄντα),
and to be ignorant (ἀμαθῆ), and to have and to hold falsehood (ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος)
there is what everyone would least accept and would most hate in their soul” (382b1-5).
Surprisingly, Adeimantus expresses that he understands (382b6).
Now that Socrates has Adeimantus’ agreement, he attempts to justify his use of the
paradoxical name “true falsehood” by contrasting it with a “not altogether pure falsehood” (οὐ
πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος).4 He explains that the former occurs when one has ignorance in one’s soul
(382b7-9), while the latter is a “kind of imitation in words (ἐν λόγοις μίμημά) of the condition
(παθήματος) in the soul [i.e., ignorance], an image (εἴδωλον) that arises later” (382b9-c1).With
this distinction in place, Socrates explains that the “real falsehood” (τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος) is hated by
both gods and humans (382c3-4), whereas the falsehood in words is not always hated by humans

“lie,” I shall translate ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος as “true falsehood.” Note that further below I will defend this interpretation
when I argue that “true falsehoods” are really false beliefs about the most authoritative things.
3 At VII.535d-e, Socrates says that the philosopher rulers are to hate both voluntary and involuntary
falsehoods; cf. Laws 730c. One might think that this is a continuation of the taxonomy of falsehoods at 382a-d because
at 382a-d Socrates discusses voluntary falsehoods. However, I do not think that Socrates means anything technical in
his use of voluntary and involuntary falsehoods at 535d-e. I think Socrates simply means that the rulers ought to hate
both saying something false without knowing it is false and saying something false while knowing it is false (i.e.
lying). The idea is that the rulers should develop negative dispositions to falsehoods generally (cf. 474b-475c, 485cd, 490a-c, and 501d). This is somewhat paradoxical because the rulers must lie in order to benefit the city (cf. III.389).
Nevertheless, the point seems to be that if the rulers dislike lying they will only lie when it is truly necessary and
beneficial; cf. Annas (1981, pp. 107, 166-7); Brickhouse and Smith (1983, p. 84); Schofield (2007, p. 148).
4 Note that eventually I will argue that “impure lie” is a better translation than “impure falsehood.” However,
because at this point in the text I am merely introducing the idea of οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος, I shall use the phrase
“impure falsehood.”
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(but is by gods). Socrates likens falsehood in words to a useful drug, which can be used for
preventing the ignorant or mad from doing bad (382c6-10).5 Additionally, Socrates explains that
when discussing ancient stories that one is ignorant of (cf. 376e-378e), falsehood can be useful
when it is like the truth as far as possible (382d1-3).6
Socrates is distinguishing between a “true” (ὡς ἀληθῶς) or “real (τῷ ὄντι) falsehood” and
an imitative falsehood that is “not altogether pure” (οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον). Hereafter, I shall simply
refer to the former kind of falsehood as a “true falsehood” and the latter kind of falsehood as an
“impure falsehood.” Socrates’ explanation of the distinction is convoluted, and thus warrants a
careful analysis. It will be helpful to begin with a general summary of the distinction. True
falsehoods and impure falsehoods differ in their location, ontology, content, and effect. For
instance, Socrates says that true falsehoods are located in the soul and in the most authoritative
place (τῷ κυριωτάτῳ). In contrast, impure falsehoods are located in words (ἐν λόγοις ψεῦδος).
They differ in ontology to the extent that true falsehoods are real 7 and involve actual ignorance,
while impure falsehoods are imitative and merely appear as real falsehoods. Socrates describes
true falsehoods as being about the most authoritative things (περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα), but does not
specify the content of impure falsehoods. True falsehoods are always worthy of hatred and thus
are never useful. However, impure falsehoods are not always worthy of hatred to the extent that
they are sometimes useful.8

5 Socrates continues the drug metaphor at III.389a-c when he asserts that just as only physicians should
prescribe drugs, only philosopher rulers should tell lies in the city. Following this, at 459d-460c, Socrates applies the
drug metaphor when developing the “rigged sexual lotteries.”
6 For a discussion of what stories Socrates might be referring to, see Belfiore (1983).
7 Hence, the name “true” or “real falsehood.”
8 Plato makes it clear that no falsehood could ever be useful to the gods (382d-382e). This demonstrates a
way in which gods differ from humans. Impure falsehoods can be useful to humans, but can never be useful to the
gods.
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A visual representation of these distinctions is found in Table 1 below:
Table 1

Location

True Falsehood

Soul, the Most
Real
Authoritative Part
of Oneself.

Impure Falsehood Words

Ontology

Imitative

Content

Effect

About The Most
Authoritative
Things

Always Harmful,
Never Beneficial

?

Sometimes
Harmful,
Sometimes
Beneficial

Now that we have a clear overview, we can begin to examine each aspect in more detail.
Let us begin with the categories of location and ontology. As I just explained, Socrates says that
true falsehoods are real and are located in the soul and the most authoritative part of oneself.
However, it is unclear what exactly this means. It seems that there are two possible interpretations:
either the soul is the most authoritative part of oneself, or the most authoritative part of oneself is
a specific part of the soul, such as the reasoning part of the soul. Both interpretations have textual
support;9 nevertheless, for the purposes of this chapter, not much will depend on settling this
dispute, and thus we can leave the issue in a stalemate.
The more pressing question is: What kind of things are true falsehoods? The most
straightforward answer is that true falsehoods are false beliefs. This is the most obvious answer
because true falsehoods are located in the soul, and beliefs are the psychological attitudes that are
standardly understood as being true or false.
However, there is a notable objection to this reading. Christopher Gill (1993, p. 45) argues

9 For instance, when Plato divides the soul into parts in Book IV, he makes it clear that reason is supposed
to have the most authority in the soul—it is supposed to control the spirited and appetitive parts. This lends credence
to thinking that the most authoritative part of a person is the reasoning part. However, there are two things that tell
against this interpretation. First, Plato has yet to divide the soul in Book II. Second, and more importantly, Plato thinks
that the soul, as a whole, has authority over the body, which suggests that Plato might be thinking of the most
authoritative part of oneself as the soul in its entirety.
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that Socrates is using the terms “true” and “false” in a non-standard (i.e., non-propositional way).10
For instance, he says that “while such a state consists, in part, in having false ethical beliefs, it is
clear from the larger context that such ‘falsehood’ is a property of the personality as a
whole...Correspondingly, ‘truth’ (at least, ‘truth in the psyche’) must also be a state of the whole
personality and not just a property of statements or beliefs.” In support of this interpretation, Gill
(1993, p. 45 and n. 15) cites the fact that Socrates uses the terms “true” and “false” in other nonstandard ways in the Republic. For instance, Socrates describes god as being true in deed and word
(382e8) and says that pleasures can be “true” and “false” (585d-586e).11
Nevertheless, the evidence in favor of Gill’s reading is lacking. First, in both of these
passages (i.e., 382e8 and 582d-586e) it is not obvious that it is necessary to read “true” and “false”
in non-standard ways, and it is possible to make sense of “true deeds” or “true pleasures” in a way
that is compatible with standard accounts of truth. For example, in describing the gods as “true in
deed,” Socrates might simply be conveying the idea that the gods are honest and do not deceive or
manipulate humans. Second, and more importantly, even if we are forced to interpret these
passages (i.e., 382e8 and 582d-586e) as using a non-standard account of truth, this does not force
a non-standard reading of truth in the notion “falsehood in the soul.” There is nothing inconsistent
in Socrates using a non-standard account of truth to talk about “true deeds” or “true pleasure” and
using a standard account of truth to talk about “falsehood in soul.” Without any further reasons for
entertaining an extended use of truth when interpreting falsehood in the soul, it is best to interpret
falsehood in the soul simply as false beliefs.
In contrast to true falsehoods, impure falsehoods are located in words and are an imitation

10 Brickhouse and Smith (1983) defend an extended use of “true” in the Republic. For a criticism, see Woolf
(2009, p. 17).
11 Cf. Philebus, esp. 40c-41a.
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of ignorance. This seems to suggest that impure falsehoods are verbal assertions with false content.
If we understand these false verbal assertions as lies told by people who know the truth,12 then we
have a clear explanation for the imitative nature of impure falsehoods.13 For example, suppose
Felipe lies to Sarah by telling her that Michael Jordan never played for the Chicago Bulls. Felipe
does not actually believe this; he knows that Michael Jordan played for the Chicago Bulls.
However, in order for Felipe’s lie to be successful, his assertion has to appear to represent his
actual beliefs. That is, he must appear to Sarah as someone who actually believes that Michael
Jordan never played for the Chicago Bulls, which is to say that he must imitate being ignorant.14
Hence, I argue that the contrast between true falsehoods and impure falsehoods is between false
beliefs and verbal lies; true falsehoods are false beliefs, while impure falsehoods are verbal lies;
because of this, for the remainder of the chapter I will use the term “impure lie” to refer to οὐ πάνυ
ἄκρατον ψεῦδος.
Many scholars disagree, however. They argue that the fundamental difference between true
falsehoods and impure lies is that impure lies are false beliefs about unimportant things and thus
are beneficial (or at the very least, not devastating to an agent), while true falsehoods are false
beliefs about important things, and thus always harm an agent.15 I disagree with these interpretation

12 I am making this qualification because a lie does not necessarily involve telling something false. For
example, even if a verbal assertion is true, it is still a lie if the person asserting it believes that it is false and intends to
deceive someone by asserting this statement.
13 Cf. Adam (1963, ad loc. 382b). Eric Brown has suggested that impure falsehoods might be imitative
because they are linguistic as opposed to them being imitative because they are lies told by someone who grasps the
truth. This is an interesting suggestion, but all of the references to impure falsehoods in the Republic involve lies being
told by people who grasp the truth (or at the very least, are aware they are not telling the full truth); cf. 3.389a-c;
5.459d-460c. Additionally, one advantage of my interpretation is that it can capture the impurity of impure
falsehoods—they are impure because they are combined with truth. Ultimately, however, not much turns on this
specific issue.
14 Simpson (2007, pp. 345-6) argues that verbal falsehoods are not lies, but deception. Simpson maintains
that lies involve a betrayal of trust, while deception does not necessarily involve this. However, it is not clear that
Socrates has this distinction in mind. Moreover, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Socrates is operating
under this distinction, it seems that some of the impure lies involve a betrayal of trust, such as the rigged sexual lottery
(V.459d-460c).
15 For example, Reeve (1988, p. 210) says, “[A verbal lie] is not an 'altogether pure lie' because it does not
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for two reasons: First, it conflates the “content” and “effect” with the “location” and “form.” From
382a-d, it is clear that Socrates means to keep these things separate. Second, and more importantly,
at 382c6-10, Plato makes it clear that impure lies are not always useful, but are only sometimes
useful. Hence, a generic feature of impure lies cannot be that they are useful, since this is not
always the case.
Although the contrast between true falsehoods and impure lies is between false beliefs and
verbal lies, it is a mistake to think that all false beliefs are true falsehoods.16 This interpretation is
problematic for two reasons. First, Plato makes it clear that true falsehoods are about the most
authoritative things, which indicates that true falsehoods are false beliefs restricted to a certain
domain (i.e., the most authoritative things). Second, Plato makes it clear that sometimes lies (i.e.,
impure lies) are beneficial. Presumably, these lies are beneficial because of the false beliefs that
they produce and sustain. For example, when Felipe lies to Sarah saying that p, this lie can only
be beneficial for Sarah, if she forms the false belief that p. In other words, there is a symmetry
between the lies that are beneficial or harmful to tell and the false beliefs that are beneficial or
harmful to believe, such that beneficial lies produce beneficial false beliefs and harmful lies
produce harmful false beliefs. Call this the “symmetry thesis.”
With this in mind, we can distinguish between four kinds of falsehoods: false beliefs that
are sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful to possess (i.e., contingent falsehoods),17 false
beliefs that are always harmful and never beneficial to possess (i.e., true falsehoods), lies that are
sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful to tell (i.e., impure lies that are contingently bad or

in fact mislead about the good...Clearly, the ruler's lies here are the verbal kind, for only they were earlier allowed to
be useful and beneficial.” Simpson (2007, p. 345) says, “A verbal falsehood misrepresents only unimportant things.”
See also Lear (2006).
16 At times Annas (1981, p. 107) and Schofield (2007, pp. 144-147) appear to suggest this position.
17 This label is my own insofar as Plato does not provide a name for this category.
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good), and lies that are always harmful and never beneficial to tell (i.e., impure lies that are
necessarily bad).
Table 2 provides a visual representation of the various distinctions. As one can see, the
content of the falsehood (either a lie or a belief) plays a fundamental role in determining whether
the falsehood is necessarily harmful or contingently harmful. When the falsehood is about the most
authoritative things it necessarily is harmful. Nevertheless, if the falsehood is about something
else, then the falsehood can be harmful or beneficial depending on various circumstances. Because
of this, we must determine what the most authoritative things are. This is the task of the next
section.
Ontology

Form

Content

Effect

True Falsehood Soul/Reason?

Real

Belief

About The
Most
Authoritative
Things

Always
Harmful,
Never
Beneficial

Contingent
Falsehood

Real

Belief

Not About The
Most
Authoritative
Things

Sometimes
Harmful,
Sometimes
Beneficial

Impure Lie that Words
is Necessarily
Bad

Imitative

Lie

About The
Most
Authoritative
Things

Always
Harmful,
Never
Beneficial

Impure Lie that Words
is Contingently
Bad or Good

Imitative

Lie

Not About The
Most
Authoritative
Things

Sometimes
Harmful,
Sometimes
Beneficial

Table 2

Location

Soul/Reason?

3. The Most Authoritative Things
There are two plausible candidates for what Socrates means by the most authoritative things at

18

II.382a-d. They are either the old Socratic issues of the early dialogues (such as ethical
considerations about how one should live), or, they are they are the Platonic issues that concern
metaphysical or philosophical matters (such as the Forms). In other words, the question is: Does a
true falsehood involve having a false belief about basic ethical facts, or does it involve being
ignorant of the Forms? In this section I shall argue that the former provides the best interpretation.
I shall proceed by first giving a positive argument in defense of this view. Following this, I shall
explain why this position is stronger than the latter interpretation.
However, before I move on, I need to clarify what might be a source of confusion. The
question I am asking is not whether some ethical truths are metaphysically independent of the
Forms. Rather, the question is: Do you have a true falsehood if you have a false belief about certain
ethical matters? Or, do you have a true falsehood if you are ignorant of the Forms? Notice that if
you are ignorant of the former, you are necessarily ignorant of the Form of the Good because,
presumably, knowledge of the Form of the Good entails grasping basic ethical truths. However,
the inverse is not true, to the extent that you can have a true belief about a basic ethical fact while
being completely ignorant of the Form of the Good. For instance, Susan can grasp that she should
help her elderly neighbor carry his groceries into his apartment without knowing anything about
the Form of the Good, and this holds true even if the Form of the Good grounds the fact that
helping her elderly neighbor is a good action.
Fundamentally, what is at stake in this debate is how damning the ignorance of the nonphilosophers is. From Socrates’ discussion at II.382a-d it is clear that true falsehoods are the worst
and most hated kind of falsehood or ignorance one can possess. Thus, if true falsehoods involve
ignorance or false beliefs about the Forms, then this bodes much worse for the non-philosophers
because they do not have knowledge of the Forms. However, if true falsehoods involve ignorance
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or false beliefs about basic ethical facts, which non-philosophers are capable of grasping, then
Plato has a much more optimistic view of non-philosophers in the Republic insofar as they do not
possess the worst kind of falsehood—namely, the true falsehood.18

a. Basic Ethical Facts
The key to understanding what Socrates means by the most authoritative things is found in the
passages that immediately precede and follow 382a-d. In Book II, just before the introduction of
the term “true falsehood,” Socrates complains to Adeimantus that the poets depict the gods acting
immorally. He says, “Telling the greatest falsehood about the most important things (τὸ μέγιστον
ψεῦδος καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων) doesn’t make a fine story” (377e6-7). The example he gives is of
Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus acting unjustly (377e-378a). The story is not “fine” because it depicts
the gods acting in despicable ways, and this sends the wrong message to audience of the poems
(378b).19
This passage suggests that the most important things have to do with ethics and how justice
is portrayed. If the greatest of gods is depicted as acting unjustly, Socrates worries that stories like
this will make the citizens believe that acting unjustly is acceptable—perhaps even praiseworthy.
This will lead the citizens to cultivate the wrong psychological dispositions, and as a result, they
will mistake what is good for bad and bad for good.20
18 To be clear, I do not think that what is at stake is whether or not Plato’s ethical theory can exist apart from
the Forms. On the “ethical reading,” the Form of the Good still provides the metaphysical grounds for good actions.
Furthermore, on the “ethical reading,” the philosophers are still in a better state than the non-philosophers insofar as
they understand why actions are wrong.
19 Page (1991, p. 9) takes to this show that the “biggest things” (τὰ μέγιστα) have to do with the cosmic
order that “dwarf the specifically human.” However, this interpretation misses the point of the passage, which is
primarily about education. Plato is concerned that because humans admire the gods, humans will want to behave like
them. Hence, if humans hear that the gods act unjustly, humans will act unjustly. This is why these stories deal with
the most important things. Cf. 377a-b, 378a-b, 380b-c, 381e, 386a-c, 388b-d, 389d-e, and 391e.
20 At 377d-e, Socrates condemns these stories saying that they “create a bad image of what the gods and
heroes are like, just as a painter might paint a picture that is not at all like the things he is trying to paint.” One might
take this to demonstrate that Socrates’ criticism is not that these stories cause harmful dispositions, but that they are
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This worry is echoed in Socrates’ criticism of the poets in Book III:
Because I think we’ll say that what poets and prose-writers tell us about the most
important matters concerning human beings (περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα) is bad.
They say that many unjust people are happy and many just ones wretched, that
injustice is profitable if it escapes detection, and that justice is another’s good, but
one’s own loss. I think we’ll prohibit these stories and order the poets to compose
the opposite kind of poetry and tell the opposite kind of tales (392b1-6).
In this passage, the most important matters concerning human beings are explained in terms of
how justice relates to happiness. It is dangerous if the citizens are taught that justice leads to
unhappiness and that injustice leads to happiness. Stories like this will mislead citizens about what
is good and bad, thereby leading them to cultivate bad psychological dispositions.
Hence, in the passages that surround 382a-d, “the most important things” (τὰ μέγιστα) are
ethical matters.21 However, what reason do we have for thinking that “the most important things”
(τὰ μέγιστα) are “the most authoritative things” (τὰ κυριώτατα)? The gap between τὰ μέγιστα and
τὰ κυριώτατα is bridged in Book III. Having just discussed the types of music and poetry that are
beneficial for education, Socrates asserts that music and poetry constitute the most authoritative
(κυριωτάτη) education because it can affect one’s psychology in the greatest way (401d-e). Music
and poetry do this in two ways: First, because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the
soul more than anything else, they can affect it in the strongest way. Second, a proper education in
music and poetry will give one the ability to recognize what is fine and good, even if one does not

simply inaccurate. However, 377e-378a reveals that this cannot be the case, because even if these stories were true,
they “should be passed over in silence and not told to foolish and young people.” This passage will be discussed in
greater detail in section four.
21 Cf. Laws 890b.
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yet understand the reason why these things are fine and good (401d-402b).22 Thus, music and
poetry constitute the most authoritative form of education because a proper education in music and
poetry supplies one with the basic psychological dispositions necessary for living well.23 This was
the same reason why the stories at II.377e6-7 and III.392b1-6 are the most important—they
concern fundamental ethical issues about how to live. Therefore, I hold that the most authoritative
things concern ethical facts about how to live. This is not a revisionary perspective, for it is just
the kind of thing we see in Plato’s early dialogues. For example, in the Apology, Socrates tells us
that he has spent his life trying to persuade others that their primary concern in life should be the
condition of their soul and whether it is good or not.24

b. The Forms
As I previously mentioned, an alternative interpretation is that the most authoritative things are
metaphysical or philosophical things, such as the Forms. Hence, on this reading true falsehoods
are false beliefs about these metaphysical things. Before I object to this position, I should note that
this view has some plausibility. The most worked out defenses of such a position is found in both
David Simpson’s (2007) and Raphael Woolf’s (2009) respective work.25 They point out that in
Book VI, Socrates maintains that “the most important” (ὁ μέγιστος) subject of learning is the Form
of the Good (503e-505a). Additionally, in Book VII, Socrates describes the Form of the Good as
having authority (κύριον) in the intelligible realm and providing truth and understanding (517c).
This provides some evidence for thinking of the Forms as the most authoritative things.

22 This aspect of education will be discussed in more detail later in section five of this chapter.
23 Cf. 546d.
24 Cf. especially Apol. 22d, 28a, 30a-b; Gorg. 521d-522e. We also see this line of thought in Plato's Middle
and Late dialogues, cf. Soph. 230e; Stat. 302b, 308b; Laws 689a-c, 731c3-7.
25 See also De Chiara-Quenzer (1994, p. 34).
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Additionally, Plato makes it clear in the Republic that understanding the Forms is evaluatively
more important than possessing mere true beliefs about basic facts. This interpretation has a clear
explanation for why this is the case—the Forms are the most authoritative things. Moreover, at
382b1-5, Socrates says that true falsehoods are about “the things that are” (περὶ τὰ ὄντα) and later
in the Republic (Books V-VII), Plato argues that “the things that are” are the Forms. Hence, one
could take this as evidence that Plato is talking about the Forms at 382b1-5.
Nevertheless, this interpretation faces three serious problems. First, the fact that Socrates
describes the Form of the Good as “important” or as an “authority” does not vindicate the Forms
interpretation over the ethics interpretation because the Form of the Good is highly relevant to
particular ethical matters. In other words, these passages can also support the reading that the most
authoritative things are ethical facts concerning how to live.
Second, at 382b1-5, Socrates emphasizes that he is not saying anything σεμνὸν when
discussing true falsehoods. The Greek word σεμνὸν means holy, profound, or majestic, and it is
often used to describe the gods and other divine things.26 This poses a significant problem for
reading “the most authoritative things” as the Forms, because Plato describes the Forms as divine.
For example, in Book VI, Socrates explains that “by consorting with what is ordered and divine
(θείῳ)” the philosopher “becomes as divine (θεῖος) and ordered as a human can be” (500c9-d2). I
take it to be uncontroversial that the ordered and divine things that the philosopher is consorting
with are the Forms. After all, a few lines later Socrates describes the study of the Form of the Good
as the most important subject for philosophers (503e-505a).27 Additionally, in Book VII, Socrates

26 See the LSJ entry. Plato sometimes uses σεμνὸς and its cognates to refer to holy things, cf. Crito 51a9,
Soph. 249a1, Stat. 290d8, 290e7; Laws 663d2. Plato also uses this term to express (sometimes ironically) that
something is worthy of esteem; cf. Crat. 392a1; Theaet. 150a3, 203e9; Phileb. 53d6; Sym. 199a3; Phaedrus 258a6;
Euthyd. 279a6, 303c8; Gorg. 502b1, 511c5; Rep. 475b1; Menex. 235b2; Laws 814e4.
27 Cf. Phaedo 80a-b.
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explains that once out of the cave, the philosopher is able to look at divine images of the things
that are (i.e., the Forms) (532c). Now because the Forms are divine, and divine things are σεμνὸν,
it follows that the Forms are σεμνὸν. This poses a serious problem for this interpretation because
at 382b1-5, Socrates makes it clear that in talking about true falsehoods he is not saying anything
σεμνὸν.
Now one might object by arguing that when Socrates tells Adeimantus that he is not saying
anything σεμνὸν, Socrates is not referring to the quality or property of true falsehoods. Rather,
Socrates is simply telling Adeimantus that he is overthinking his explanation of true falsehoods.
In other words, true falsehoods might be false beliefs about things that are holy or majestic, but it
does not follow from this that one’s explanation of true falsehoods is profound or deep.28
In response to this objection I should point out that if Socrates is talking about the Forms
at 382a-d, then his explanation of true falsehoods is even more elusive and cryptic than it first
appears. This is because 382a-d is sandwiched between discussions which are primarily about
education and not about metaphysics. Thus, if Socrates is sneaking in complex metaphysical
ideas—ideas that are not explained until much later in the text—then he should have asked
Adeimantus to think harder because he is, in fact, saying something quite profound. This is
powerful evidence against reading “the things that are” (τὰ ὄντα) at 382b1-5 as the Forms.29
Third, and most importantly, if true falsehoods are false beliefs about metaphysical things,
such as the Forms, then it follows that it is always harmful to possess false beliefs about the nature
of reality. Now, assuming that the symmetry thesis is true, if it is always harmful to possess false
beliefs about the nature of reality, then it is always harmful to lie about the nature of reality. The

28 I thank Tyler Paytas for raising this objection.
29 One might push back and say that Socrates is merely being ironic in an attempt to win Adeimantus'
sympathy. I believe, however, that this makes for a weaker and less interesting interpretation and that it is far more
interesting as a matter of interpretative method to take Socrates at his word.
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problem with interpreting true falsehoods as false beliefs about the Forms is that in the “allegory
of the cave” philosophers lie to the non-philosophers about the nature of reality. For instance,
Socrates explains that disastrous social results could ensue if the non-philosopher were told that
the sights and sounds were not real:
Soc.: Wouldn’t it be said of him [viz., the philosopher] that he’d returned from his
upward journey with his eyesight ruined and that it isn’t worthwhile even to try to
travel upward? And, as for anyone who tried to free them [viz., the nonphilosophers] and lead them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him,
wouldn’t they kill him?
Glau.: They certainly would (517a3-7).
One lesson to draw from this passage is that philosophers should not attempt to teach nonphilosophers about the Forms. The non-philosophers do not have the intellectual capacity nor the
proper education to understand the Forms. If a philosopher attempts to teach a non-philosopher
about the Forms, the non-philosopher would likely think that the philosopher was foolish and that
his nonsense teachings are dangerous to the city.30 Hence, it is best if philosophers do not attempt
to disrupt the non-philosophers’ mistaken beliefs about nature of reality by telling them the truth.
If the philosophers are to guide society, they have to do it by telling falsehoods, and some of the
falsehoods will be about the nature of reality—and these false beliefs will benefit the nonphilosophers.
This is a point which Woolf (2009, p. 21) fails to see; for instance, he says, “That someone
is not philosophical, by contrast, makes it not bad but pointless to impart certain truths, namely the

30 One might object that at 480a the non-philosophers are not supposed to be angry at the philosophers when
they speak the truth. However, 480a does not actually say this. The passage only says that if non-philosophers take
Socrates' advice they should not be angry in being called lovers of opinions rather than philosophers.
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philosophical ones; for they could not be grasped by such a person.” I disagree, 517a3-7 suggests
that it is bad to try to communicate these truths, but it does not suggest that it is pointless. One of
the upshots of this is that sometimes we ought not to tell the truth even when it is about divine
things, such as the Forms. That is, sometimes we should not be gadflies (cf. Apology 30e).
One might object by arguing that although philosophers are not telling non-philosophers
the truth about the Forms or the nature of reality, it is not the case that they are straightforwardly
lying to them about the Forms and reality. For example, if philosophers fail to tell non-philosophers
the whole truth about reality, does it follow that they are lying about reality? By my lights this
seems to be a paradigm example of lying.31 After all, philosophers are intentionally causing nonphilosophers to have and to continue to have false beliefs about facts which they know. However,
a full discussion of what exactly constitutes a lie will lead us too far astray; what is essential for
the purposes of this chapter is that philosophers make false verbal assertions that produce and
sustain false beliefs about the nature of reality in non-philosophers, and these false assertions
produce a better outcome than if philosophers were to tell the truth about these things.
Independent of my arguments against the Forms reading, one might find it odd that on my
reading “the things that are” at 382b refers to ethical facts about how to live. One might wonder
why Socrates is using descriptive language to refer to normative content.32 Admittedly, Socrates’
use of “the things that are” at 382b is strange. Nevertheless, it is possible to use descriptive
language to talk about normative matters. Suppose, for instance, that the world is such that one
ought to instantiate and promote goodness. Now suppose that it is also a fact of the world that
certain dispositions and actions instantiate and promote goodness. If this is true, then there is a set
of possible actions and dispositions that instantiate and promote goodness, and it is possible to be

31 See for instance Mahon (2007, pp. 189-90).
32 I thank an anonymous referee at Classical Philology for raising this interesting objection.
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ignorant about this set of things. Consider a simple example. When I was a child, my father used
to tell me that I ought to clean my room and that this is “just the way things are.” In saying that
this is “just the way things are,” my father was using a descriptive claim about the facts of the
world to make the normative claim that I ought to clean my room. Moreover, my reluctance about
cleaning my room points to me being ignorant about “the way things are,” according to my father.33

4. Ethical Beliefs
In the previous section, I argued that it is better to interpret the most authoritative things as ethical
matters rather than as philosophical or metaphysical things. However, we might wonder if all
ethical beliefs count as being about “the most authoritative things” or if it is a particular subset. It
will be helpful to begin by distinguishing between two types of ethical beliefs: “normative
commitments” and “justifications.” Normative commitments are beliefs about how one should live
and what one should pursue, while justifications are beliefs about why certain normative
commitments should be held. For example, suppose that agent A judges that she should φ for
reason R. The justificatory belief is R, while the normative commitment is A’s judgment that she
should φ. Notice that it is possible for A to judge correctly that she should φ and for her justificatory
belief, R, to be false.34
In what follows, I argue that true falsehoods are false normative commitments. I defend

33 To be clear, I am not saying that one can derive an “ought” from an “is.” I am merely saying that one can
describe an “ought” as an “is.”
34 We can further subdivide these ethical beliefs. For instance, justificatory beliefs can be divided into
cognitive states with metaethical content and cognitive states without metaphysical content. For example, A might
believe that she should φ because this it promotes the greatest amount of happiness, or A might believe that she should
φ because it instantiates the Form of the Good. Notice, that the latter involves more robust metaphysical commitments
than the former. This distinction is not relevant for the purposes of this chapter. Additionally, we can further
distinguish between general ethical commitments concerning how one should behave and ethical particulars about
how one should act at a very specific moment. The useful false beliefs that I discuss in this section fit the former kind
of ethical belief better. I thank an anonymous referee at Classical Philology for clarifying this issue.
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this claim by examining three beneficial false beliefs in the Republic. I should note, however, that
I am not arguing that Plato explicitly makes this distinction. Rather, my point is that by analyzing
various passages in the Republic, we can find this distinction in play.
The first example occurs in Book II at 377e-378a. Socrates asserts that stories about the
gods acting unjustly tell the greatest falsehood about the most important things. Following this,
Socrates says, “But even if it were true,35 it should be passed over in silence and not told to foolish
and young people” (378a2-4). 36 In this passage, Socrates is explicitly stating that even if it were
true that the gods acted unjustly, people should not be told this (except in extreme circumstances).
The context of the passage implies that the citizens should be told stories in which the gods always
act justly, even if these stories are completely false.37
Socrates is willing to sacrifice the truth about the gods because he recognizes that the
stories people hear about the gods, influence the normative commitments people draw.38 We can
represent this belief-formation process with the following model:
A Reasons that:
B1) I should emulate the gods.
B2) The gods φ.
NC) I should φ.
Now provided that the citizens form normative commitments in this way, Socrates is

35 It is clear from the context that Socrates does not think that it is true. Cf. Laws 941b-c.
36 Grube/Reeve translate ἄφρονάς τε και νέους as “foolish young people.” I agree with Woolf (2009, p. 12,
n. 8) that this passage should be translated as “foolish and young people.” Plato explicitly includes adults in his
discussion of music and poetry, cf. 378c6-d2, 380c1-2, and 387b4.
37 Strictly speaking, Socrates does not actually say that they should be told a falsehood. He only says that
they should not be told the truth. However, it can be inferred from the context that they will be told a falsehood about
this.
38 Cf. 377a-b, 378a-b, and 380b-c. Additionally, notice the similarity with the Euthyphro; Euthyphro makes
all sorts of normative mistakes because of the stories he has heard about the gods. I thank G. Fay Edwards for
reminding me of this.
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concerned that if it were the case that the gods acted unjustly and people knew this fact, people
would form the false normative commitment that they should act unjustly. We can represent
Socrates’ concern as follows:
A Reasons that:
B1) I should emulate the gods. (False)39
B2) The gods act unjustly. (True)
NC) I should act unjustly. (False)
Hence, because of this worry, even if it were true that the gods acted unjustly, the citizens
should be told the falsehood that the gods never act unjustly. This false belief about the gods is
beneficial because it will produce the true normative commitment that they should always act
justly. This can be represented as follows:
1. Falsehoods about the gods
A Reasons that:
B1) I should emulate the gods. (False)
B2) The gods always act justly. (False)
NC) I should always act justly. (True)
The false justificatory belief in this example is that one should always act justly because
the gods always act justly.40 However, Socrates is tolerant of this false belief because it will lead
people to act rightly by giving them a true normative commitment. This suggests that Socrates is
tolerant of false justifications when they produce true normative commitments.
The second example comes right after the first. Socrates asserts that he does not want the

39 Belief (1) is false because if the gods act unjustly, it is not the case that people should emulate the gods in
this way.
40 Again, it is important to keep in mind that Plato does not actually think that the gods act unjustly, he is
merely arguing that if it were the case, then people should not be told the truth.

29

citizens told stories about the gods hating and warring with one another because this will make the
citizens think that this behavior is appropriate. Because of this, Socrates proposes that the poets
adopt new stories:
But if we’re to persuade our people that no citizen has ever hated another and that
it’s impious to do so, then that’s what should be told to children from the beginning
by old men and women; and as these children grow older, poets should be
compelled to tell them the same sort of thing (II.378c6-d3).
Socrates recognizes that people imitate behaviors that they take to be ordinary or normal
(378b). If people are told stories about citizens never hating one another, they will think that it is
abnormal to hate a fellow citizen, and this will lead them to judge that such behavior is
inappropriate. We can represent the structure of the belief-formation process as follows:
A Reasons that:
B1) I should act in ways that are ordinary, and should not act in ways that are not
ordinary.
B2) It is not ordinary to φ.
NC) I should not φ.
We can represent the beliefs that this story produces and sustains with the following
model:
2. Educative Falsehoods
A Reasons that:
B1) I should act in ways that are ordinary and should not act in ways that are not
ordinary. (False)
B2) No citizen has ever hated a fellow citizen. That is, it is ordinary for citizens
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not to hate one another, and it is not ordinary for them to hate one another. (False)
NC) I should not hate my fellow citizens. (True)
Although B1 and B2 are false, they play an instrumental role in producing the true
normative commitment that citizens should not hate each other. Moreover, it is important to note
that B2 does a better job at producing this true normative commitment than if people were told the
truth about human behavior. For instance, imagine that the citizens were told: “Although it is
impious to hate one another, this behavior is not that uncommon, for it is actually quite ordinary
for humans to fight with each other.” Provided that people formulate normative commitments
based upon what is deemed ordinary or normal, such stories would lead citizens to the conclusion
that it is permissible to sometimes hate one another.41
The third example is the infamous noble lie (414d-415c).42 In Book III, Socrates and
Glaucon agree that in order to create the appropriate structure for their utopian city they need a
creation story upon which to found the city. The citizens will be told that everything up until this
point has been a dream43 and that while they were dreaming, their real selves were being created

41This demonstrates just how perceptive Plato is when it comes to human psychology. Today, psychologists
are finding that the best way to change people’s behavior towards the environment is to tell them how their peers
behave in such situations. For instance, Goldstein et al. (2008) found that the best way to reduce the number of towels
used by guests in a hotel was not to tell them that reusing towels helps the environment and that not reusing them
harms the environment. Rather, it was more effective to tell guests that the majority of other guests in the hotel reused
their towels.
42There is an interesting question as to how Plato’s attitude towards truth and falsehood in the Republic is
similar and different to his attitude in the Laws. Schofield (2007, pp. 161-162) suggests that it is quite similar to the
extent that Laws 663d-664a seems to endorse something like “noble lies.” Recently, David Lay Williams (2013)
argues that, unlike the Republic, the Laws does not endorse beneficial lies; cf. Laws 730c. Although I believe Williams’
argument is interesting, I ultimately think that Plato endorses the use of noble lies in the Laws in much the same way
as he does in the Republic. That is, in the Laws like the Republic, Plato is willing to tolerate falsehoods insofar as they
do not mislead about the most authoritative things. Additionally, because Plato is less obviously concerned with the
Forms in the Laws, a strong case can be made for the claim that the most authoritative things in the Laws do not
concern the Forms, but concern normative commitments.
43 Lear (2006, p. 32-3) insightfully points out how this aspect of the noble lie is epistemically revolutionary
in the sense that it tells one that everything up until this point has been a dream. However, Lear (p. 33-4) mistakenly
thinks that this aspect of the noble lie will teach citizens to recognize allegory as allegory. This, however, is an
overinterpretation; this aspect of the noble lie is simply intended to erase the other myths so that the founders of the
city can instill new myths.
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and nurtured inside the earth, who is their mother, thus making them all related.44 Despite the fact
that all citizens are related, different citizens have different metals in their soul: some gold, some
silver, some bronze, some iron, and some brass. The myth serves two fundamental purposes: First,
it unifies the city by making the citizens think that they are all related. Second, it divides the city
by putting the citizens into distinct classes.45 The unifying aspect benefits the citizens by
facilitating harmonious relations amongst them. Additionally, it gives the auxiliaries and the ruling
class a personal reason to care about the well-being of the producers, which in turn, prevents the
auxiliaries from bullying the weaker citizens (416a-b). The dividing aspect of the myth provides
the members of different classes with an explanation for why members of different classes have
different lifestyles and different political obligations.
Because there are two different aspects of the noble lie, I shall analyze each aspect
separately. The unifying aspect develops or sustains the following three beliefs:
3. Unifying Aspect of the Noble Lie
A Reasons that:
B1) I should care for my relatives. (True)
B2) All citizens are related to one another. (False)
NC) I should care for my fellow citizens. (True)
Socrates is cleverly playing off the natural belief that people should care for their relatives.
Hence, by making the citizens falsely believe that they are all relatives, the citizens are led to the
true normative commitment that they should care for their fellow citizens.

44 Essentially, the rulers are inserting a false memory in the citizens. Surprisingly there is some empirical
evidence that inserting false memories can be beneficial. For instance, Clifasefi et al. (2013) found that giving
alcoholics the false memory that they had a horrible experience while drinking reduced their overall level of alcohol
consumption.
45 For an interesting discussion of these ideas see Schofield (2009), (2007); Bloom (1991, pp 365-367).
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The separating feature of the noble lie has a similar structure. This aspect produces and
sustains the following beliefs:
4. Dividing Aspect of Noble Lie
A Reasons that:
B1) Some citizens have different metals in their soul. (False)
B2) People with different metal in their soul are suited to different tasks, such that
people with metal γ should φ. (False)
B3) I have γ. (False)
NC) I should φ. (True)
Beliefs 1-3 provide the relevant background and justification for the true normative
commitment.
Each of these examples has roughly the same structure. 46 The citizens are given false
justifications in order to produce and sustain true normative commitments.47 This suggests that the
most authoritative things are normative in nature and that true falsehoods are false normative
commitments.48 Interpreting true falsehoods in this way provides a clear explanation for why true
falsehoods are always hated by gods and humans. In Book IV, Plato equates justice to
psychological health (444d-445b). He maintains that just actions create and sustain psychological
health, while unjust actions produce psychological disharmony. Thus, true falsehoods are
pernicious because normative commitments are inextricably tied to one’s well-being. For example,

46 The other beneficial false beliefs in the Kallipolis have the same structure as well. For example see
Socrates' discussion of the communal living arrangements (416e-417b) and the rigged sexual lottery (459d-460c). I'm
leaving these examples out merely to avoid unnecessary repetition.
47 Notice how this is suggested at 382c6-10: “Isn't it useful against one's enemies and one's so called friends,
when they are attempting, through madness or ignorance, to do something bad, doesn't it then become as a useful drug
for preventing them?”
48 This aspect of my interpretation has some affinities with Page's (1993, p. 17) reading: “Only if lying did
nothing else but frustrate normal human access to the truths required for good action could it be intrinsically
objectionable.”
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if A has a false normative commitment (i.e., a true falsehood), her false belief is going to lead her
to act wrongly, and this is going to harm her well-being. Therefore, because A’s well-being is tied
to the ethical quality of her actions, it is the greatest error for A to be mistaken about how she
should live. However, it is much less concerning if A is mistaken about why she should perform
an action, as long as the action she is performing is appropriate.

5. The Primacy of the Practical
I have argued that Socrates is tolerant of false justificatory beliefs, but intolerant of false normative
commitments. The upshot of this interpretation is that practical considerations have a kind of
primacy over theoretical concerns.49 To see this, let us reexamine why Socrates considers music
and poetry to be the most authoritative form of education. As I previously discussed, in Book III,
Socrates argues that one reason education in music and poetry is the most authoritative is that it
allows one to grasp that something is fine and good, before one understands the reason why it is
fine and good (401d-402b). Socrates is distinguishing grasping that φ is good from understanding
why φ is good. The latter is much more theoretically complex than the former. This is why
education of the former precedes the latter and why only philosophers truly obtain an
understanding of the latter.50

49 This also undermines a traditional way of understanding the falsehoods in the Republic. Commentators
often say that the falsehoods are false on the surface, but produce deeper and theoretically robust truth. For example,
Lear (2006, pp. 31-3) argues that impure falsehood in the Republic are connected relate to the Greek word ὑπόνοια,
which means allegory, or under-thought. The idea is that the impure falsehoods are false on the surface, but have
deeper layer of truth, which they convey. In Dorter's book on the Phaedo (1982, p. 95), he offers a similar interpretation
saying, “The most famous instance of this kind of technique is the 'noble lie' of the Republic by which people are to
be made to accept the true state of affairs not by being told the truth...but by being told a lie that symbolizes the truth
and that would be easier to persuade them of. See also Ferrari (1989, p. 112); Morgan (2000, p. 164); Dorter (1982,
p. 7). Perhaps, also see: Gill (1993); Johansen (1998); Kamtekar (2006, p. 199); and Reeve (1988, pp. 209-10). My
interpretation undermines this view because I argue that the beneficial falsehoods are about complex theoretical things
and produce simple—albeit important—truths.
50 Cf. Aristotle EN I.4. 1095b3-8. For discussions see Brown (2004, p. 286); Gill (1996a, p. 200), (1996b,
pp. 240-320), and (1985, p. 273).
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With this distinction in mind, let us turn to the beneficial falsehoods in the Republic. I have
argued that Socrates is willing to tolerate false justificatory beliefs for the sake of producing true
normative commitments. Normative commitments are practical in nature because they are beliefs
about what one should pursue. For example, if A has the true belief that she should φ, then A will
act rightly (assuming, of course, that she is not akratic or ignorant of some relevant empirical fact).
In contrast, justifications are more theoretically robust because they are about the reasons why one
takes an action to be right or wrong.51 For example, if A believes that she should care for her fellow
citizens and not hate them because it leads to a harmonious society and that this is good because
harmony and unity are by their very nature good, then A has a rather complex understanding of the
ethical facts concerning this matter. However, if A merely believes that she should care for her
fellow citizens because she falsely believes that the citizens are her relatives, then A has a rather
shallow grasp of the ethical fact concerning this matter. This is because, although A grasps the that,
she misunderstands the why. Each of the beneficial falsehoods in the Republic has this same
structure: they mislead one about why something is right in order to get one to form a true belief
about the action that one should pursue. This demonstrates a way in which practical concerns have
a kind of primacy over theoretical concerns—the fact that p is false is far less important than the
fact that believing that p will get me to behave correctly, and this holds true even when that p is
about complex theoretical things, such as the Forms.52

51 Kant held that for an action to have moral worth one must understand that the action accords with moral
duty. That is, one must understand why such an action is the right action. See especially Section 1 of the Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals.
52 There is an interesting comparison with Kant's account of reason. Kant maintained that practical reason
has primacy over theoretical reason. By primacy Kant meant two things: First, if there is a conflict between the two,
practical reason overrides theoretical reason. Second, Kant maintained that theoretical reason was ultimately grounded
by practical reason, and this is ultimately why practical considerations take precedence over theoretical concerns. See
the Critique of Practical Reason Chapter 2, Section 3. For Plato, practical considerations have the former kind of
primacy, but not the latter.
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CHAPTER TWO
Philosopher Rulers and False Beliefs

“Something might be true while being harmful and dangerous in the highest degree.
Indeed, it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know
it completely would perish, in which case the strength of a spirit should be measured
according to how much of the ‘truth’ one could still barely endure—or to put it
more clearly, to what degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded,
sweetened, falsified” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 2.39).

1. Introduction
In chapter one, I analyzed what kinds of false beliefs are beneficial in the Republic; in this chapter,
I examine who in the Kallipolis believes these beneficial falsehoods. Do only the less educated
citizens believe the falsehoods? Or, do the sophisticated philosopher rulers also believe these
falsehoods? This question is important because if only the non-philosophers benefit from having
false beliefs than the first chapter does little to undermine Nietzsche’s interpretation of Plato. After
all, Nietzsche’s point is that Plato thought that philosophers themselves undervalue falsehood and
overvalue truth. Thus, if I can show that the philosophers in the Kallipolis do, in fact, benefit from
holding false beliefs, then Nietzsche’s reading of Plato is dealt a serious interpretive blow. In this
chapter, I challenge Nietzsche’s interpretation by arguing that Plato’s theory of education and
moral psychology demonstrate that the philosophers of the Kallipolis believe the noble lie.1

1 I am focusing on the noble lie because it seems obvious that the philosopher rulers will not believe all of
the falsehoods in the city. For instance, because the rulers will be running the “rigged sexual lottery” they will not
believe that it is a random lottery (V.459d-460c).

Moreover, I argue that these false beliefs have positive ethical value because they motivate the
non-reasoning part towards virtuous activity and without these false beliefs the philosopher’s soul
will lack harmony.
In doing this, I aim to undermine a traditional view of the noble lie in which is viewed as
fundamentally a device for educating the non-philosophers in the Kallipolis. On this reading, the
elite and sophisticated philosopher rulers lie to the non-philosophers, who are unable to fully grasp
the truth; such lies help motivate the non-philosophers towards virtuous activity and the promotion
of the common good.2 Hence, according to many scholars, the falsehoods of the noble lie play no
role in motivating fully accomplished adult philosophers towards virtue. The motivation for this
view is that it would seem strange that the wisest citizens, who have knowledge of the Forms,
believe something as far-fetched as the myth of the metals.3

2. The Noble Lie and the Received View
In Book III of the Republic, Socrates asks Glaucon how they might devise (μηχανὴ)4 one noble lie
(γενναῖοv ψεῦδος)5 that would “in the best case, persuade even the rulers” (III.414b9-c2).6 Socrates

2 Examples of this view or something close to it are found in: Adam (1963, ad loc. III.415d); Annas (1981,
p. 108); Crossman (1963); Dodds (1951, chap. 7); Dombrowski (1997); Grote (2010/1865); Popper (1963, esp. chap.
8); Reeve (1988, chap. 4); Schofield (2009), (2007).
3 For instance, Williams (2013, p. 313, n. 51) raises the question: “A trickier question is why Socrates
suggests that the myth should also be told to the rulers (Republic 414b, 414d). To be sure, he is unclear whether or not
they can be similarly misled...It is possible—and maybe even likely—that Plato simply thinks that the myth is likely
to take hold among the masses if the rulers also believe it. There would be no ‘leaks’ of the truth and less possibility
of it ever being revealed as fiction. But again, the effectiveness of the myth does not seem logically contingent upon
persuading the rulers, and Plato is dubious about the likelihood of their believing it.”
4 Cf. III.415c, Laws I.640b, II.664a, VI.752c, VI.769e, VII.798b.
5 The Greek word ψεῦδος is ambiguous between lie, falsehood, and fiction. I shall use the expression “noble
lie” because parts of the “noble lie” are false and the founders of the city in speech (i.e. Socrates, Adeimantus, and
Glaucon) do not believe this story as a literal truth. Also, scholars disagree about the Socrates’ use of “noble.” For
instance, Page (1991, p. 21) asserts that it refers to being of “impeccable origins,” while Schofield (2007, p. 138)
maintains that it refers to the massiveness of the lie. I side with Page (1991) on this issue; however, this issue is of
minor relevance to the purposes of this chapter.
6 Socrates is making a clear reference back to his earlier discussions of lying at II.382a-d and III.389b; also
see Socrates' discussion with Cephalus at I.331b-d. Note that at III.414d2-4 Socrates repeats again that he wants
everyone in the city to be persuaded of the noble lie. This will be discussed below.
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has in mind telling a Phoenician story,7 which describes both the origins of the city and the
psychological nature of the citizens. Socrates explains that he will “first try to persuade the rulers
and the soldiers and then the rest of the city” that their upbringing, education and experiences
“were a sort of dream” (III.414d2-4).8 He will tell them that while they were dreaming, they
themselves, their weapons, and their tools were really being developed and nurtured inside the
Earth and that “when the work was completed, the Earth, who is their mother, delivered all of them
up into the world” (III.414e1-3). Additionally, he will tell them that different citizens are born with
different metal in their soul.9 The type of metal a citizen has in her soul determines her political
obligations (III.415a). For instance, those born with gold should become rulers, those born with
silver should become auxiliaries, and those with bronze, iron, and brass should become farmers
and craftspeople (III.415a). Socrates concludes the noble lie by conveying that the ultimate
purpose of it is to make the citizens “care more for the city and each other” (III.415d3-4).
Essentially, there are three aspects to the noble lie. First, the noble lie attempts to cause an
epistemic revolution in its citizens by telling them that their memories and experiences where
really just a dream.10 The hope is that in doing this, the citizens will reject the things that they
previously learned, and thus will be primed to absorb the content of the noble lie.
Second, the noble lie unifies the entire city by telling citizens that they are all kin.11 For
instance, after Socrates explains that the citizens are born from the same mother he says,

7 The noble lie is referencing the story in which Thebans are sprung from Cadmus, a Phoenician, sowing a
serpent’s teeth. Cf. Apollod. III.4.1, Laws II.663c-664c.
8 Essentially, the founders and rulers are inserting a false memory in the citizens. Surprisingly there is some
empirical evidence that inserting false memories can be beneficial. For instance, Clifasefi et al. (2013) found that
giving alcoholics the false memory that they had a horrible experience while drinking reduced their overall level of
alcohol consumption.
9 This aspect of the noble lie is referencing Hesiod's Works and Days (109-201) five ages of humanity.
10 Lear (2006, pp. 32-34) argues that this aspect of the noble lie gives the citizens the ability to distinguish
allegory from fact. This seems to be an overinterpretation; this aspect of the noble lie is simply intended to erase the
other myths so that the founders of the city can instill new myths.
11 See Schofield (2009), (2007); Bloom (1991, pp. 365-7).
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“Therefore, if anyone attacks the land in which they live, they must plan on its behalf and defend
it as their mother and nurse and think of the other citizens as their earthborn brothers” (III.414e36). Not only does such a story help unite citizens against external threats, it prevents internal
infighting by giving the auxiliaries and the ruling class a personal reason to care about the wellbeing of the producers by making them believe that the producers are their family. In turn, this will
prevent the auxiliaries from bullying the physically weaker citizens and the rulers from taking
advantage of the intellectually inferior citizens (III.416a-b).
Further evidence for this interpretation is found in a passage that occurs just before the
noble lie is introduced:
Mustn’t they [viz., the rulers] care for the city?...Now one cares most for what one
loves...and someone loves something most of all when he believes that the same
things are advantageous to it as to himself and supposes that if it does well, he’ll do
well, and that if it does badly, then he’ll do badly too (III.412c13-d7).
The location of this passage strongly suggests that the noble lie is a device (III.414b) for
getting the rulers to care for the city (III.415d) and it does this by giving the rulers a reason to love
and identify with all the citizens. The importance of civic unity is reiterated in Book V when
Socrates says:
Is there any greater evil we can mention for a city than that which tears it apart and
makes it many instead of one? Or any greater good than that which binds it together
and makes it one? (V.462a9-b2)
Glau.: There isn’t (V.462b3)
Soc.: And when, as far as possible, all the citizens rejoice and are pained by
the same success and failures, doesn’t this sharing of pleasures and pains bind the
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city together? (V.462b4-6).
This unifying aspect of the noble lie works by instilling the following beliefs in its citizens,
such that when citizen, C, hears the noble lie she forms something like the following beliefs:
Unifying Aspect of the Noble Lie
C Reasons that:
U1) I should care for my relatives. (True)
U2) All citizens share the same mother and thus are all related to one another.
(False)
UC) Therefore, I should care for all my fellow citizens. (True)
Socrates is cleverly playing off the natural belief that people should care for their relatives. Hence,
by making the citizens falsely believe that they are all relatives, the citizens are lead to the true
normative conclusion that they should care for their fellow citizens.
Third, the noble lie divides the city into different classes, but it does this in such a way that
harmony can be sustained amongst the different classes.12 It accomplishes this by providing an
explanation for why different citizens have different political obligations and lifestyles. The idea
is that such an explanation will lead the citizens to believe that their place in the city is not some
arbitrary function of history, but reflects their true nature crafted by the gods; the hope being that
this justification for the class system will reduce the likelihood that citizens question the political
structure of the city and resent individuals from different classes.
Hence, when a citizen, C, hears the noble lie she forms something like the following beliefs:

12 See Schofield (2009), (2007); Bloom (1991, pp. 365-7).
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Dividing Aspect of Noble Lie
C Reasons that:
D1) Some citizens have different metal in their soul. (False)
D2) People with different metal in their soul are suited to different tasks, such that
people with metal γ should φ. (False)
D3) I have γ. (False)
DC) I should φ. (True)
Beliefs D1-D3 provide the relevant background and justification for the true normative conclusion
DC.
Despite the importance of the noble lie, both Glaucon and Socrates express doubts about
its viability.13 The worry is that this myth sounds archaic and is not the kind of thing that Socrates’
contemporaries would believe (III.414b-c). Such concerns lead Socrates to ask Glaucon if he has
any device for making the citizens believe it (III.415c), to which Glaucon replies, “I can’t see any
way to make them believe it themselves, but perhaps there is one in the case of their sons and later
generations and all the other people who come after them” (III.415d1-2). Glaucon’s point is that it
would be quite difficult to convince people who have not been raised with such stories; however,
if the noble lie could become embedded in the identity of the culture, children stand a chance of
actually believing it, and thus are more likely to believe it as adults. In order to see why exactly
Glaucon thinks this, we must turn to the discussion of early childhood education in Books II and
III.
According to Socrates, early childhood education is critical because it is during this period
that one’s psychology is “most malleable” and can take on “any pattern one wishes to impress on

13 Consider, for instance, Socrates' hesitance in telling the noble lie and Glaucon's response to hearing it
(III.414c-415d).
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it” (II.377a12-b3, cf. II.377c). It is extremely important that children are exposed to stories with
the appropriate content because this content will be impressed into their soul and greatly impact
their development of character. For instance, if children are exposed to stories which praise
injustice or cowardice, they will likely become adults who praise injustice or cowardice (II.377d378e, III.386a-388e). The danger of hearing these stories is exacerbated by the fact that “the young
can’t distinguish what is allegorical from what isn’t” (II.378d7-8). Thus, when children hear stories
about gods and heroes, they will not be able to decipher between the allegorical lesson and the
literal story being told. This is especially dangerous because “the opinions they [viz., children]
absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable”
(II.378d8-e1).14
We now have a clear explanation for why Glaucon thinks that children stand a good chance
of absorbing the noble lie, while adults do not. Children are malleable and not able to discern
allegory from the literal truth. Therefore, if children are taught the noble lie, they will believe that
it is their true history and not merely some fictional myth. In contrast, adults can decipher between
allegory and reality, and their psychological states are relatively fixed. Therefore, if an adult were
not taught the noble lie as a child, then it is unlikely that she will believe it as a literal truth during
her adulthood.15
From this, it is clear that Socrates anticipates that the guardian children will believe the
noble lie, but do the adult philosophers continue believing the noble lie? The received view is that
when guardians become philosopher rulers they no longer believe the noble lie as a literal truth,

14 This is why in Book III, Socrates describes education in music and poetry as the most authoritative form
of education—for it is this kind of education that affects one's psychology in the greatest way (III.401d-e). Cf. Aristotle
EN I.4. 1095b3-8. For a discussion see Brown (2004, p. 286); Gill (1996a, p. 200); (1996b, pp. 240-320); and (1985,
p. 273).
15 Cf. Lear (2006, pp. 32-3).

42

but believe the moral of it.16 That is, the philosophers believe that they should care for all citizens
(UC) and that different citizens are suited for different tasks (DC), but they do not actually believe
that all citizens are born from the same mother, Earth, (U2) and that different citizens are born with
different kinds of metal in their souls (D1). The idea being that when philosophers engage in
dialectic and come to have knowledge of the Forms (VII.532b-541b), they will no longer believe
such far-fetched things, such as U2 and D1; rather, these stories will operate as useful fictions that
guide their lives.
In the next section, I shall offer a preliminary objection to the received view. Ultimately, I
shall argue that this objection fails, but nevertheless is instructive in supporting a more
sophisticated argument that demonstrates that philosophers continue believing the falsehoods U2
and D1 in the non-reasoning part of their soul, and that these false beliefs produce and sustain
virtuous motivations and harmony in their soul.

3. Dyed Wool and the Bent Stick
a. Preliminary Objection
There are two passages that, on the face of it, seem to tell against the received view. First, as I
previously mentioned, Socrates explicitly says that the beliefs children absorb “are hard to erase
and apt to become unalterable” (II.378d8-e1, cf. III.401d-e, IV.425a). This, of course, does not

16 It is not difficult to find examples of the received view, but here is a sampling. Adam (1963, ad loc.
III.415d) in his excellent commentary remarks that “the Rulers of [Books] VI-VII might teach the legend as an ἐν
δέοντι ψεῦδος [a necessary falsehood], but would themselves refuse their assent.” Annas (1981, p. 108, my emphasis)
offers a similar account: “Plato seems to envisage the Guardians as eventually believing it [viz. the noble lie], so we
do not have a straight case of manipulation by them of the others; but the rulers are surely thought of as believing the
myth on a rather different level from the others. So there is, at the least, a double standard,” Lear (2006, pp. 32-4)
argues that the noble lie has “a special belated effect on the future rulers of the city...it sets them up for a later aha!
experience” in which they discover the truth about the noble lie and only believe the moral of it. For other examples
of the received view see Dodds (1951, chap. 7); Grote (2010/1865); Popper (1963, esp. chap. 8); Reeve (1988, chap.
4); Schofield (2009), (2007).
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mean that Socrates believes that adults necessarily retain all of their beliefs from childhood;
however, it does demonstrate that he thinks that the beliefs you acquire as a child are difficult to
remove.
Second, Socrates makes it clear that many of the beliefs that the guardians adopt during
their education are “dyed” so deeply into their soul that they are preserved “through everything”
(IV.429b8, IV.429c8, and IV.430b2-3). For instance, Socrates explains that just as “no amount of
washing, whether with soap or without it” can remove the dye from wool that has been properly
dyed, no amount of “pleasure, pain, fear, and desire” can remove the beliefs about what to fear and
what not to fear from the guardians that have been properly educated (IV.429c-430b)
It is clear from Socrates’ discussion of the noble lie that if there are beliefs that he wants
etched into the souls of the guardians, the noble lie is surely one of these. After all, he describes
the best case scenario as one in which philosophers are persuaded of the noble lie (III.414c1-2),
and explicitly says he wants to persuade the rulers first (III.414d2-4). Additionally, just before
Socrates introduces the noble lie in Book III, he asserts that the best guardians will be able to
maintain their conviction that “they must always do what they believe to be best for the city”
(III.413c5-7) in the face of “labors, pains, and contests” (III.413d4-5).
Consider also that Socrates says:
Like those who lead colts into noise and tumult to see if they’re afraid, we must
expose our young people to fears and pleasures, testing them more thoroughly than
gold is tested by fire. If someone is hard to put under a spell...is a good guardian of
himself and the music and poetry he has learned...then he is the best person both for
himself and for the city. Anyone who is tested in this way as a child, youth, and
adult, and always comes out of it untainted, is to be made a ruler as well as a

44

guardian (III.413d8-414a2).
Hence, the philosopher rulers will be those who maintain their convictions that they should
care for the city in the face of everything, which is exactly what Socrates takes the noble lie to be
teaching the citizens (III.415d). This suggests that the noble lie will remain with the citizens even
if they become philosopher rulers.
This objection to the received view ultimately fails, nonetheless. The problem is that these
passages only support the weaker claim that philosopher rulers do not lose their convictions
concerning the noble lie. This does not entail that they believe the noble lie as a literal truth, but
merely entails that they believe the moral of it. That is, these passages are consistent with the
philosopher rulers believing that they should care for the city and all of its members (UC), while
rejecting the claims that the Earth is actually their mother (U2) and that there is metal in their soul
(D1). Although this objection fails, it is still instructive, in order to see how, we must turn to
Socrates’ account of moral psychology in Books IV and X.

b. On the Limits of the Non-Reasoning Part of the Soul
In Book IV, Socrates divides the soul into three parts: the appetitive part, the spirited part, and the
reasoning or calculating part (λογιστικόν). Unlike the reasoning part of the soul, the appetitive part
and the spirited part are non-reasoning. Nonetheless, the non-reasoning part17 of the soul still
possesses beliefs. For instance, in Book X18 Socrates directly says, “Then the part of the soul that
forms a belief (δοξάζον) contrary to the measurements couldn’t be the same as the part that believes

17 For the remainder of the chapter, I shall speak of a non-reasoning part of the soul, however, one should
remember that the non-reasoning part of the soul has two parts: the appetitive and the spirited.
18 It is a matter of dispute as to whether the non-reasoning part of the soul discussed in Book X is the
appetitive part, the spirited part, both, or neither. For a discussion see Moss (2008) and Singpurwalla (2011). However,
the answer to this question is irrelevant for the purposes of this chapter; all that matters is that Socrates thinks that the
soul has a non-reasoning part, which has these features.
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in accord with them” (X.603a1-2). Consider also the following passage from Book IV in which
Socrates says:
We call a single individual courageous, namely, when it preserves through pains
and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t
(cf. IV.429c-d)...And we call him wise because of that part of himself that rules in
him and makes those declarations and has within it the knowledge of what is
advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the community of all
three parts...And isn’t he moderate because of the friendly and harmonious relations
between these same parts, namely, when the ruler and the ruled believe
(ὁμοδοξῶσι) in common that the rational part should rule and don’t raise faction
against it (IV.442b11-d1, my emphasis; cf. IX.574d1-575a7, X.605c1-2).19
If we take Socrates at his word, this demonstrates that the non-reasoning part of the soul is capable
of forming beliefs.20
Nevertheless, although the non-reasoning part of the soul has the capacity for beliefs, it is
clearly inferior to the reasoning part in that it can only form beliefs on the basis of appearance
whereas the reasoning part is capable of forming beliefs on the basis of rational calculation via
measuring, counting, and weighing (X.602d).21 In Book X, Socrates illustrates this with two
examples. First, consider a submerged stick. When you perceive the submerged stick, the non-

19 Plato describes the non-reasoning parts of the soul as having cognitive abilities in other dialogues as well,
see: the Phaedrus 247d-e, 248a-c, 253d-254d, 256a; the Timaeus 70a-71e. In the Phaedo, Socrates describes the body
as having cognitive abilities, see: Phaedo 65b-d, 80a, 83d, 94c-e.
20 My interpretation assumes a literal interpretation of Socrates’ claim that the non-reasoning part of the soul
can form beliefs and reason. For worked out defenses of this position see Moline (1978), Penner (1971, p. 100); Irwin
(1995, pp. 217-8); Bobonich (2002, pp. 235-45). See also to a lesser extent Klosko (1988, pp. 347-8). Opposition to
this reading has been defended by Gearson (2003, pp. 107-11); Lorenz (2004, pp. 110-11), (2006, pp. 44-8); Stalley
(2007, pp. 63-83); Wilberding (2012, pp. 132-33). Additionally, for a discussion on Socrates’ use of personification
in discussing the non-reasoning part of the soul; see Kamtekar (2006).
21 For an interesting discussion on how the various parts of the soul are unified see Brown (2012).
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reasoning part of you believes that the stick is bent (X.602c-d). However, the reasoning part of you
is not limited to forming beliefs on the basis of appearance; through calculating, measuring,
counting, and weighing, the reasoning part of you can form the belief that the submerged stick is
actually straight (X.602e-603a). Therefore, a person is not necessarily of one mind about the
submerged stick to the extent that the reasoning part can form the belief that the stick is straight,
while the non-reasoning part simultaneously believes that it is bent.
Now just as a person is not necessarily of one mind about visual perception, a person is not
necessarily of one mind about “matters of action” as well (X.603c-d). For instance, according to
Socrates, when a good and decent father loses a son, the reasoning part of him will deliberate about
what future plans he needs to implement in order to continue living in the best way possible.
Nevertheless, the non-reasoning part of the father will experience pain and suffering at the loss of
his dear son because this is how the loss unreflectively appears to him (X.603e-604d). The point
is that just as the non-reasoning part inside of you latches onto thinking that a submerged stick is
bent, the non-reasoning part inside of you latches onto thinking that the loss of a son is disastrous
and the worst thing ever. Likewise, just as the reasoning part of you can judge that the submerged
stick is straight, the reasoning part of you can judge that the loss of son is not necessarily terrible
and that it might actually be for the best.22 Hence, the reasoning part has a capacity that the nonreasoning part lacks—it can form judgments on the basis of deliberative calculation, while the
non-reasoning part cannot—it is restricted to the realm of appearance.
I am now in a position to explain why philosopher rulers must believe the noble lie as a

22 Consider what Socrates says about the death of a loved one X.604b-c: “The law says, doesn't it, that it is
best to keep as quiet as possible in misfortunes and not get excited about them? First, it isn't clear whether such things
will turn out to be good or bad in the end; second, it doesn't make the future any better to take them hard. Third, human
affairs aren't worth taking very seriously; and, finally, grief prevents the very thing we most need [viz. reflective
deliberation] in such circumstances from coming into play as quickly as possible.” Cf. Laws VII.803b.
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literal truth in the non-reasoning part of their soul. As I discussed above, the young guardians will
be taught the noble lie in such a way that it will be preserved “through everything”; presumably,
one of the central images that the noble lie stains into the guardian’s soul is that each citizen is her
true brother or sister. This belief will make the citizens appear differently—they will appear not as
some distant foreigner, but as a close and special relative (U2). When a philosopher ruler completes
her education, the reasoning part of her soul might (or might not) come to understand that the noble
lie is not a literal truth, but merely a fictional myth, and thus her fellow citizens are not really her
brothers and sisters. Nevertheless, the non-reasoning part inside of her will hold fast to the belief
that her fellow citizens are her relatives (U2) because this is how the citizens appear to it, and the
non-reasoning part is restricted to the realm of appearance.
Possessing this false belief, however, is actually a good thing because it produces unity and
harmony in the city by motivating the philosophers to love the non-philosophers (cf. V.462a9-b6).
In order to see this, let us contrast two different reasons a philosopher ruler, PR, might have for
holding UC.
PR’s Reasons for holding UC
R1) PR believes that when she cares for her fellow citizens she is caring for her
relatives. (False)
R2) PR believes that when she cares for her fellow citizens she is instantiating
goodness, harmony, and oneness. (True)
As seen in U1-UC, the unifying aspect of the noble lie provides citizens with R1, which appeals
to the natural bond and obligations that come with special relationships. In contrast, R2 appeals to
the abstract ideas of goodness, harmony, and oneness, and how these concepts relate to caring for
PR’s fellow citizens. This kind of understanding is only available to philosopher rulers because
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only they come to know the Form of the Good.23
Taking this into account, the nobleness of this false belief (U2) will become apparent;
especially if one considers the counterfactual situation in which young guardians are not given the
noble lie, but are taught the truth instead. Imagine, for instance, that young guardians are taught
that different individuals have different natural abilities, and that there is no close ancestral bond
between all citizens. These truths are likely to cause great disharmony amongst the citizens insofar
as citizens will not appear to one another as relatives. Thus, the non-reasoning part of the soul will
not form judgments, such as R1, which are conducive to having harmonious relationships amongst
citizens. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the non-reasoning part of the soul lacks the
capacity to grasp truths, such as R2, because understanding these truths involves deliberative
calculation.24
If this is right, then we have a clear explanation for why Socrates considers it so important
that the philosopher rulers are persuaded of the noble lie (cf. III.414b-c, III.414d). The nonreasoning part of the soul is too cognitively limited to respond positively to certain kinds of
reasons, such as R2. Thus, in order to motivate the non-reasoning part of the soul towards virtuous
activity, it must be given cruder types of reasons, such as R1. Therefore, without the noble lie, the
non-reasoning part of the soul would not be motivated towards virtuous activity and as a result
one’s soul would lack harmony and the city would suffer as a result of this.25
This might point to why Socrates believes that it is so dangerous for the young to train in
dialectic. If young guardians are trained in dialectic before the non-reasoning part of their soul

23 I am making an assumption about what knowledge of the Forms is like; nevertheless, I take what I am
saying here to be in line with what many others have said; see: Brown (2004, p. 287); Cooper (1999a, p. 144); Irwin
(1995, pp. 272-3); Fine (1999, p. 228); Annas (1981, p. 108); Burnyeat (2000).
24 For instance, in order for a philosopher ruler, PR, to grasp R2, she has to understand the abstract concepts
of goodness, harmony, and oneness, and understand how particular activities relate to these concepts.
25 Edelstein (1949) offers a similar argument with respect to Plato’s ethical myths about the fate of the soul
in the afterlife.
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forms stable dispositions with respect to their fellow citizens, they might not accept the noble lie,
and in virtue of this, will not develop the appropriate beliefs, desires, and motivational states with
respect to their fellow citizens. Socrates gestures at this in Book VII when he asks Glaucon to
imagine a young boy, who unbeknownst to him, is not being raised by his biological parents. The
boy is surrounded by all sorts of flatterers and wealth; nevertheless the boy gives no thought to
these things, but instead honors, obeys, and cares for his mother and father. However, if the boy
were to somehow discover that the people raising him were not his true biological parents, he
would reject the values that they have been teaching him and would honor, obey, and care for the
flatterers instead of them (VII.537e-538e). The lesson is that one should not come to dialectical
training until certain dispositions and beliefs are stable, and thus will not be challenged under the
scrutiny of dialectic.
Now although Socrates does not explicitly connect the story about the boy to the noble lie
the connection seems clear enough. When the boy discovers that the people raising him are not, in
fact, his parents, he no longer cares for them. Likewise, if a child were to discover that the noble
lie is not literally true, he would no longer care for his fellow citizens because he would no longer
view them as his sisters and brothers. What this points to is that there is a gap in the lives of
philosophers that knowledge of the Forms cannot fill—philosophers are deprived of traditional
families (III.412-IV.421c, V.457b-471c)—the noble lie fills this gap by making the non-reasoning
part of their soul believe that the entire city is their family.26

26 In the “Allegory of the Cave” Socrates asserts that once the philosophers leave the Cave, they have to be
persuaded (πείθω) and compelled (ἀναγκάζω) to return to the Cave (VI.500d4-8, VII.519e4, VII.520a8, VII.520e2,
VII.521b7, VII.539e3, VII.540b5). Socrates, however, does not explain the means by which the rulers will be
persuaded. I suggest that this might take the form of reminding them that the entire city is their family; cf. Schofield
(2007), (2009). For fuller discussions on the “return to the cave,” see Brown (2004), (2000), and Kraut (1999).
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c. False Beliefs in the Reasoning Part?
I have argued that the non-reasoning part of the philosopher rulers believe the noble lie as a literal
truth and that this is required in order to have virtuous motivations and a harmonious soul. This
undermines the received view, or at the very least, it demonstrates that the tradition has
underappreciated how the falsehoods of the noble lie benefit the non-reasoning part of the soul.27
Now we might ask the further question: Do the philosopher rulers retain the falsehoods of the
noble lie in the reasoning part of their soul as well, or do they shed these falsehoods when they
come to know the Forms via dialectic?
I do not believe that there is a positive argument that can demonstrate that the reasoning
part of the philosopher rulers continues to believe the noble lie as a literal truth when they obtain
knowledge of the Forms; nonetheless, it is, at the very least, conceptually possible that they do still
possess these false beliefs. For instance, PR might have the following beliefs with respect to the
unifying aspect of the noble lie.
PR believes that:
U1) I should care for my relatives. (True)
U2) All citizens share the same mother and thus are related to one another (False)
U3) Caring for my fellow citizens instantiates goodness, harmony, and oneness.
(True)
UC) Therefore, I should care for all my fellow citizens. (True)
There is nothing inconsistent in the reasoning part of PR holding both U2 and U3 and
because of this, there is no reason to think that PR will necessarily lose the false belief, U2, when
she obtains the true belief, U3. Of course, PR’s reasons for holding the conclusion UC are

27 I am making this qualification because most scholars do not discuss how the different parts of the soul
regard the noble lie.
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overdetermined in the sense that the beliefs, U2 and U3, leave her with two different reasons for
holding this conclusion (UC), R1 and R2, respectively. The fact that PR has two different reasons
for holding a single conclusion is not necessarily problematic—after all, as I explained above R1
and R2 appeal to very different aspects. If this is right, then it is at the very least possible that
philosophers do not lose the false belief, U2, when they discover the Form of the Good through
dialectic.
One might worry that my thesis is defeated because I cannot definitively establish that
philosophers retain R1 in the reasoning part of the soul. Nonetheless, this is not the case; my thesis
is that the noble lie motivates philosophers towards virtuous activity in such a way that
counterfactually philosophers would be less virtuous if they were not taught this falsehood. If my
argument that philosophers retain the noble lie in the non-reasoning part of their soul is sound,
then this thesis follows from it. Because it is an interesting question as to whether philosophers
retain the noble lie in the reasoning part of their soul I examined this question in this sub-section.
Nevertheless, my thesis stands or falls independently of this claim.28

4. Too Strong, Too Weak, and Inconsistent
a. Too Strong
Having put forth a positive account of why the noble lie motivates virtuous activity in adult
philosophers, one might be left with two objections. One might worry that my thesis is too strong
since it appears to preclude the possibility that someone like Socrates is virtuous. This is
problematic because, as far as humans are concerned, Socrates is clearly virtuous. For instance, I
have argued that the non-reasoning part of the soul cannot distinguish truth from falsity. As a result

28

It is strengthened if this additional claim is true, however; but it is not obvious that it is weakened if this additional
claim is false.

52

of this, the core beliefs one has as a child will remain in the non-reasoning part of the soul in
adulthood. Hence, humans not raised in an appropriate environment (such as Socrates) will not
have the appropriate core beliefs in the non-reasoning part of the soul (such as the noble lie) as
adults, and thus their soul will lack harmony.
This objection loses its force, however, once we consider that Plato himself was aware of
this concern. In Book VI Socrates and Adeimantus discuss how to raise individuals to become real
philosophers. Broadly speaking, this requires two things: (1) having individuals that have the
appropriate philosophical nature and (2) having the appropriate environment to nurture their
philosophical nature. Hence, this account appears to suggest that if one has a philosophical nature,
but lacks the appropriate environment, one will not develop into a philosopher. However, at 496ad, Socrates acknowledges that it is still possible to become a philosopher even if one is raised in a
corrupt city.
He provides five examples of this happening. First, some of those who have the proper
philosophical nature might avoid being overtaken by corrupters through exile. Second, a great
souled individual might look beyond the affairs of the small city where she resides (496b). Third,
“a very few might be drawn to philosophy from other crafts that they rightly despise because of
their good natures” (496b4-5). Fourth, others might avoid a corruptive environment as a result of
a physical limitation; for instance, Theages’ physical illness restrained him from pursuing politics,
which would have tempted him away from philosophy (496b-c). Fifth, some individuals, such as
Socrates, have daemonic signs that can guide them towards philosophy and away from corruption
(496c).29
Speaking about these individuals Adeimantus and Socrates say:

29

To be clear, Socrates is open to the possibility that he is the only such person with a daemonic sign.

53

Adei.: “Well, that’s no small thing for him [viz., a philosopher surrounded by
corruption] to have accomplished before departing.”
Soc.: “But it isn’t the greatest either, since he didn’t chance upon a
constitution that suits him. Under a suitable one, his growth will be fuller, and he’ll
save the community as well as himself” (497a1-5).
Now, the objection was raised that my interpretation was inconsistent with individuals like
Socrates becoming philosophers. The objection goes that because they lacked the appropriate core
beliefs as children, they will not be able to develop the appropriate philosophical dispositions. This
passage (i.e., VI.496a-497a) demonstrates that Plato thinks that it is still possible for individuals
who were not raised in the right environment to become philosophers; nevertheless, these
individuals are rare and will always be less great as they would have been if they were raised in
the appropriate environment. My response to this objection follows suit. Individuals who are raised
without noble lies (or suitably similar stories) can become philosophers. Nonetheless, they are
anomalies. Moreover, they will not be as great as they would have been if they were raised with
the appropriate core beliefs.

b. Too Weak
Another objection is that the account I have provided is too weak to support my thesis to the extent
that I have not shown that the virtuous soul always requires false beliefs. For instance, one might
argue that I have only shown that false beliefs are useful for developing virtue, but these false
beliefs become superfluous once one becomes virtuous. Perhaps, in the virtuous soul, the nonreasoning part simply accepts that it should follow the command of the reasoning part (cf. IV.
442b-d). Accordingly, the false beliefs might guide the non-reasoning part to make this decision,
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but once it makes this decision those beliefs are no longer important.
In response to this objection I would like to point out that in such a case these false beliefs
are still counterfactually important. In Book IX Socrates explains that unnecessary pleasures and
desires are “probably present in everyone, but they are held in check by the laws and by the better
desires in alliance with reason,” but “in a few people, they have been eliminated entirely or only a
few weak ones remain, while in others they are stronger and more numerous” (571b4-c1). This
passage suggests two ways that inappropriate desires can be controlled: (1) they can be restrained
by the law and reason and (2) they can be altogether eliminated, or at the very least, severely
reduced. Notice that the latter case provides a kind of counterfactual reliability insofar as if the law
or reason were temporarily absent, one would still pursue virtue because one’s vicious thoughts do
not exist, or exist to only a small degree. However, this does not hold true in the former case; in
such a case, when the law and reason are absent, these vicious desires will run rampant. Or as
Socrates puts it, “When the rational, gentle, and ruling part of the soul slumbers, then the beastly
and savage part, full of food and drink, casts off sleep and seeks to find a way to gratify
itself…There is nothing it won’t dare to do at such a time, free of all control by shame or reason”
(IX.571c4-9).
The noble lie promotes virtuous desire and reduces vicious desires by inspiring citizens to
love each other and to care about the common good of the city. In turn, this provides a kind of
counterfactual reliability, such that if it were the case that reason was not in control or if there were
no laws forcing obedience, one would still be motivated to love their fellow citizens and to care
for the good of the whole city.
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c. Inconsistent
Lastly, some scholars might object to my interpretation on grounds that it results in the
philosopher’s soul being too divided. They might argue that because on my reading different parts
of the philosopher’s soul holds different beliefs (or is in different cognitive states), the soul is not
properly unified, and this is problematic because philosophers are supposed to exist in a state of
psychic harmony. However, my interpretation avoids this problem, and it does so in such a way
that illuminates something that many philosophers have underappreciated: psychic harmony is not
a matter of the different parts of the soul holding the exact same propositions for that is impossible;
rather, psychic harmony is a matter of the different parts of the soul sharing certain beliefs about
who should rule and what one should pursue.
To see this consider a passage from Book IX. At IX.588c-e Socrates likens the parts of the
soul to three different beasts: the appetitive part is like a large many-headed beast, the spirited part
is like a lion, and the reasoning part is like a little human. These creatures somehow have grown
together and from the outside appear as a human being. How these three beings relate to each other
depends on one’s overall psychological disposition. For instance, in the case of the person who
praises injustice: (a) the many-headed beast and lion grow strong, (b) they starve, weaken, and
drag the little human, and (c) all three parts fight amongst each other (IX.588e-589a). In contrast,
the person who praises justice, should secure: (a) that his words and actions give the little human
in him the most control, (b) that he controls the many-headed beast like a farmer, “feeding and
training the gentle (τὰ ἥμερα), but hindering the growth of the wild (τὰ ἄγρια),” and (c) that he
“make the lion’s nature his ally, care for the community of all his parts, and bring them up in such
a way that they will be friends with each other and himself” (589b1-6).
If we take this metaphor seriously, then we should not expect that the different parts of the
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soul share the same beliefs. The different parts of the soul are akin to different beings with different
cognitive abilities and personalities. Accordingly, to think that psychic harmony requires the
different parts of the soul sharing the exact same thoughts is akin to thinking that the only way a
domestic dog could exist in a harmonious relationship with her owner is if they share the same
thoughts. Hence, as far as virtue in the soul is concerned, what matters is that the parts of the soul
care for each other and agree that the little human should rule (i.e., the reasoning part). Likewise,
as far as virtue in the city is concerned, what matters is not that the different parts of the city share
the exact same thoughts; rather, what matters is that the different parts of the city care for each
other and agree that the philosophers should rule.

5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that philosophers in the Kallipolis believe in and benefit from the
falsehoods of the noble lie. I have argued that the non-reasoning part of the soul cannot ascertain
certain truths and that in order to be virtuous the non-reasoning part of the soul must believe certain
falsehoods, such as the noble lie. Additionally, I have argued that there is nothing inconsistent in
believing the noble lie and having knowledge of the Forms. This suggests that the noble lie is not
necessarily lost when they discover the Forms through dialectical investigation.30 This
demonstrates that Plato thought that philosophers themselves can benefit from falsehood; hence,
this poses a serious challenge to Nietzsche interpretation of Plato as overvaluing truth and

30 Many scholars have questioned the justness of Plato's Kallipolis. One issue that many find particularly
morally problematic is that the philosopher rulers deceive the non-philosophers in the city. This is worrisome because
a political system that relies upon one class of citizens deceiving other classes of citizens seems inconsistent with a
just political structure. However, if I am right that the philosopher rulers, at least partly, believe some of the falsehoods
that they are telling the other citizens, then the Kallipolis is less morally objectionable than many scholars have thought
because the philosopher rulers are not fully deceiving or lying to the other citizens. For discussions of the role of
deception in the Kallipolis see Annas (1981, pp. 106-7, 167), Brickhouse and Smith (1983), Dombrowski (1997), Page
(1991), Popper (1966), Reeve (1988, especially chap. 4), Taylor (1999), and Williams (2013).
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undervaluing falsehood. In the next two chapters, I examine Plato’s attitude towards false beliefs
in the Laws.
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CHAPTER THREE
Persuasion, Falsehood, and Motivating Reason in Plato’s Laws
“To accomplish these things by deeds or words—with pleasures or pains, by honors
or dishonors, even by monetary penalties or gifts, and in general by whatever
procedure someone may use to bring about hatred of injustice and desire (or at any
rate, lack of hatred) for the nature of the just—it is this that is the task of the noblest
laws” (The Athenian Stranger, Laws IX.862d)

1. Introduction
In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger maintains that law should consist of both persuasion
(πειθὼ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b). Scholars are divided on how to
interpret the Athenian’s use of persuasion: some, such as Christopher Bobonich, argue that the
Stranger has in mind the “rational” persuasion found in philosophical discourse; others, such as
Richard Stalley and Glen Morrow, argue that the persuasion is “non-rational,” and thus primarily
appeals to emotion. Nevertheless, both sides agree that the persuasion instills true beliefs and gives
citizens good epistemic reasons for obeying the laws. However, in this chapter I argue that both
positions fail to appreciate the positive role that false beliefs play in Magnesia. Once we take these
useful false beliefs into account, it becomes clear that the fundamental purpose of the preludes is
to motivate right action, and epistemic considerations are merely a subsidiary concern. In other
words, similar to the Republic, false beliefs are useful when they produce normative truth. The
advantage of this reading is that it provides a clear explanation for why some of the preludes appear
“rational” and why others appear “non-rational”—because there are different citizens, with

different educational backgrounds, the lawgiver needs to offer different kinds of reasons in order
to motivate these different citizens to obey the law.

2. Non-Rational vs. Rational Persuasion
The Laws centers around a conversation about laws and constitutions between three elderly men:
an unnamed Athenian Stranger,1 a Cretan named Kleinias, and a Spartan named Megillus. The
discussion begins with the Athenian asking his counterparts about the central purpose of
government. Kleinias and Megillus, who come from cultures that esteem war and courage, hold
that the purpose of government is to win wars. The Athenian Stranger finds this too myopic,
however.2 Of course, it is important that a city does well in war, but this should not be its primary
focus (I.628 ff.); rather, the aim of government is to develop virtue in its entirety. That is, the
government should seek to cultivate not only courage, but also justice, moderation, and wisdom
(I.630 ff.; cf. III.688a-b, IV.705a-707d, XII.963a). This leads to a discussion on the importance of
citizens developing all of the virtues.
At the end of Book III, Kleinias reveals that the discussion has been especially beneficial
because he is one of ten Cretans who have been appointed to construct a legal code for a new city,
Magnesia. This raises the issue of what laws and constitution Magnesia should have. The Athenian
is quick to remind his friends that they should not lose sight of the fact that the purpose of
government is to produce all of the virtues in its citizens; thus, the laws of Magnesia should fulfill
this end (IV.705a-707d.). The Athenian proposes that this can be achieved by having a legal code

1 The Stranger is never named throughout the Laws. Pangle (1980, p. 3, n. 2) points out that various scholars
have speculated about who the Stranger is. For instance, both Cicero (Laws I.15) and the scholiast (in the Hypothesis)
think it represents Plato himself, while Aristotle (Politics II.1265a) thinks the Stranger is Socrates. Malcolm Schofield
(2006, p. 3) maintains that the Athenian Stranger is supposed to remind the reader of Solon.
2 Cf. Pangle (1980 pp. 379-380); Bobonich, C. (2002, p. 93, n. 1). Also note that Republic VII.544c1-3
describes Crete and Sparta as timocracies; cf. VII.545a.
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that consists of both persuasion (πειθὼ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b).
The Athenian explains what he has in mind by comparing the medical practice of a free
doctor with that of a slave doctor (IV.720a-720e).3 The doctors differ in their knowledge, whom
they treat, and how they treat them. The slave doctor, for instance, primarily treats slaves, does not
have systematic knowledge of medicine and health, and like a dictator, simply prescribes what he
thinks is best for the patient, without giving an account (λόγος) of the treatment and the nature of
the disease, or without listening to the needs and desires of the patient (IV.720b-c). After the slave
doctor treats one slave, he quickly darts off to treat the next patient (IV.720c). In contrast, the free
doctor, primarily treats free people, has systematic knowledge of medicine, and is very attentive
to the questions and concerns of his patient:
He [viz., the free doctor] investigates these things [viz., the disease] from their
beginning and according to nature, communing with the patient and his friends; in
this way he himself learns (μανθάνει) something from the sick and at the same time
he gives the individual patient all the instruction (διδάσκει) he can. He gives no
prescription until he has in some sense persuaded (συμπείσῃ); when he has on each
occasion tamed (ἡμερούμενον) him [viz., the patient] through persuasion (πειθοῦς),
he tries to complete his restoration to health (IV.720d2-e2).
According to the Athenian, the slave doctor uses a single method of compulsion, while the
free doctor uses a double method of both persuasion and compulsion (IV.720e). The double
method is superior because it is gentler (IV.720e). The Stranger argues that the legislator should
apply the double method, like the free doctor.4 Thus, the lawgiver should not simply issue

3 R. B. Clark (2003), insightfully demonstrates the ways in which the legislation follows and moves away
from Ancient medical practices. For an interesting discussion on the role of the medical analogy and Plato's theory of
punishment in the Laws, see Trelawny-Cassity (2010).
4 Cf. Statesman 293a-c
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commands and threaten the citizens like a dictator. Rather, the legislator should discuss and
persuade citizens that it is in their best interest to follow the laws. It is only when persuasion fails,
that the lawgiver should force the citizens into compliance.5
Legislators can achieve persuasion by prefacing the laws with preludes (προοίμια).
Preludes in musical compositions are “artistically designed to aid the coming performance” by
providing “a sort of limbering up (ἀνακινήσεις), so to speak” (IV.722d4-6). That is, they introduce
audience members to the forthcoming musical composition in way that makes the performance
better received. Likewise, preludes in the law make the citizens more cooperative and “more ready
to learn” (εὐμαθέστερον), and thus more willing to freely accept the laws (IV.723a4-5). In turn,
the lawgivers will not have to rely as heavily upon violent force in order to get citizens to comply
with the law; this is a superior method because it is gentler.
We can break the “doctor” analogy into four lessons that the Athenian is attempting to
teach Megillus and Kleinias about legislating. First, the free doctor differs from the slave doctor
to the extent that the free doctor has systematic knowledge of medicine, whereas the slave doctor’s
knowledge of medicine is in some sense deficient. The lesson is that the lawgiver should be
knowledgeable of laws and constitutions. Second, the free doctor does not rush from one patient
to another, like the slave doctor. Rather, he does not leave the patient until he can best treat the
patient. Likewise, the legislator should not rush in creating the laws, but should take his time and
carefully consider the details of the law. Third, the free doctor applies both persuasion and force,
while the slave doctor only applies force. Thus, the legislator should apply both persuasion and

5 Stalley (1994, p. 170) points out that the doctor analogy is somewhat disanalogous: “If the patient is not
persuaded he does not have to undergo treatment...If, on the other hand, those to whom the preludes are addressed are
unconvinced, they will be subjected to punishment whether they like it or not.” Nightingale (1993, p. 287) notes
another disanology, saying that the “ideal legislator can never engage the citizens in a personal conversation as the
doctor does.” See also Nightingale (1999, pp. 118-9).

62

force, and should not just apply a single method of force (or persuasion). Fourth, the slave doctor’s
method is shorter or briefer to the extent that it only involves force. In contrast, the free doctor’s
method is longer because it involves both persuasion and force. The Athenian’s point is that when
it comes to legislating, what matters is not the length of the law, but whether the law is effective
at producing virtue and well-being in the city.6
There are two main interpretations of the persuasion found in the preludes. Some argue
that Plato has in mind the “rational” persuasion that is akin to the methods of philosophers. As
Bobonich (2002, p. 104) explains, “The preludes are thus designed to be instances of rational
persuasion, that is, attempts to influence the citizens’ beliefs by appealing to rational
considerations. They are not intended to inculcate false, but useful beliefs, or to effect persuasion
through non-rational means.” Hence, according to Bobonich (2002, p. 104), through the preludes
“the citizens will learn why the laws are fine and just and should also learn why following the
laws, and more generally, acting virtuously is good for them.”
In contrast, other scholars maintain that the preludes involve “non-rational” persuasion and
do not resemble anything like philosophical arguments. Instead, the preludes primarily appeal to
emotion, fear, pain, and pleasure as means of developing sound affective dispositions and true
beliefs in the citizens.7 R.F. Stalley (1994, p. 167) explains:
[T]here is no requirement that the preludes offer a rational justification for the laws
in the sense of giving them a thorough philosophical grounding. Rather the
legislator must seek by any possible means to create a condition of the soul in which
the feelings and appetites harmonize with right opinion.

6 To modern ears, this point seems rather obvious; however, one should keep in mind that Megillus comes
from a culture that praises laws that are brief (IV.721e-722b).
7 See Morrow (1953, pp. 234-250), (1960, pp. 552-60); Stalley (1983), (1994); Yunis (1996, p. 228).
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The term “non-rational” persuasion, however, is a bit of a misnomer. Defenders of this
position do not think that non-rational persuasion is devoid of reason or intellectual activity.
Rather, they mean to highlight the role that the emotions play and to distance this kind of activity
from that of philosophical discourse. For example, Morrow (1953, p. 242) says, “I do not wish to
imply nor do I think would Plato, that they [viz., the preludes] make no appeal to reason. They are
intelligently persuasive; they are persuasion at the high level of rational insight suffused with
emotion.” Likewise, Stalley (1994, p. 167) says:
There is, however a sense in which their powers of reason must be involved. They
need rational capacities to grasp the opinions that they are taught, to understand the
laws and to apply them in their own lives...Plato is very well aware that there is a
close association between our opinions and our feelings.8
Both the rational interpretation and the non-rational interpretation agree, however, that the
preludes produce true beliefs. For instance, Morrow (1953, p. 243) says that “the persuasions
employed in the state is unquestionably concerned with instructing, i.e., inculcating true beliefs,
as Plato thought them to be.”9 Viewed in this way the disagreement between both sides is really
over what type of epistemic reason the preludes provide.10 The rational side maintains that it is
knowledge (or something close to it), while the non-rational side maintains that it is merely true

8 The non-rational interpretation has three main points in its favor. First as Stalley (1983, p. 43) notes that
the vast majority of the preludes in the text are mere exhortations and mostly have “the character of rather conventional
sermons.” See also Yunis (1996, chap. 8 and appen. 1) Notable examples are V.726a-734e, VI.772e-773c, VII.823d824b, IX.854b-c, IX.870a-e, X.904e-905c, XI.927a-d, and XI.930e-932a. Second, the Athenian links the preludes to
musical education and musical education does not give one the kind of understanding that philosophers have, which
suggests that the preludes do not give one the kind of understanding that philosophers have as well; see II.653b,
IV.722c-d, V.734e, and Rep. III.401d-402b. Third, the Athenian describes persuasion as involving “enchantments”
(ἐπῳδαί) (II.659e, II.664b, II.665c, II.666c, II.670e, VI.773d, VII.812c, and VII.944b); see Morrow, (1953); Dodds
(1951, p. 212, n. 20). For a response to Morrow, see Bobonich (1991 p. 374). See also Stalley (1994, p. 170).
9 See also, Stalley (1994, p. 167)
10 I am using “epistemic reason” to broadly cover reasons for belief or related cognitive states that track the
truth or are related to evidence. I am contrasting these with believing or trying to believe for reasons related to your
well-being; that is, for “practical reasons.”
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belief. In what follows, I argue that both sides underappreciate the role that useful false beliefs
play in Magnesia. Once we consider these useful false beliefs we can no longer view the
fundamental purpose of the preludes as providing epistemic reasons for obeying the law; instead,
we must view them as primarily serving a practical purpose—sometimes at the cost of truth and
knowledge. Before we turn towards the evidence, I need to be clear that my point is not that all of
the preludes are useful false beliefs or that that they do not teach the citizens anything true. Rather,
my point is that many of the preludes involve useful false beliefs and because of this, the primary
purpose of the preludes is not epistemic, but is practical. Let us examine the evidence.

3. On The Weakness of Moral Motivation
In Book II, the question is raised: Is the most just life always the most pleasant life, or, is there a
wedge between justice and pleasure, such that the most just life is not the most pleasant life?
(II.661d-662d). The Athenian argues that justice and pleasure are inextricably connected, such that
it is always the case that the most just life is the most pleasant life. Nevertheless, the Athenian
argues that even if this were false, citizens should still be taught this:
But just suppose that the truth had been different from what the argument has now
shown it to be (εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ᾕρηχ’ ὁ λόγος ἔχειν),
and that a lawgiver, even a mediocre one had been sufficiently bold in the interests
of the young, to tell them a lie (ψεύδεσθαι).11 Could he have told a more useful lie
(ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον) than this, or one more effective in making everyone
practice justice in everything they do willingly and without pressure? (μὴ βίᾳ ἀλλ’

11 The Greek term ψεῦδος is ambiguous between “lie” and “falsehood.” I am translating it here as “lie”
because the context suggests that the legislators will know that this myth is false; and thus are intending to deceive
the citizens.
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ἑκόντας πάντας πάντα τὰ δίκαια) (II.663d6-e2).12
Kl.: Truth is a fine thing, and it is enduring, but to persuade one of it
certainly seems no easy task (II.663e3-4).
Ath.: Yes, but what about that fairy story about the Sidonian? That was
thusly incredible, but it was easy enough to convince people of it, and of thousands
of other similar stories (II.663e5-6).
Kl.: What sort of stories? (II.663e7).
Ath.: The sowing of the teeth and the birth of armed men from them.13 This
remarkable example shows the legislator that the souls of the young can be
persuaded of anything; he has only to try. The only thing he must consider and
discover is what conviction would do the state most good. In that connection, he
must think up every possible device to ensure that as far as possible the entire
community preserves in its songs and stories and doctrines an absolute and lifelong
unanimity. But if you see the matter in any other light, have no hesitation in
disputing my view (II.663e8-664a8).
Although the Stranger ultimately thinks that it is true that the most just life is the most pleasant
life (cf. II.664b3-c1), if this were not the case, he would lie because this falsehood will motivate
the citizens to act justly.14

12 Cf. Rep. II.378a2-4.
13 This is reference to the myth of Cadmus, which, interestingly enough, is the myth suggested in the “noble
lie” of the Republic (III.414b-415d); see Schofield, (2007, pp. 101-15); Dodds (1951, pp. 211-2). With the noble lie
in mind, I should note that one thing I find strange about Bobonichs’s account is that he asserts that the persuasion
involves the methods of a philosopher and that it does not involve useful false beliefs. However, the Republic makes
it clear that Plato has no qualms about philosophers lying when it is beneficial and necessary.
14 Cf. Morrow (1960, p. 557) downplays the significance of the Athenian's use of falsehood because this
statement is actually true. For instance, Morrow says, “The charge that Plato advocates indiscriminate lying and
deception rests more on suspicion than on Plato’s text.” However, Morrow fails to consider the relevance of the fact
that, counterfactually, if this claim were not true, the Athenian would still want it told because of the positive effects
of the lie.
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This passage demonstrates two things. First, the Stranger is willing to tolerate lying when
telling the truth is possibly harmful and insufficient to motivate just actions.15 Second, the Stranger
thinks that morality is a weak source of motivation for the majority of citizens. For instance, the
Athenian is worried that if it is true that justice and pleasure are not connected, and the citizens are
taught this truth, the citizens will choose pleasure over justice. This suggests that the Athenian
takes pleasure to be a stronger source of motivation than acting for the sake of justice. 16 The
problem seems to be that if citizens believe that pleasure does not accompany just actions, then
the citizens will believe that their reasons for acting justly are primarily other-regarding. This is
problematic because most citizens are motivated to act for reasons that they perceive to be selfregarding.
There are three passages that support this reading. In Book IX, the Athenian argues that
there are three main obstacles to political success. The first obstacle is that most people fail to
intellectually grasp that the goal of politics is to do what is best for the common good, and not
what is in their private interest (IX.875a-b). The second obstacle is that most people do not
understand that often the best way of promoting their own private interest is to promote the good
of the state (IX.875a-b). That is, most people do not grasp the fact that they often have self-

15 Recently, Williams (2013, pp. 384-9) argues that Plato is more tolerant of lying in the Republic than the
Laws. Williams points to Republic III.389b in which Plato says that only the rulers of the Kallipolis will be allowed
to lie and argues that there is nothing equivalent to this in the Laws. I believe that Plato’s attitude towards lying is the
same in the Laws and the Republic, but because my concern in this chapter is primarily with the Laws I will not address
this claim in great detail. Nevertheless, I would briefly like to point out two problems I have with Williams’ interesting
reading. First, XI.916e-917b has similarities with III.389b in that Plato makes a point of saying that one should not lie
to their superiors, which leaves rooms for superiors lying to their inferiors. Second, the fact that the lie at II.663d-664a
makes reference to the noble lie suggests that Plato has it still in mind, and is thinking of this falsehood in the same
light as the noble lie. Additionally, I should note that I will address some of Williams’ concerns in section five.
16 This claim is further supported by the fact that at II.653a-c the Athenian describes pleasure and pain as
vehicles for developing goodness or badness in the soul. Consider also the Athenian’s concern that citizens select
music and dances that appear the most pleasurable, and that this usually does not result in them choosing the best
music and dances (II.658a ff.). See also V.732e: “Pleasures, pains, and desires are by nature especially human; and
from these, of necessity, every mortal creature is, so to say, suspended and dependent by the strongest cords of
influence [viz. pain and pleasure]” (cf. I.664a ff.).
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interested reasons to act for other-regarding reasons. The third obstacle is not intellectual, but
purely non-cognitive. The Athenian explains that even if people had the correct intellectual grasp
of the goal of politics, most individuals would still fail to act on behalf of this goal because their
selfish mortal nature would drive them to pursue their own pleasure over that of the city (IX.875bc).
We find a similar worry conveyed in Book V when the Athenian argues that the cause of
every failure is excessive self-love (V.721e). The Athenian explains that love is blinding; when
individuals are in love, they cannot see the object of their love as it actually is. Rather, their vision
of this object is skewed (V.721e).17 The problem with excessive self-love is that the object of love
is oneself, and thus individuals becomes trapped in a vicious circle of self-deception, which blinds
them to what is truly just and beneficial. Consequently, when they act in a way that they perceive
to be just and in their interest, they are quite mistaken, and are actually acting unjustly and in a
harmful manner (V.722a).18
Both of these examples point to two general claims that the Athenian holds of most
individuals:
1) Most individuals are primarily motivated to act for reasons that they perceive to
be self-regarding.
2) Most individuals fail to recognize that often they have self-regarding reasons to
act for other-regarding reasons.

17 Cf. Rep. V.474d-e.
18 Consider also the cosmological myth of Book X that warns “you have forgotten about this very fact, that
all generation comes to be for the sake of this: that a happy existence may belong to the life of the universe; and it
does not come to be for the sake of you, but you for the sake of it. For every doctor and every skilled craftsman does
all his work for the sake of all; he makes a part straining for what is best in common, for the sake of the whole, and
not the whole for the sake of a part” (903c-d).
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Because most citizens think in this way, most individuals are not going to be motivated by reasons
that they perceive to be other-regarding. Therefore, in order to persuade the citizens to act rightly,
the lawgiver needs to find a way to positively direct people’s selfish nature towards justice. The
lawgiver can do this by having preludes attached to the law, which highlight, or even mislead,
citizens about how it is in their self-interest to obey the law.
Hence, the reason the Athenian is willing to lie about the connection between pleasure and
justice is that justice alone is a weak motivation for most citizens. It is such a weak motivator in
the eyes of the Athenian that even if citizens are taught that pursuing justice leads to pleasure, the
Stranger believes that the lawgiver must provide additional incentives in order to motivate the
citizens to act correctly. For example, in Book XI, the Athenian explains that robbery is actually
counterproductive because no monetary gain is worth as much as having a virtuous soul and
stealing corrupts one’s soul; thus, one is better off not stealing (XI.913b). Following this, the
Athenian says that citizens should believe the myth about robbery, which says that it leads to
infertility (XI.913c). Now why does the Athenian add the myth? Why is it not enough to tell
citizens that acting unjustly is bad for their soul? Most individuals are not going to believe that
acting unjustly is bad for them because it harms their soul. Or, if they do believe it, the temptation
for these material possessions will be too strong. Thus, by telling citizens a fanciful story about
how robbery leads to infertility, the idea that injustice harms and that justice benefits becomes real
in a way that has motivational force. It is obvious that this is the intention of the Athenian because
after saying that the citizens should be told this myth, he considers what to tell those who are
indifferent to having children (XI.913c). Hence, the Athenian is clearly trying to locate what will
motivate citizens to behave rightly.19

19 Another example of this occurs at IV.721b-c in which the males are told that they should marry between
the ages of thirty and thirty-five because this is how they will achieve immortality. Stalley (1994, p. 170) points out
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4. Theology for the Unsophisticated
In the previous section, I argued that Plato is willing to tell falsehoods about justificatory ethical
facts as a means to counteract people’s inclination towards selfishness. However, there is another
reason Plato is willing to tell falsehoods to citizens: some subject matters are beyond the grasp of
certain individuals and it is dangerous to try to explain the truth of such subjects to these
individuals. This is most evident in how the Stranger handles theological matters in the city. In
what follows, I shall argue that there are two different accounts of religion presented in the Laws.
On the one hand, there are traditional religious myths told to unphilosophical citizens. These
stories incentivize virtuous behavior and disincentivize vicious behavior. On the other hand, there
are abstract theological issues, which are only to be discussed by philosophers.20
The more traditional or mythical religious views are often conveyed in the preludes that
accompany the laws. 21 Consider a brief sampling; the Athenian wants citizens to believe:
a) That robbing will lead them to infertility (XI.913c).
b) That the “demoness of the roads” guards and protects things left by other people

that there is a strange disconnect between this law and its accompanying prelude: the law is very specific, it is about
the age males should marry, while the prelude is a general statement about procreation. Speaking about this prelude,
Pangle (1980, p. 448) says, “The prelude does not justify the command to marry on the grounds of utility to the city
(population growth), or on moralistic grounds (avoidance of sexual promiscuity), or on the basis of obedience to gods
and parents (impiety is here identified with self-deprivation, not disobedience to god; contrast 774a). Instead, it evokes
the sublimely selfish, natural longing for immortality and invites individual citizens to satisfy that longing. Rather
than asking the citizens to devote his soul to his family (717c), the prelude encourages him to use his family as the
instrument for his own fulfillment.” Cf. Clark (2003, pp. 130-5); Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, III.7: “What great
philosopher up to now has been married? Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer—none
of these got married. What's more, we cannot even imagine them married. A married philosopher belongs in a comedy,
that's my principle. And Socrates, the exception, the malicious Socrates, it appears, got married ironically to
demonstrate this very principle.”
20 See Dodds (1951, p. 220).
21 Morrow (1960, p. 401), notes that in many ways the Athenian is simply extending traditional stories about
the gods and the divine for his own purposes: “It is not a new religion that Plato proposes for his state, but the old
religion, purified of its unwitting errors, and illuminated by a more penetrating conception of the meaning of religious
worship.”
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(XI.914b).
c) That those who commit involuntary homicide are haunted by the ghost of those
who they killed (IX.865d-e).
d) That those who commit voluntary homicide are punished in Hades and when
they return to Earth, they will suffer the same fate as their victim did (IX.870d-e).
e) That those who voluntarily kill their relatives will suffer the same fate as their
victim. For instance, if a man kills his father, then he will be murdered by his son.
If a man kills his mother, he will be reborn as a woman and killed by her son
(IX.872d-873a).
f) That the gods are more responsive to the prayers of those who honor their parents
and more likely to punish those who do not (XI.931b-932a).
In each of these stories those who violate a law will face some sort of divine punishment.
These stories serve three purposes: First, they disincentivize serious misconduct by making
citizens fear the haunting vengeance of Justice. Second, they reassure the injured party by telling
them that their perpetrator will suffer.22 Third, they convey a teleological theology, in which the
gods and divine beings do not act randomly, are not unjust, and are not indifferent to the affairs of
humans. but, the gods act in an orderly and systematic way, are just, and are invested in the lives
of humans.23 Accordingly, these religious myths operate as noble lies (Rep. III.414d-415c): they
give citizens false beliefs about why they should obey the law in order to motivate the true belief
that they should obey the law.24

22 Cf. Saunders (1991, p. 196).
23 Cf. X.885b, X.902e ff.
24 This is consistent with Plato’s general account of musical education in that musical education is
fundamentally about teaching citizens what they should do and not why they should do it. Consider II.653b: “I call
education the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and liking, pain and hatred are
formed in the soul on the right lines before the ability to understand the reason”; cf. Rep. III.401d-402b. See Aristotle
EN I.4.1095b; Brown (2004, p. 386).
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However, it is unlikely that Plato actually believes that the details of these stories are true.
Although there is no direct evidence of this in the Laws, there are two general reasons to think this.
First, these myths evoke the imagery of traditional myths, which Plato’s Socrates denies are
entirely true in other works. For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates tells Euthyphro that he is
likely being prosecuted because he finds the traditional stories of the gods difficult to accept (6ab). Additionally, consider Book II of the Republic, in which Socrates asserts that the myths are
“false, taken as a whole, but also have truth in [them]” (II.377a4-6). With this in mind, consider
Socrates’ evaluation of the “myth of Phaethon” in the Timaeus (22c-d). In the myth, Phaethon, the
son of the Helios (the sun god), arrogantly rides his father’s sun-chariot and sets the heavens and
earth ablaze. Speaking about this myth, Plato says, “This tale is told as a myth, but the truth behind
it is that there is a deviation in the heavenly bodies that travel around the earth, which causes huge
fires that destroy what is on earth across vast stretches of time” (22c6-d3). Hence, according to
Socrates, the myth is a personification of real astronomical events; nevertheless, many people who
hear this story will take the fictional aspect as true, and fail to grasp the real astronomical lessons
behind the myth.25 Likewise, Plato might believe that some aspects of the religious myths in the
Laws are true, such as that the gods are teleological and just, and that the citizens should obey the
laws (cf. X.885b, X.902e ff.). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Plato actually believes the fantastic
aspect of the myths in the Laws, such as, that those who are killed in involuntary homicide track
and haunt their killers as ghosts (IX.865d-e).
Second, there is evidence that the Athenian is thinking of the myths in much the same way
in the Laws. Book X is largely a defense of the theological views of the city and the dangers of not
conforming to the city’s religion. The Athenian is concerned that atheists, deists, and misguided

25 Cf. Rep. II.378d7-e1: Soc.: “The young can't distinguish what is allegorical from what isn't.”
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theists (who think that the gods can be bribed), are a great threat to society. Speaking about these
people, the Athenian complains that things would be better if they:
believed the stories which they heard from their nurses and mothers since the time
they were still young children being nourished on milk, hearing them spoken as if
incantations to them, in a playful, yet serious manner; and the same stories they
heard repeated also in prayers at sacrifices (X.887d2-5).
Moreover, the Athenian is clear that he wants citizens to believe in these stories not as mere
myths, but as absolutely true (X.887d-e).
From this, we can construct the following argument:
1) Plato believes myths told to children are on the whole false, but can convey some
allegorical truth.
2) The citizens of Magnesia will be told myths about the gods as children, which
are to be believed in earnest.
3) Therefore, the citizens of Magnesia will be told falsehoods about the gods, which
are to be believed in earnest.
Now before I discuss the significance of these passages I would like to address a potential
objection. Both T. J. Saunders and Bobonich downplay the significance of these passages. For
instance, Saunders (1991, pp. 210-11) says:
Most of the preambles are positive in content and spirit; the savage ones are to be
deployed only where education and persuasion have proved ineffective. At this
point Plato throws anything and everything at the potential criminal’s head;
however crude and primitive, regardless of inconsistency with his official
penology.
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Similarly, Bobonich (2002, pp. 113-4) says, “Such stories are designed for those who have failed
to benefit from the education given to all and are the next resort when persuasion and education
have failed. They are followed by the last resort, which is that statement of the penalty attached to
violation of the law.”26 However, Saunders and Bobonich are misrepresenting how these preludes
work. It is not as if they are told to reckless individuals just about to commit a crime. Rather, they
are built into the educational system; thus, all citizens will be taught these myths. Moreover, the
Athenian makes it clear that these are not new myths, but are already traditional stories held by
many people and that he wants citizens to earnestly believe these stories (X.877d-e).27
Why does Plato want to tell citizens false theological stories? Why not teach them the truth?
The answer is that the truth about these matters is too complex and abstract for the average citizen
to understand. Hence, these abstract truths will not be able to motivate citizens and might even
lead the citizens to act worse. This is why he relies upon falsehoods.
Consider the Athenian’s discussion of education in astronomy and mathematics in Book
VII. Education in astronomy and mathematics produces knowledge of the “divine” or “natural”
necessities that govern the cosmos (VII.818d). Because of the difficult nature of the subject matter,
only a select few will study these subjects in depth (VII.818a).28 The majority of people will only

26 See also, Bobonich (1991, p. 381).
27 Additionally, one might object that throughout his corpus Plato is happy to use myths and that it is a
mistake to think that Plato is trying to instill false, but useful beliefs through these myths, because these myths are not
meant to be understood as literal truths. In response to this objection, I would like to point out that the tone of the
religious myths in the Laws is very different. The religious myths in the Laws are less poetic and hyperbolic than in
other dialogues—they instead, seem to evoke traditional religious imagery in order to motivate the citizens towards
justice. Consider the fact that the religious myths in the Laws are specific to certain crimes, as opposed to general
speculations about what happens when one dies, cf. Phaedo 114 ff.
28 Bobonich (2002, p. 107-9) argues that the fact that all citizens have some training in mathematics marks
an important difference from the Republic. According to Bobonich, the importance is that because all free citizens
receive some mathematical training, all free citizens will be exposed to the idea of non-sensible properties. However,
Bobonich is overstating the importance of this training; only an elite few will study mathematics with any kind of
precision (VII.818a). The majority will simply study what is necessary for managing practical affairs and being a
decent citizen (VII.809c). Moreover, for the vast majority of citizens, their education in mathematics will come in the
form of unsophisticated play during their childhood (VII.819b-d, VII.820d). See Morrow (1960, pp. 343-8).
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study these complex subjects as far as it is practically necessary to organize and conduct a
household properly. During this discussion, Kleinias suspects that the Athenian is frightened by
his and Megillus’ lack of familiarity with such important subjects. The Stranger responds that,
indeed, this is a concern of his; however, what frightens him even more is when people study such
divine subjects in a bad way—this is far worse than blanket ignorance (VII.819a).29
The Athenian’s anxiety becomes more explicit in Book X. As I previously discussed, in
Book X, the Athenian attempts to convince an imaginary young atheist that the gods exist. At the
beginning of the discussion, Kleinias wonders why they cannot simply point out to the atheist that
(a) the Earth, Sun, Stars, and all of the universe have order, and (b) that all Greeks and Barbarians
believe in the existence of gods (X.886a). Kleinias’ simple argument reveals his naivety; he
mistakenly attributes the cause of atheism solely to an uncontrollable lust for pleasure (X.886a-b).
The Athenian explains that atheism is often caused by ideas put forth by modern astronomers who
argue that the planets are soulless rocks, devoid of reason, and thus incapable of caring about the
affairs of humans (X.886c-d). The Athenian continues this idea in Book XII, when he attributes
atheism to amateurish and lowly studies of astronomy (XII.966e-967d).30 The Athenian argues
that if such individuals had a better understanding of astronomy and the nature of soul, they would
not view the planets as soulless beings that are devoid of reason and simply moving chaotically.
Rather, they would understand that the planets have souls and move with reason.31
Hence, we see three different positions: the ignorant (Megillus and Kleinias), the amateur

29 The Athenian's worry seems to be well-founded. For instance, the traditional explanation for why
individuals deny human caused climate change has been that most individuals have a limited knowledge of science
and lack the technical proficiency to understand the data. However, recently Kahan et al. (2012) found that there is
little support for this account. In fact, Kahan et al. found that greater scientific literacy correlates with greater cultural
polarization. The idea is that as one's familiarity with science increases, one is able to twist and manipulate the data
to conform to their ideology. This accords with the Athenian thinking that the real danger to society is not blanket
ignorance, but being educated in the wrong way.
30 Cf. Apology 18a-c.
31 Cf. Pangle (1980, p. 494); Mayhew (2010, p. 214).
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astronomer (the Atheist), and the real astronomer (the Athenian). Both the ignorant and the real
astronomer believe in the existence of gods, while the amateur astronomer does not. Now, to the
extent that atheism is a threat to society, the real worry is not ignorance, but receiving an improper
education. An improper education occurs when one studies things that one is unqualified to
study.32 Not only is one likely to draw the wrong conclusions, but one will become harder to
persuade of the truth later on.33 This is why when the Athenian discusses theological matters with
an imaginary young atheist in Book X, he recommends that the youngster wait until he is older to
make up his mind up such important matters. In the meantime, he should listen most of all to what
the lawgiver has to say about such things and not risk impiety (X.888a-d).
Hence, Plato believes that one’s theological education should be in proportion to one’s
philosophical abilities (cf. XII.968d-e). Those with robust philosophical skills or capabilities will
study the more advanced theological views discussed in Book X and Book XII. In contrast, those
lacking in philosophical skills or capabilities will merely be taught traditional myths, which teach
a shadow of the truths understood by philosophers, but nonetheless contain many falsehoods.
Support for this interpretation is found in two key passages. The first passage is from Book
XII. After arguing that amateurish astronomy causes atheism, the Athenian asserts that in order for
one to be an adequate ruler, one must grasp that the soul is the eldest of all things and that the stars
have intelligence (XII.967e). Additionally, one should learn the necessary subjects (i.e., math and
astronomy; cf. VII.818 ff.) that precede these matters (XII.967e). Following this, the Athenian
asserts that such a person “should see what is common to these things and the things that concern
the Muse, and should apply this understanding, in a harmonious way, to the practices and customs
that pertain to the habitual dispositions” (XII.967e2-4).

32 Cf. Republic VI.491d-e, VII.518e-519a.
33 Cf. Republic VII.517a.
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This suggests three things. First, there is a distinction between the set of things that concern
the Muse and the set of theological truths discovered through the divine sciences.34 Second, at
some points both sets overlap. Third, the ruler should apply his understanding of what is in
common between both sets in a way that produces sound dispositions in the citizens. This supports
my claim that some citizens only learn a portion of the theological truths that are known, and that
what these citizens are taught about the gods is mainly a function of what will help produce sound
dispositions.
However, this does not suggest the further point that the reason why some citizens are only
taught a portion of theological truth is because it is dangerous to attempt to teach them more
advanced truths. Support for this idea is found in Book X. Before the Athenian embarks on a
sophisticated philosophical discussion of the soul, he issues a warning to Megillus and Kleinias:
Suppose we three had to cross a rapidly flowing river, and I, who happened to be
the youngest of us and experienced with many currents said ‘I ought to try first on
my own account, and leave you two in safety while I see if the river is fordable for
you two older men as well, or if not, just how bad it is. If it turns out to be fordable,
I’ll then call you and put my experience at your disposal in helping you to cross;
but if in the event it cannot be crossed by old men like yourselves, then the only
risk has been mine’...The situation is the same now: the argument ahead runs too
deep, and men as weak as you will probably get out of your depth. I want to prevent
you novices in answering from being dazed and dizzied by a stream of questions,
which would put you in an undignified and humiliating position you’d find most
unpleasant (X.892d5-893a2).35

34 Cf. VI.783a.
35 Cf. Mayhew (2008, pp. 104-5); (2010, p. 215).
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Hence, the Athenian’s worry is not simply that Megillus and Kleinias will fail to understand
the subsequent discussion about the soul. His concern instead is that in their attempt to understand,
they will drown in confusion. Because of this, the Athenian, who has a background in philosophy,
will guide the discussion and will help his weaker friends ford this philosophical river. The larger
point of this metaphor is that it is dangerous for those lacking philosophical skill, to investigate
such complicated topics alone—they need a guide to filter the truth in a way they can grasp it.

5. Three Passages on Truth and Rational Argumentation
a. The Doctor Analogy
There are three key passages that one might take to undermine my interpretation of the preludes.
The first of these passages occurs in Book IX when the Athenian compares the method of the free
doctor’s educative method to that of a philosopher:
Ath.: We didn’t make a bad image, when we compared all those living under
legislation that exists now, to slaves being doctored by slaves. For it’s necessary to
know well some such thing as the following: if one of those doctors who practices
medicine on the basis of experiences rather than reason should ever encounter a
free doctor carrying on a dialogue with a free man who was sick—using arguments
that come close to philosophizing (καὶ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγγὺς χρώμενον μὲν τοῖς
λόγοις), grasping the disease from its source, and going back up to the whole nature
of bodies—he would swiftly burst out laughing and would say nothing other than
what is always said about such things by most of the so-called doctors. For he would
declare, ‘Idiot! You’re not doctoring the sick man, you’re practically educating him
(σχεδὸν παιδεύεις), as if what he needed were to become a doctor, rather than
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healthy!’
Kl.: Well, wouldn’t he be speaking correctly when he said such things?
Ath.: Maybe—if, at any rate, he went on to reflect that this man who goes
through laws in the way were doing now, is educating the citizens but not legislating
(παιδεύει τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νομοθετεῖ). Would he not appear to be saying this
too in the right way? (IX.857c2-e5).
Because the Athenian compares the free doctor’s method to practicing philosophy, one might
interpret the point of the preludes as being primarily a means by which the lawgiver supplies
epistemic reasons, like a philosopher.36
I have two responses to this objection. First, notice that the text does not say that the doctor
is a philosopher, or that the doctor is educating through philosophical argumentation. Strictly
speaking, the text says only that the doctor is “using arguments that come close to philosophizing.”
This conveys some distance between the activity of the free doctor and the activity of a
philosopher, which suggests that there is some difference between the legislator persuading
through preludes and a philosopher teaching through philosophical discourse.
Second, the quip about free doctors being like philosophers has little to do with persuasion,
but is fundamentally about how the founders must be philosophical in their approach to founding
the city. To see this, we have to look at the broader context in which the passage is situated. The
relevant discussion begins with the Athenian boldly asserting that one law should apply to all
instances of stealing; that is, all thieves should face the same punishment, no matter how they steal,
what they steal, the amount they steal, or the psychological states governing their action (IX.857a).
Kleinias rightfully questions whether one law should apply to all instances of robbery, since there

36 Cf. Bobonich (2002, pp. 100-1).
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are many varying circumstances (IX.857b). The Athenian is pleased with Kleinias’ objection,
remarking that it has woken him up from mindlessly legislating (IX.857c). The objection reminds
the Athenian of what he said earlier about the failure of past legislators. After this, the Athenian
offers the quip about the free doctor being like a philosopher (IX.857c-e).
Following this, the Athenian mentions that they are fortunate because they are not forced
to legislate immediately, but have time to inquire into what the best laws are for Magnesia
(IX.857e-858a). Kleinias agrees, and the three discuss stealing and justice in greater philosophical
detail. The discussion actually leads the Athenian to make nuanced distinctions in the law between
crimes committed in different psychological states. For instance, he distinguishes between crimes
committed while in a fit of anger or with prolonged deliberation (IX.866d-867b), and considers
the degree to which another party is injured (IX.862b-c). In revising his position, the Athenian
reveals to Megillus and Kleinias the value in legislating as philosophers. The passage, therefore,
has little to do with persuasion, but is primarily about reminding Megillus and Kleinias that they
should not mindlessly legislate, but should take their time and carefully consider the relevant
circumstances that pertain to each law.

b. Arguing with an Atheist
The second passage occurs in Book X when the Athenian asserts that “no one who believes in gods
according to the laws has ever voluntarily done an impious deed or let slip an illegal utterance”
(θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς ἠργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον
ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον) (X.885b4-5; cf. X.907d-e). The Athenian attributes deliberate wrong doing37 to

37 One should keep in mind that strictly speaking the Athenian thinks that all wrongdoing is involuntary
(V.731c, V.734b, IX.860d). Nevertheless, he does acknowledge that different psychological states can contribute to
wrongdoing and that different punishments are appropriate with respect to these varying states. For a helpful
discussion, see Stalley (1983, ch. 14).
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three religious beliefs: a) atheism, b) deism, and c) a misguided theism, in which the gods are
easily persuaded by humans (X.885b, cf. XI.921c, XII.948b-c). Kleinias asks the Athenian how
they should deal with those who do not share the religious beliefs of the city (X.885c). The
Athenian responds by taking up the position of an imaginary atheist and engages in a dialectical
exchange with the Atheist. Pretending to be an atheist, the Athenian says:
For some of us don’t believe in the gods at all, and others believe them to be as you
say. Now we demand, just as you demanded in regard to the laws, that before you
threaten us harshly (πρὶν ἀπειλεῖν ἡμῖν σκληρῶς), you first try to persuade and teach
(πείθειν καὶ διδάσκειν) that there are gods, adducing adequate evidence (τεκμήρια
λέγοντες ἱκανά), and that they are too good to be turned aside and beguiled from
what is just by certain gifts...From lawgivers who are claiming to be not savage but
gentle, we expect that persuasion be used on us first (παρὰ δὲ δὴ νομοθετῶν,
φασκόντων εἶναι μὴ ἀγρίων ἀλλὰ ἡμέρων, ἀξιοῦμεν πειθοῖ πρῶτον χρῆσθαι πρὸς
ἡμᾶς). And perhaps we would be persuaded by you, even if you didn’t speak much
better than the others about the existence of the gods, so long as you spoke better
as regards the truth (X.885c2-e5; cf. X.888a-891a).
The rest of Book X consists in the Athenian offering the Atheist several arguments in defense of
the city’s religion, showing that: gods exist, they care about humans, and are just. The fact that the
Athenian attempts to persuade the Atheist through argumentation lends credence to thinking that
Plato has rational persuasion in mind in the Laws.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that these passages are an anomaly in the
Laws. The vast majority of preludes unequivocally do not involve rational argumentation. This
raises the questions: Why is the Athenian relying upon rational argumentation to persuade the

81

Atheist? Why doesn’t the Athenian use non-rational persuasion, as he clearly uses in other parts
of the text? What is the relevant difference between Book X and the other Books, such that rational
persuasion is needed in Book X and not in the other passages?
Book X is unique to the extent that the Athenian debates an imaginary atheist, who has two
distinct features that make rational persuasion necessary. First, because the Atheist is convinced
that gods do not exist, he is not going to be motivated by preludes which appeal to divine
punishment or reward.38 These preludes will only motivate those citizens who are already
operating in a religious framework. Since the Atheist does not believe that there are gods, the
Athenian must take a different approach in order to persuade him; after all, threatening atheists
with divine punishment for not conforming to certain behaviors or beliefs will surely fall on deaf
ears.
Second, part of the reason why the Atheist is convinced that gods do not exist is because
he has been exposed to cosmological arguments against theism (X.886c-e; cf. XII.967a-d).39
Therefore, if the Athenian is to stand a chance at persuading the Atheist that gods exist, he is going
to first have to show why the Atheist’s view of cosmology is mistaken and this is exactly what the
Athenian sets out to do when he offers arguments about the nature of the soul and the cosmos to
the Atheist.
In other words, the Athenian’s use of rational arguments in Book X should be viewed as a
last ditch effort to gets the Atheist’s compliance without force. The Athenian makes it clear that it
would be far better had the Atheist unreflectively believed the myths about the gods that he was
taught as a child (X.887d). The rational persuasion of Book X, hence, is not a generic feature of

38 The vast majority of preludes make some reference to the gods, see especially II.663d-664a, IV.713a715d, IX.865d-e, IX.870d-e, IX.872d-873a, and XII.913c-914b.
39 Cf. VII.818c-819a, Apology 18a-c.
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the persuasion that Plato has in mind in the Laws, but is a special instance of it used to persuade
an individual who is not going to be moved by religious myths.

c. The Value of Truth
The third passage that one might think undermines my reading occurs in Book V when the
Athenian says:
Truth is the leader of all good things for gods and of all things for human beings.
Whoever is to become blessed and happy should partake of it from the very
beginning, so that he may live as a truthful man for as long a time as possible. Such
a man is trustworthy. The untrustworthy man is one who finds the voluntary lie
congenial; he who finds the involuntary lie congenial is foolish (ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος ᾧ
φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον, ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους). Neither of these is enviable,
because every man who is untrustworthy and ignorant is also friendless (V.730c16).40
One might take this passage to demonstrate that the legislators will not apply falsehoods in the
city; however, a careful reading of this passage will reveal that this is not the case.
First and foremost, the passage does not say that lying is never permissible or beneficial.
Rather it says that one should be truthful “for as long a time as possible,” which is consistent with
the Athenian thinking that in certain circumstances lying is permissible because being truthful is
not beneficial, and thus not possible.41 Second, the primary point of the passage is to teach citizens

40 Catherine Zuckert (2009, p. 91) takes this passage to demonstrate that the rulers are not permitted to lie.
41 This is consistent with Plato’s view of lying in the Republic. For instance, at II.383a-e Socrates asserts
that it is sometimes beneficial for the humans to use the “impure lie” when talking to the ignorant or mad; nevertheless,
the gods are altogether without lies because the gods are not friends with the ignorant and the mad. For additional
examples of beneficial lies in the Republic see I.331b-d, II.377e-378a, II.378c-d, III.414d-415c, III.416e-417b, and
V.459d-460c.
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that they should dislike lying.42 There is nothing inconsistent with the Athenian thinking that the
legislators should dislike lying, but that lying is necessary at certain times. In fact, teaching citizens
that they should hate lying will guard against them lying when it is unnecessary or harmful. Third,
although this passage makes it clear that the Stranger considers truth to be extremely valuable,
there is nothing inconsistent with the Athenian also thinking that falsehoods are useful in certain
circumstances. After all, as I have tried to explain, given the ineffectiveness of morality to
motivate, and most citizens’ inability to understand theology, false beliefs about why actions are
just are useful for teaching citizens true beliefs about what actions are just. In other words, false
beliefs provide a means by which citizens can come to recognize certain practical truths about
what they ought to do.

6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that both the rational interpretation and the non-rational interpretation
make the same mistake—they underappreciate the role that useful false beliefs play in Magnesia.
When we take into account these useful false beliefs, it becomes clear that the primary function of
the preludes is not epistemic, but practical—the preludes are designed to motivate correct action
by any means necessary (cf. IX.862d). There are two reasons that falsehoods accomplish this. First,
most just actions will appear to the average citizen as being grounded in other-regarding reasons
and this is problematic because most citizens are motivated by what they take to be self-regarding
reasons. Second, some truths are too complicated and abstract for the average citizen to understand
and it is dangerous to attempt to teach them these complex things. These two points are related; if

42 This is also consistent with Plato’s attitude towards truth and falsehood in the Republic. At various places
in the Republic Socrates makes it clear that the philosopher rulers should love truth and hate falsehood (V.474b-475c,
VI.485c-d, VI.490a-c, VI.501d, and XI.591d-e); nevertheless he permits them to lie when it is beneficial (III.389b-c).
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citizens were capable of knowing abstract truths about goodness, reason, and justice, they would
not need to be taught that they have self-regarding reasons to behave correctly because they would
already be motivated to instantiate these concepts by any means. My interpretation of the preludes
provides a clear explanation for why sometimes the preludes appear rational and other times appear
non-rational. On my interpretation the fundamental purpose of the preludes is to motivate citizens
to act correctly. However, because there are different citizens, with different educational
backgrounds, the lawgiver needs to offer different reasons for obeying law. 43 When addressing
recalcitrant atheists, the lawgiver must appeal to reason; nevertheless, when addressing the average
citizen, he can appeal to emotion.

43 This idea is suggested in the Athenian's discussion of poetry in Book IV. Surprisingly, the Athenian argues
that although the law must always be consistent, poets can contradict themselves. This is not a defect of poetry, but a
benefit, because it can show how different people should behave in different circumstances (IV.719c-e; cf. Pangle
1980, pp. 446-7).
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CHAPTER FOUR
On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws

“If intoxication is nature playing with human beings, the Dionysiac artist’s creation
is a plaything with intoxication. If one has not experienced it for oneself this state
can only be understood by analogy; it is rather like dreaming and at the same time
being aware that the dream is a dream. Thus the attendant of Dionysus must be in
a state of intoxication and at the same time he must lie in ambush, observing himself
from behind. Dionysiac art manifests itself, not in the alternation of clearmindedness and intoxication, but in their co-existence” (Nietzsche, The Dionysiac
World View, I. p. 121).

1. Introduction
In chapter one, I defended two claims about Plato’s view of false beliefs in the Republic. The first
claim is that falsehoods are beneficial when they produce normative truths. The second claim is
that false normative beliefs are never beneficial—these are the “true falsehoods” that are always
hated by gods and humans alike. In chapter three, I argued that Plato is committed to the former
claim in the Laws; however, I did not address whether Plato maintains the latter claim in the Laws
as well. In this chapter, I explore this issue by examining the Athenian Strangers’ defense of
drunkenness in Book I and II of the Laws.
Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness (μέθη) is surprisingly positive in the Laws, especially
as compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato
maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance, while in the Laws, Plato holds that

it can produce courage and temperance. This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind, and
if he did, why?1 Ultimately, this chapter answers affirmatively and argues that this marks a
substantive shift in Plato’s attitude towards false beliefs and anti-rational desires. More precisely,
this chapter argues that in the Republic, Plato holds that anti-rational desires2 and the beliefs that
produce them are always detrimental to health and virtue; in contrast, in the Laws, Plato maintains
that anti-rational desires and the beliefs that produce them can be instrumental to health and virtue.
I conclude this chapter by explaining how this claim converges with and is corroborated by the
claim that, in the Laws, Plato thinks that akrasia is more prevalent than in other texts.3

2. Intoxication in the Republic
There are four passages in the Republic in which Plato describes the ethical quality of drunkenness.
The first passage occurs in Book II when Socrates discusses the types of stories about the gods and
humans that it is appropriate and inappropriate to teach to young guardians. Socrates considers a
story told by Musaeus and his son in which the righteous are sent to Hades to engage in a kind of
eternal drinking party (363c-d). Socrates rejects this story on the grounds that it gives the wrong
impression as to what the rewards of virtue are—”as if they thought drunkenness was the finest
wage of virtue” (363d1-2). This passage demonstrates that intoxication should not be viewed as a

1 The role of drunkenness in the Laws has been mostly neglected by scholars. For instance, Stalley (1983, p.
5) remarks that “many readers have found the section tedious,” while Post (1929, p. 16) holds that it is simply a device
to “entice the unsuspecting drunkard into hearing a sermon on temperance.” The exceptions are Belfiore (1986) and
North (1966, pp. 191-2). Belfiore offers the most thoughtful and interesting discussion of drunkenness. However, I
disagree with her analysis in many important respects and I will discuss these issues further below. North provides a
useful, but brief discussion.
2 By “anti-rational desires,” I do not simply mean non-rational, but I mean as opposed to reason; that is,
desires that reason does not sanction. I will discuss this in more detail in section six.
3 My discussion of drunkenness will be restricted to the Laws and the Republic. The obvious text that I am
excluding from my discussion is the Symposium. I am excluding this text for two reasons: (1) with some minor
exceptions (cf. 176c-d), the Symposium does not explicitly discuss the dangers and benefits of intoxication; (2) the
Symposium does not involve the construction of city, and thus the norms concerning intoxication discussed in the
Symposium are taking place under a different context from the Laws and the Republic.
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reward for the virtuous and it might suggest that drunkenness is not to be associated with virtue
(cf. III.390a-b).
The second passage occurs in Book III when Socrates is discussing the education of the
guardians. At 398e-399a, Socrates objects to the use of the Lydian and Ionic musical harmonies4
in the education of the guardians because they are soft (μαλακαί), lax (χαλαραί), lazy (ἀργίαι), and
suitable for symposium (cf. 395e-396a). Hence, because these harmonies encourage behaviors,
such as drunkenness, softness, laxness, and laziness, they will be forbidden from the guardians’
education. Instead, the guardians will only hear musical harmonies that encourage courage and
temperance (399a-e).5 This passage suggests that Plato thinks that intoxication is harmful to one’s
ethical development because it makes one cowardly, lazy, and intemperate.
The third passage occurs in Book III when discussing the training of the body for young
guardians:
Soc.: We said that our prospective guardians must avoid drunkenness, for it is less
appropriate for a guardian to be drunk and not to know where on earth he is than it
is for anyone else.
Glau.: It would be absurd for a guardian to need a guardian (403e4-7).
Although this passage (i.e., 403e) is making reference back to the discussion of intoxication at
398e, the reasons raised against drunkenness are different. At 398e, Plato objects to drunkenness
on the grounds that it will hinder the development of a virtuous soul, while at 403e, the reasons
against intoxication have to do with responsibility. The guardians are supposed to protect the city
and they will not be able to fulfill this duty if they are drunk.6

4 The usual translation is “mode,” however, I am convinced by Woerther (2008, p. 91, n. 11) that “harmony”
is a better translation. Cf. Aristotle Politics VIII.1340a-b.
5 Socrates does not know the exact harmonies that have this feature (399a).
6 Of course, issues concerning responsibility and virtue are related in significant ways. Hence, all I mean by
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The fourth passage occurs in Book IX when Socrates discusses the nature of the tyrannical
soul. Socrates compares the soul of a tyrant to that of a soul during drunken sleep. Socrates warns
that “drunken sleep awakens the bestial and savage part in us,” which seeks to “satisfy its own
instincts” (571c4-7). In such a condition, “nothing is too outrageous, being unfastened and
delivered from all sense of shame (ἀναισχυντίας) and prudence” (571c7-d2). During drunken sleep
one’s erotic desires run wild—seeking anyone, be it one’s own mother, man, beast, or god;
additionally, one is prone to violent outbursts, gluttony, and all sorts of foolish behavior (571c-d).
In contrast, during sober and healthy sleep, reason is in control, and as a result one’s sleep will
likely be peaceful and lawful (571d-572b).
This passage continues with Socrates explaining how the tyrant’s soul is similar to the soul
of a drunk. The tyrannical soul develops when erotic desires, “like a great winged drone,” become
the leader of the soul’s desires (573a1-2; cf. V.475a). Then, “other desires—filled with incense,
myrrh, wreaths, wine, and the other pleasures found in their company—buzz around the drone,”
and nurture the drone and make it grow as large as possible (573a4-8). Following this, the drone
adopts “madness as its bodyguard” and if it finds any reasonable beliefs or desires, “it destroys
them and throws them out, until its purged him of moderation and filled him with imported
madness” (573a8-b4). Hence, in both the tyrant’s and the drunk’s soul, anti-rational desires run
mad and thwart reasons control of the soul (573c; Phaedrus 238b, 256c).
These four passages make it clear that Plato’s attitude towards intoxication in the Republic
is negative.7 Let us now turn to Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness in the Laws. In the next

this distinction is that at 398e the criticism of intoxication concerns the fact that it causes intemperance and cowardice,
while at 403, it is about the fact that while drunk one is not able to fulfill certain duties.
7 Plato, however, does maintain that there will be drinking wine in the so called “city of pigs” (III.372a-b);
nevertheless, Glaucon objects to the city of pigs on the grounds that it is lacks the goods related to symposium
(III.372e), so it seems unlikely that drunkenness occur in the city of pigs; cf. IV.426a-b.
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section I examine Plato’s discussion of drunkenness in Laws I; following this I examine it in Laws
II.8

3. Laws I: Wine as Testing and Training
Books I and II of the Laws are largely about “musical education.”9 The Athenian is quite critical
of the Cretan and Spartan educational systems, arguing that their method of education is illequipped to develop virtue in their citizens—including the virtue of courage, which Megillus and
Kleinias value over every other virtue.10 According to the Athenian, not only does courage
“combat against fears and pains,” but it also guards against “longings (πόθους) and pleasures, and
certain terrible cajoling flatteries (δεινὰς θωπείας κολακικάς) that can turn to wax (ποιοῦσιν
κηρίνους) the spiritedness (τοὺς θυμοὺς) even of those who think themselves solemn” (I.633c8d3). This is problematic for the citizens of both Crete and Sparta because, according to Megillus
and Kleinias, they only train in resisting pain, but do nothing to combat pleasure (I.635b-d).
The Stranger remarks that there is something perplexing about the Cretans’ and Spartans’
educational system. On the one hand, the Spartans’ and Cretans’ lawgiver maintains that their
citizens should “keep away from and not taste the greatest sorts of pleasure and play” (I.635b5-6).
On the other hand, “as to pains and fears” the lawgiver maintains “that if someone flees them, from
childhood until the end of life, the result will be that when he gets into unavoidable toils and fears
and pains, he will flee before those who have had gymnastic training in such things and will be
enslaved by them” (I.635b6-c3). The Athenian wonders why the same lawgiver did not think the

8 I believe that the Laws is a unified work, and thus I am merely analyzing Books I and II separately for
purposes of clarity.
9 Music, μουσική, was a broad category for the Ancient Greeks, which included rhythm, harmony, and
discourses (λόγοι).
10 For instance, in Book I Kleinias and Megillus argue that governments exist to win wars and thus the
primary virtue that governments should develop is courage (628 ff.).
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same thing about training in pleasure as he did about training in pain. The lawgiver should have
said to himself:
‘If our citizens grow up from youth lacking experience in the greatest pleasures, if
they aren’t practiced in enduring pleasures and in never being compelled to do
anything shameful (ἀμελέτητοι γιγνόμενοι ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καρτερεῖν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν
αἰσχρῶν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποιεῖν), their softness of spirit before pleasures will lead
them to suffer the same thing as those who are overcome by fears. They will be
enslaved in another and more shameful fashion to those who are capable of
enduring pleasures, who have experienced pleasures (τοῖς γε δυναμένοις καρτερεῖν
ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ τοῖς κεκτημένοις τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς), and who are sometimes
human beings vicious in every way. They’ll have souls that are part slave and part
free, and will not be worthy of being called courageous and free men without
qualification’ (I.635c5-d5).
Kleinias and Megillus, however, are quite wary about the advantages of training in
pleasure. Accordingly, the Athenian proposes that they look at the virtue of temperance
(σωφροσύνη) and examine how training in pleasure can aid in cultivating temperance. This leads
the Athenian to inquire into Sparta’s and Crete’s method for developing temperance.
Unfortunately, Megillus is unsure how exactly Sparta trains their citizens to develop temperance,
but he suggests that it is likely developed in their practice of gymnastics and common meals
(I.636a).11 Awkwardly, the Athenian condemns this practice, arguing that it is the cause of
unnatural sexual behaviors in Sparta and Crete (I.636b-e).12 Although Megillus is uncertain of how

11 The common meals were essentially an all-male club with a military emphasis; see Morrow (1960, pp.
389-98). In the Politics II.1271a-1272a, Aristotle notes that the Spartans developed their practice from the Cretans.
For a discussion of the connection of common meals and gymnastics with pederasty see Percy (1996).
12 The Athenian points out that all Greeks accuse the Cretans of being the originators of the myth of
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to respond, he ultimately defends the Spartan practice of evading pleasure (I.636e)—boasting that
in his opinion “the ways of Sparta with regard to pleasures are the finest to be found among
humankind” (I.636e8-a2). Megillus explains that Spartans do not host any drinking parties and
that drunkenness is so disparaged that Spartans would beat any drunkard they came across, even
during the festival of Dionysus (I.637a-b).13
The Athenian, however, is not impressed with this Spartan practice; rather, he takes to
defending intoxication, arguing that under the appropriate conditions it is quite valuable.14 The
Athenian explains that drinking wine intensifies “pleasures and pains and the spirited and erotic
emotions” (I.645d6-8), while dulling “sense perceptions (αἰσθήσεις), memories, beliefs, and
prudent thoughts (φρονήσεις)” (I.645e1-2). Intoxication thus renders you in a childlike condition
in which you have very little self-control (I.645e-646a); as a result you are bolder, more talkative,
more confident, more hopeful, more joyful, more fearless, and more shameless (I.649a-d, II.666cd, II.671b-c; cf. Cratylus 406-c). If this condition were permanent it would be awful, but because
Ganymede, which is the model for the Greek practice of pederasty (I.636d; cf. VIII.836c-839d). For a discussion of
the history of pederasty in Greek culture see Percy (1996). Plato's attitude towards pederasty in the Laws seems to
differ from his attitude in the Symposium and the Phaedrus; cf. Republic V.458c-d. Interestingly enough, this passage
was contentiously discussed in Romer v. Evans, see Clark (2000) for an overview. It should also be noted that part of
the Athenian's criticism of common meals is that the Spartans and the Cretans are only concerned with making their
citizens good at war and are not concerned with the virtues that come about during peace and leisure; cf. I.625e, I.633a,
VI.780b. Plato wants to extend this practice to women (VI.780e-781d) and for the focus to be not just preparation for
war, but communion with fellow citizens; cf. Pangle (1980, p. 379). In Politics II.1274b, Aristotle points out that
Plato's inclusion of women in common meals was unique to him. This demonstrates an openness not found in many
other Greek thinkers; nevertheless, Plato’s inclusion of women is rooted in the sexist belief that women severely lack
virtue and discipline, and this practice will help them develop it (VI.781a-b).
13 Both the Spartans and Cretans were notoriously abstemious and restrained wine drinkers; cf. Minos 320a.
For instance, the Helots were the only people allowed to get drunk in Sparta. The adult Spartans forced the Helots to
get incapacitatingly drunk to make an example to the Spartan youth of how not to behave; see Cartledge (2004, p. 98).
Morrow (1960 p. 371, n. 255) explains that during the festival of Dionysus, a cart carrying the god was
followed by wagons with raucous riders shouting insults and obnoxious things at one another and the crowd. This is
likely what Megillus is complaining about at I.637a-b.
14 The Athenian is quite explicit that he is not merely talking about the value of drinking wine, but the value
in getting drunk (637d); see Belfiore (1986, p. 430, n. 29). Some scholars have argued that this is not the case. For
instance, England (1921, ad loc. 637d4) advises, “We must remember that the Greeks drank nothing stronger than
wine, and nearly always drank that mixed with water and hence the word μὲθη had not the disgusting connotation that
its equivalent has among us”; while Stalley (1983, p. 124) writes that symposiasts are only “mildly intoxicated.”
However, these accounts cannot explain why the Athenian would describe drunkenness as causing the effects that it
does (cf. I.645d-e).

92

it is only temporary, it can be used medicinally to strengthen the soul. This is not unlike taking
purgative medicine or engaging in vigorous exercise; both practices strengthen the body by first
temporarily weakening it (I.646c).15 Drunkenness works in a similar manner: the wine temporarily
weakens the soul by putting it in a base condition; nevertheless, this experience can ultimately
strengthen the soul by producing “shame” (αἰδώς) in it, which is a precondition for virtue
(I.646b).16
The Athenian explains how drunkenness develops a sense of shame (αἰδώς) by
distinguishing between two types of fear. On the one hand, there is the fear of expecting an evil,
such as pain or death (I.646e). Fearing pain or death is dangerous because it can prevent individuals
from acting courageously in battle (I.647b-c). Because of this, it is vital that individuals are trained
to develop immunity to this kind of fear. This takes the form of exposing citizens to the fears that
they should be fearless of; the idea being that with practice, citizens will learn to endure the “evils”
that they find fearful. The Spartan and Cretan educational system focuses on this kind of fear
(I.633b-d).
On the other hand, there is the fear of doing something dishonorable, especially in the
presence of someone noble; this kind of fear is called “shame” (αἰδώς) (I.646e-647b). Shame is a

15 Cf. Republic II.382a-e, III.398a-e.
16 Pangle (1980, p. 27, n. 55) notes that although αἰδώς is synonymous with αἰσχύνη, the former has a more
august connotation in which it can mean a “sense of honor,” “reverence,” or “respect.” Thus, Pangle translates it as
“awe” and translates the latter as “shame.” Cairnes (1993, p. 415) states that αἰσχύνη refers to a shameful state of
affairs, while αἰδώς refers to an individual's reaction to that state of affairs. Thus, αἰδώς has in inhibitory sense, such
that if one possesses αἰδώς, one will hesitate to do something disgraceful. The Athenian tends to use αἰσχύνη to
describe shameful acts and uses αἰδώς to means something like “a sense of shame” or “fear of doing something
dishonorable”; nonetheless, at other times, he seems to use them interchangeably. Consider the following example:
Ath. “And often we fear reputation, when we think we shall gain a bad repute for doing or say something bad; and
this fear we, like everybody else, I imagine, call shame (αἰσχύνην)...Does not, then, the lawgiver, and every man who
is worth anything, hold this kind of fear in the highest honor, and name it shame (αἰδῶ); and to the confidence that is
opposed to it does he not call it shamelessness (ἀναίδειάν).” Belfiore (1992, pp. 203-16) argues that Plato's discussion
of αἰδώς in the Laws greatly influenced Aristotle's conception of αἰδώς. Nevertheless, there is an interesting difference
between Plato and Aristotle in the sense that Plato identifies αἰδώς as a type of fear, while Aristotle contrasts those
who act rightly because of fear and those who act rightly because of αἰδώς, see EN X.9.1179b4-16. For another
discussion of Aristotle's account of αἰδώς, see Konstan (2007, pp. 92-6).
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good type of fear because when individuals have shame they are not only able to resist suffering
and pain, but they are able to endure the greatest pleasures as well (I.646a).17 The idea is that when
you confront something that frightens you, or an extreme amount of pleasure, out of fear of being
viewed a disgrace by someone noble, you will not flee from pursuing excellence, but will remain
on the road to virtue. Therefore, it might be appropriate to call shame a precondition for virtue
because its existence aids in producing courage, temperance, and justice. 18 Now just as citizens
develop fearlessness of expecting pain by being exposed to that which they think is painful, citizens
develop the fear that is shame (αἰδώς) by being exposed to and overcoming pleasures that seduce
them into acting shamelessly and unjustly (II.647c-e).19
Properly supervised drinking parties provide an inexpensive and safe way to cultivate and
test shame (I.649c-650a).20 In a state of drunkenness, you become more cheerful, more fearless,
and less controlled (I.649b). As a result, you will become more tempted to shamelessly pursue
pleasure. Putting individuals in this condition, provides an opportunity to develop shame in much
the same way that being exposed to pain and fear develops courage and fearlessness: just as one
learns to overcome pain and fear by being exposed to it, one will learn to overcome the temptation
of pleasure and fearlessness by being exposed to it as well (I.649c).21 Additionally, if a symposiast

17 This is why at I.647b-c the Athenian says that “each of us must be at the same time fearless and fearful.”
18 At 647a-b, the Athenian calls “shamelessness” (ἀναίδεια) the greatest evil in both private and public life.
19 Pangle (1980, p. 27, n. 55) points out that in Plutarch's Cleomenes IX it is noted that the Spartans have a
positive attitude towards fear; they hold that it is not something that should always be avoided, but rather should be
cultivated in certain ways. For instance, the Spartans believed that fear had the power to hold a regime together; cf.
Euthyphro 12b. This is why the Spartans constructed temples to Phobos (Fear) and his twin brother Deimos (Terror).
This suggests that the Athenian might be trying to persuade Megillus that drunkenness is valuable by showing him
how it can cultivate something that his own culture values. One should also keep in mind that Dionysus is the god of
battle panic; see Euripides' Bacchae 302-5, cited by Belfiore (1986, p. 436).
20 The Athenian is clear that it is necessary that drunkenness occurs under the appropriate conditions. He
argues that if these conditions cannot be met, he would prefer that drunkenness be forbidden altogether (I.637e-674c).
21 There is an interesting question as to how exactly this analogy is supposed to work: Does habituation to
pain make painful experiences less painful, or does it make us care less about the pain? Likewise does the exposure
to pleasure make pleasurable experiences less pleasurable, or does it make us care less about pleasure? The Stranger
does not provide a clear answer; nevertheless, it seems that the answer is probably a combination of both.
Stalley (1983, p. 124) objects to this analogy on the grounds that wine reduces self-control, but does not
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acts inappropriately there is no great danger (I.649d-650b) because a wise, sober, and elderly,
symposiarch is leading the symposium (I.640d, II.671d, II.672a).22
Furthermore, this practice provides the city with the knowledge of who has a sense of
shame, and thus can resist pleasure, and who is shameless, and thus cannot resist pleasure, which
is some of the most useful knowledge that the city can acquire (I.650b). In other words, there is a
kind of honesty that comes from intoxication; in this state, you reveal your true character (cf.
Symposium 214a, 217e; Protagoras 347c-e).
From the Athenian’s discussion in Book I, we can identify two benefits of drunkenness:
(1) it is a safe and inexpensive device for testing one’s sense of shame, and (2) it provides a means
by which one can train in the resistance of pleasure and develop a sense of shame. Let us turn to
the Stranger’s discussion of intoxication in Book II.

4. Laws II: Pleasure, Motivation, and Evaluative Judgments
The Athenian is adamant that drinking parties are only beneficial under certain conditions. There
are four conditions that matter most: (1) there needs to be a wise, sober, and elderly symposiarch
(II.672a), (2) there are strict age restrictions on the symposium (II.666a-b), (3) those who engage
in symposium are not on duty (II.647a-b),23 and (4) the symposium is restricted to the festival of
Dionysus (VI.775b).24 For the purposes of this section, it is only necessary to focus on the age
actually heighten pleasure. However, I think Stalley’s criticism is mistaken; Plato is assuming that the drinking party
is taking place in a fun and joyous setting, in which individuals are surrounded with friends.
22 At 648d the Athenian suggests that people might practice drunkenness while alone. However, as Belfiore
(1983, p. 424, n. 13) explains there is no contradiction for Plato “to allow solitary, unsupervised drinking but to require
a symposiarch to rule groups of drinkers.” Drinking parties are also restricted to certain individuals (II.666a-b) and to
the festival of Dionysus (VI.775b). This shall be discussed in more detail in the next section.
23 For instance, the Athenian forbids the following from drinking: female and male slaves, magistrates during
the year in which they serve, pilots, soldiers, and judges while performing their services, and anyone in an important
council meeting (II.674a-b).
24 The Athenian is particularly concerned about individuals getting drunk during their wedding reception.
He is concerned that this will ruin one's ability to procreate or effect the development of the fetus (775b-775e); see
Abel (1999). The text indicates that the symposium is not restricted to men, but women will be allowed their own
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restrictions of the symposium.
The Athenian maintains that citizens are forbidden to drink wine until the age of eighteen
(II.666a).25 After the age of eighteen, citizens will be permitted to drink and taste wine in
moderation (666a). However, only those nearing the age of forty and older will be allowed to
engage in drunkenness (666a-b).26 These ages are not arbitrarily selected, but are grounded in the
Athenian’s understanding of education and moral psychology
According to the Stranger, children have a fiery disposition in which they are always
seeking to move and sing, and are incapable of remaining calm (653d-e, 664e, 672c). In contrast,
adults are reluctant to sing and dance because they no longer find such activities pleasurable, but
consider them shameful:
Everyone as he grows older becomes apprehensive about singing, and takes less
pleasure in doing this, and when he is forced to sing, he feels ashamed (αἰσχύνοιτ᾽).
The more elderly and sober (σωφρονέστερος)27 that he gets, the more this
increases...Surely, then, he will be more than ever ashamed (αἰσχύνοιτ᾽) to get up
and sing in the theater, before people of all sorts (665d9-e6).
This is no trivial matter, but is quite serious insofar as musical education forms the basis

symposium; cf. VIII.828c.
25 One might worry that this suggests that drunkenness is not crucial to learning self-control, or that one
cannot develop self-control until adulthood. However, as I explain below, this is not the case. The Athenian's point is
that how one trains in self-control differs for different ages. For the youth who already have a lot of spirit, they need
calm activities to lower their spirit, and as a result they will be more controlled. Adults, on the other hand, have a
dearth of spirit, and need something to excite them so that their resistance to pleasure is sharpened and does not wane,
and drunkenness does this.
26 The Athenian is consistent in banning wine from the youth, however the particular age at which one is
permitted to drink varies. Morrow (1960, p. 318), Stalley (1983, pp. 124-5), and England (1921, p. 12) hold that Book
I suggests that the Athenian wants young individuals to engage in drunkenness. However, I agree with Belfiore (1986,
p. 425 and n. 15) that this is not the case.
27 Σώφρων is often translated as “temperate,” “moderate,” or “self-controlled.” In the context of this passage,
“sober,” is the best translation for two reasons. First, “sober” more directly suggests that one is not interested in
drinking and perhaps more serious. Second, the Athenian believes that this is a defect of old age and thus it seems
inappropriate to use “temperate,” “moderate,” or “self-controlled,” because Plato generally considers these positive
qualities.
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for developing proper evaluative judgments and emotional responses.28 According to the Stranger,
humans are distinct from other animals to the extent that only humans, with the help of the Muses,
Apollo, and Dionysus, are capable of perceiving rhythm and harmony in song and dance (i.e.,
chorus) (653e-654b, 664e-665a). The idea is that through organized and systematic singing and
dancing at festivals, the rambunctious movements of children become fine and harmonious, and
from this, children learn to take pleasure in what is fine and good and to hate and be pained by
what is ugly and bad (653b-654d).29 In other words, musical education forms the basis for citizens’
ethical development because it is through musical education that citizens develop correct opinions
and feelings about what is good and bad.30
We have the beginning of explanation for why the Athenian believes that the elderly may
engage in drunkenness and why the youth should abstain from intoxication. Because the young
already have fiery dispositions and are eager to participate in song and dance, they are already
primed to be educated into what is fine and good through musical education. However, this is not
the case for older adults since they find such activities shameful. Because adults no longer
participate in chorus, their musical education and virtue are prone “to slacken” and become
“corrupted to a great extent” (653c7-9). Evidence of this is reflected in the very fact that they no

28 Cf. Timaeus 47d-e, Soc.: “And harmony, whose movements are akin to the orbits within our souls, is a
gift of the Muses, if our dealings with them are guided by understanding, not for irrational pleasure, for which people
nowadays seem to make use of it, but to serve as an ally in the fight to bring order in any orbit in our souls that has
become unharmonized, and make it concordant with itself, Rhythm, too, has likewise been given to us by Muses for
the same purpose, to assist us. For with most of us our condition is such that we have lost all sense of measure and are
lacking in grace.”
29 The third chorus, which is called the Chorus of the Elders, and referred to as a Chorus of Dionysus, is
responsible for selecting the songs and dances in the festivals (II.670d). Morrow (1960, p. 315) notes that “to call this
chorus of elders a chorus of Dionysus is a paradox. Dionysus, the giver of wine and the leader in frenzied dances, was
a powerful god among the multitude, but scarcely the god one would choose as patron of an Academy of taste and
morals”; cf. Belfiore (1986, pp. 425-7).
30 Ath.: “I call education the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and
liking, pain and hatred that are formed in the soul on the right lines before the ability to understand the reason (μήπω
δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν), and then when the souls do become capable of reasoning, these passions can in
consonance with reason affirm they have been correctly habituated in the appropriate habits. This consonance in its
entirety is virtue”; cf. Republic III.401d-402b.
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longer recognize the choral dances and songs as fine and pleasurable, but mistakenly think that
participating in these activities is shameful (665d-e). Drunkenness can cure this ailment by putting
adults in a childlike condition, a state in which they lack self-control (I.645e), and are more
excitable and eager to sing and dance (I.649a-b, II.671b-c), and thus able to become reeducated:
As a man approaches forty he is to share in the enjoyment of the common meals,
invoking the presence of the other gods, and especially Dionysus, at this mysteryrite31 and play of older men, which he has bestowed on human beings as a drug that
heals the austerity (αὐστηρότητος) of old age. Its effect is that we are rejuvenated,
and the soul, by forgetting its despondency of spirit (δυσθυμίας), has its
dispositions turned from harder to softer, so that it becomes more malleable, like
iron32 when it is plunged into fire. Will not this softer disposition, in the first place,
render each one of them more ready and less ashamed to sing chants and
‘incantations’ (as we have often called them), in the presence, not of a large
company of strangers, but of a small number of intimate friends? (II.666b2-c8).
Thus, when drunk, older adults who are normally reluctant to sing and dance, will be more
eager to participate in the chorus. Now, since a wise symposiarch will govern their drunken
behavior, he will ensure that the songs and dances they perform are noble. The Athenian explains:
Just as when they were young in the hands of the man who has the skill and the
ability to train and mold them. And now, even as then, the man who is to mold them
is the good legislator; he must lay down symposium laws, able to control that
symposiast who becomes cheerful and bold and unduly shameless and unwilling to

31 For a discussion of Greek mystery religions see Burkert (1987), (1985).
32 This suggests that the Athenian has not lost site of the “puppet metaphor” from Book I; cf. II.671b-c. This
will be discussed further below.
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submit to the proper limits of silence and speech, of drinking and music, making
him consent to do in all ways the opposite—laws able also, with the aid of justice,
to fight against the entrance of such ignorable audacity, by bringing in that most
noble fear which we have named a sense of honor and shame (αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην)
(II.671c1-d3).33
Hence, musical education will not only re-develop adults judgments about what is good and bad,
but will redevelop their emotional dispositions as well, such that they will like and take pleasure
in good and fine things and hate and are pained by bad and ugly things.
Part of the re-education that occurs during the symposium is a result of the physiological
effects that wine has upon adults and how these effects relate to the development of shame.
Essentially, there are two physiological causes of shamelessness. There is the kind of
shamelessness that arises from having too much spirit or excitement of the emotions. 34 In such a
circumstance, you are unable to endure pleasure, and as a result you are prone to succumb to your
crude appetites—not fearing the opinions of noble individuals. This is the kind of shamelessness
that is often discussed. Nevertheless, there is another, more subtle, kind of shamelessness that
occurs when you do not have enough spirit or excitement of the emotions. Under these
circumstances, your despondency of spirit and lack of shame prevents you from pursuing virtuous
activity, which is a sign that you have stopped caring about what noble people think of you.
The former kind of shamelessness primarily affects younger individual (653a-665a, 672c).
For this reason, the young should not be given wine, such an activity would be akin to pouring

33 Morrow (1960, p. 315) writes, “It seems that Plato still felt, as he did when he was writing the Symposium,
that 'enthusiasm,' or intoxication with the divine, was the driving force underlying all insight and achievement. The
popular tale that Dionysus gave wine to man in vengeance for having been deprived of his reason by Hera is an affront
to his divinity (II.672b).”
34 I am using the terms “spirit” and “emotions” to cover a wide range of emotions which involve vigor and
energy.
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“fire into the fire that is already in the body and the soul” (666a4-6). 35 Nevertheless, because older
individuals lack spirit, the fire of wine will reignite their passions, and in doing this it can redevelop
their sense of shame (666b-c, II.671c-d); this is why the Athenian says that wine was given to
human beings to put “shame in the soul and health as well as strength in the body” (672d7-9).
In other words, Plato believes that wine can be used as a drug for inciting allopathic
catharsis.36 Allopathic treatment consists in restoring health through medicine that contains
ingredients that are opposite in nature to those that have caused the illness initially. An example
of this would be if a doctor treats a patient suffering from an excess of “heat” with a drug that
“cools” the patient. The idea being that the “cooling” agent will purge the excess “heat” in the
body, and thus bring balance and harmony to the patient. In contrast, homeopathic catharsis
restores health through an antidote that contains ingredients that are similar in nature to those that

35 In the Timaeus at 60a, Plato describes wine as a fiery substance that heats both the soul and the body.
36 Belfiore (1986, pp. 431-7) supports this interpretation with an interesting analysis of ancient medicine.
Belfiore (1986, p. 433-4) notes that Plato discusses catharsis in other texts. For instance, in the Sophist 230b-e Plato
holds elenchos is the “greatest and best catharsis”; see also, Phaedo 69 ff. However, Belfiore argues that Plato’s
discussion of catharsis is unique in the Laws because, here, catharsis is beneficial because it causes disorder. Belfiore
maintains Plato's discussion of catharsis in the Laws greatly influenced Aristotle's conception of catharsis.
Nonetheless, it is not clear that the conception of catharsis in the Laws had much influence on Aristotle's conception
of catharsis to the extent that catharsis in the Laws is primarily allopathic, while Aristotle's conception of catharsis is
not obviously allopathic, but might be homeopathic. Traditionally, Aristotle's account of catharsis was interpreted as
being straightforwardly homeopathic, see Bernays (1997/1880); Flashar (1956); Bywater (1909, p. 153-5); Lucas
(1968, p. 285); Schadewaldt (1970); Fortenbaught (1975); Janko (1987, intro, sec. 5); and Halliwell (1986). However,
Belfiore (1992) interprets Aristotle's account of catharsis as allopathic. For a recent summary of the various
interpretations of Aristotle's account of catharsis, see Munteanu (2011). Aristotle discussions of catharsis are found in
the Poetics 1149b24-8 and Politics 1342a4-15, 1341b36-41.
Although I agree with Belifore that Plato mostly advocates for allopathic catharsis in the Laws, there is one
passage that suggests that that he also believes that homeopathic catharsis can be useful. Consider VII.790d-e: “For
presumably when mothers want to lull their restless children to sleep they don't provide stillness but just the opposite
motion; they rock them constantly in their arms, and not with silence but with some melody. It's exactly as if they
were charming the children with aulos-playing, even as if it is done for the maddened Bacchic revelers, to whom they
administer this same cure, which consists of the motion that is dance and music”; cf.VII.791a-b; Phaedrus 228b, 234d;
Crito 54d; Ion 533d-536d; Symposium 215c-e. Linforth (1950a, p. 158) explains, “The disorder which they [i.e., the
Corybantic rites] relieved was an inner tumult of fear and apprehension caused by a bad condition of the soul, and the
cure was wrought by the external tumult of the rites…The cure is homeopathic in that it produces symptoms identical
or nearly identical with those of the disorder to be cured”; cf. Dodds (1951, p. 231, n. 59). Additionally, it should be
noted that the festival of Dionysus was traditionally seen as an opportunity to purge excess irrational desires and
feelings. Plato's inclusion of the festival suggests that he recognized the importance of catharsis. For a discussion of
the role of dancing, music, and madness in Plato's philosophy; see Dodds (1951, chap. 3.) and Linforth (1950a),
(1950b).
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have caused the illness initially. An example of this would be a doctor treating an agent with excess
“heat” with a drug that further “warms” the agent; the idea being that the additional heat will purge
the excess heat, and thus bring harmony and balance to the patient. That Plato believes that wine
can be used as a drug for inciting allopathic catharsis is clear from the fact that wine should be
given to the elderly to rekindle the fire that they lack, while the young, who are already full of fire,
should not be given wine; rather, they should be given something that can cool and calm their
manic movements.
Accordingly, in Laws II, drunkenness provides two educational benefits: (1) it aids one in
re-developing one’s evaluative judgments and affective states, and (2) it has the physiological
effect of re-exciting the emotions required for virtuous activity.37

5. The Textual Response
Having explored Plato’s attitude towards intoxication in both the Republic and the Laws we are
now in a position to assess the similarities and differences. There are two similarities. First, both
texts maintain that while in a position of responsibility, one should not practice intoxication.
Second, both texts maintain that a state of permanent intoxication is not a good thing (cf. Laws
I.646b-c).
There are, however, two main differences. First, in the Republic, intoxication is associated
with softness, laziness, and looseness, while in the Laws it is associated with vigor, spirit, and
energy. Second, intoxication in the Republic negatively affects the soul by promoting cowardice
and intemperance, while in the Laws it can promote the virtues of courage and temperance. This

37 It is unclear that Plato sees these two points as being different; nevertheless, it is still useful to distinguish
between them. Drunkenness is also beneficial because it contributes to friendship (I.640b, II.672a). It should be noted
that the use of wine as a tool for education is part of the general idea that education should be conjoined with play
(II.656c, II.671e, VII.798b-c, VII.803c-804b, VIII.832d; Republic VII.537a.
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raises the question: Did Plato change his mind about intoxication, or, are these difference merely
the result of the Laws and the Republic having different focuses?
There are some obvious differences between the Laws and the Republic. The Laws is
concerned with practical matters and deals with ordinary citizens, while the Republic is more
theoretical and deals with more idealized citizens.38 Scholars generally cite two pieces of evidence
to support this reading. First, in the Laws, unlike the Republic, one finds detailed discussions of
practical issues. Second, the Stranger refers to the polity of Magnesia as second best (Laws
V.739e4, IX.875d3-4), while in the Republic Socrates makes it clear that he is not concerned about
practical limitations, but is concerned with ideals (Republic V.472c4-d2). Hence, one might argue
that had Plato been interested in discussing ordinary people and practical matters in the Republic,
such as how to deal with old age, he would have said many of the same things about drunkenness
in the Republic as he did in the Laws.39
Nevertheless, this cannot explain why Plato’s description of drunkenness is different. As I
explained above, intoxication in the Laws is associated with vigor, while in the Republic it is
associated with the languid. This difference cannot be the result of the texts focusing on different
citizens because it has to do with the nature of intoxication itself. Additionally, even though the
guardians differ from the citizens of Magnesia, Plato wants both sets of citizens to be courageous
and temperate; thus, it is telling that the guardians and the citizens of Magnesia train in pleasure
in very different ways. In the Republic, the guardians train in pleasure by not being exposed to
gluttony, lust, and drunkenness. After all, this is why in Books II, III, and X, Socrates bans many

38 See Stalley (1983, pp. 16-7). Bobonich (2002) rejects this claim, arguing that the Laws is Plato's new
utopian construction. In support of Bobonich’s claim is the fact that the first-best city that Magnesia lags behind is far
more ideal than the Kallipolis in the sense that every citizen in it is virtuous.
39 Belfiore (1986, p. 428) seems to adopt this position; she argues that in the Laws Plato adopts a less
idealized theory of health for the less idealized citizens. I will discuss her position in detail further below.
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of the traditional stories about gods, heroes, and men. In contrast, the citizens of Magnesia learn
about pleasure by being exposed to vicious behaviors so that they might develop a resistance to
them. For these reasons we must conclude that Plato did in fact change his mind about intoxication.
Now one might object that at Republic III.413d-414a, Plato says that the guardians will be
tested by being exposed to pleasures:
Like those who lead colts into noise and tumult to see if they’re afraid, we must
expose our young people to fears and pleasures, testing them more thoroughly than
gold is tested by fire. If someone is hard to put under a spell...is a good guardian of
himself and the music and poetry he has learned...then he is the best person both
for himself and for the city. Anyone who is tested in this way as a child, youth, and
adult, and always comes out of it untainted, is to be made a ruler as well as a
guardian (III.413d8-414a2).
I have three responses to this objection. First, the main focus in the educative process
discussed in Books II and III is mostly concerned with only exposing the guardians to virtuous
examples—so that they imitate their excellence. Second, it is revealing that Plato does not include
intoxication as a means by which the guardians will be tested in pleasure (cf. II.398e, III.403e),
since in the Laws intoxication is the true test to see if one is able to resist pleasure. Lastly, this
passage (viz., Rep. III.413d-414a) demonstrates that the guardians who are candidates for being
philosopher rulers will be exposed to pleasure as means of training. Nevertheless nothing in the
Republic suggests that this training will extend to other members of the city. Hence, one reason
that Socrates might not want to expose the other citizens to such pleasures is that he thinks it is
obvious that it will negatively affect them. However, in the Laws, all adult citizens will be exposed
to pleasures as means of training, because the Athenian believes that it will help them develop
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virtue, which suggests that Plato has changed his mind about this issue.
If I am right about this, we are left with the following questions: Why did Plato change his
mind about the effects of intoxication? And, why did he change his view about the role that
drunkenness should play in education? I will first offer an answer to the former question, then I
will consider and reject Elizabeth Belfiore’s answer to the latter question. In the Politics at
VIII.1342b23-27, Aristotle mentions that certain musical critics disapproved of Plato’s rejection
of relaxed harmonies, describing them as intoxicated, in the sense that they lack power (cf.
Republic III.398e). George Grote (2010/1865, p. 328, n. 1) suggests that this criticism might be
why Plato changed his perspective on the effects of intoxication in the Laws. I think Grote’s
suggestion might be the best answer we can find to this question and thus I will primarily focus on
the latter question in the remainder of the chapter.40

6. Virtue, Health, and Training
Elizabeth Belfiore (1986) argues Plato’s discussion of intoxication in the Laws reveals that Plato
is offering a novel account of what constitutes a virtuous soul in the Laws. In order to understand
Belfiore’s position, we must first consider her interpretation of the Republic. At Republic
VII.588d-559d, Plato distinguishes between necessary and unnecessary desires.41 Necessary
desires are those that are beneficial; these include things like the desire for food and water. Reason
sanctions the fulfillment and pursuit of these desires because they are beneficial and required for
continuous flourishing during embodiment. In contrast, unnecessary desires are those that are not

40 Lord (1982, pp. 215-9) has challenged the authenticity of this passage. Nevertheless, since there does not
seem to be any other explanations available, we must, tentatively, accept Grote’s suggestion.
41 Strictly speaking, Plato is drawing this distinction among the appetitive desires in this passage. Belfiore
(1986) notes that her account makes heavy use of Cooper (1999b), Gosling and Taylor (1982, pp. 97-128), and Annas
(1981, pp. 128-52).
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required for survival or flourishing, such as gluttony or erotic lust. The pursuit of these unnecessary
desires is harmful to both the soul and the body, and because of this, reason does not sanction the
pursuit and satisfaction of unnecessary desires; in other words—they are anti-rational.
For instance, in Book IV, Plato warns that reason must control the appetitive elements in
the soul. For if reason is lax, the appetitive elements will grow “big and strong” and “attempt to
enslave and rule” reason (IV.442a7-b2). The point is that we ought to pursue only those desires
sanctioned by reason, because if we fulfill desires not sanctioned by reason, these desires will grow
bigger and stronger, and eventually rule our soul. In other words, the anti-rational elements are
dangerous because they undermine the rule of reason.
In Book VI, Plato illustrates what he has in mind with a “channeled stream” metaphor.42
Plato explains that “whenever someone’s desires incline strongly towards some one thing, they are
weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel” (VI.485d68). For instance, if your desires are taught to flow into the channel of learning, your desires for
bodily pleasure will weaken (VI.485d). Or conversely, if your desires are trained to flow to the
channel of bodily pleasure, your desires for the pleasure of the mind will weaken. Belfiore (1986,
p. 423) suggests that the metaphor “implies that just as any diversion of water into one channel
deepens that channel, and thus increases the tendency of a stream to flow in that direction, so even
a temporary yielding to a particular kind of desire strengthens that desire permanently and weakens
opposing desires.”
Within the channeled stream metaphor we find two broad commitments about psychic
health:

42 See Belfiore (1986, pp. 423-4) whose analysis follows Cooper (1999b).
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The Republic’s Account of Psychic Health
a) Harmony Condition: Health and virtue are a kind of harmony, or lack of strife
in the soul.
b) Rationality Condition: Reason should always be in control of the soul and antirational elements are always harmful.43
The harmony condition and the rationality condition explain why Plato condemns tragedy
and comedy in the Republic.44 Plato worries that when you watch tragedy, the non-reasoning part
of your soul takes pleasure in pitying and grieving with characters who suffer grave misfortunes
(X.606a-b). This is dangerous because “after feeding fat the emotion of pity it is not easy to restrain
it in our own sufferings” (X.606b5-8). Comedy and other forms imitative poetry pose the same
threat by arousing anti-rational desire, which “nourishes and waters the elements that should be
dried up and makes them rule over us, when they should be ruled, in order that we may be better
and happier men instead of worse and more miserable” (X.606d4-7; cf. X.604a-d, X.607d).
Belfiore (1986, p, 423) explains, “Feeling these emotions at the theatre involves a satisfaction of
unnecessary, anti-rational desires and a weakening of reason...Even temporary yielding to these
desires permanently strengthens them, diverting energy into a channel opposed to that governed
by reason.”
According to Belfiore (1986), in the Laws, Plato rejects both the harmony condition and
the rationality condition insofar as both strife and anti-rational elements are constitutive to psychic
health and virtue.45 Belfiore holds that in the Laws a “deficiency of anti-rational emotion can be as

43 Belfiore (1986) does not uses these terms, but they are implicit in her discussion. Additional support for
this interpretation can be found in two passages. First, in Republic IV, Plato holds that just actions create and sustain
psychological health, while unjust actions produce and sustain psychological disharmony (444d-445b). Second,
Plato’s account of the tyrant’s soul in Republic IX.573a-c suggests that vicious desires and beliefs destroy reasonable
beliefs and desires.
44 See Belfiore (1986, pp. 422-4).
45 There is also a contrast between the Timaeus and the Laws on this issue. At Timaeus 43a-44d, Plato asserts
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harmful as excess” (1986, p. 421). On Belfiore’s reading, virtue and psychic health involve there
being two different elements—the rational and anti-rational—warring against each other, with the
rational continuously overcoming and purging the anti-rational:
The Law’s Account of Psychic Health
a) Strife Condition: Strife is intrinsic to health and virtue.
b) Anti-Rational Condition: Anti-Rational elements are intrinsic to health and
virtue.
Belfiore supports this reading in three main ways. First, she notes that the Athenian
describes the disordered and mad movements of children positively, describing them as
fundamental to musical education:
No creature is born having as much intelligence as it is fitting for it to have when it
is grown. In that time in which it has not yet acquired the good sense proper to it,
every creature is mad (μαίνεται) and makes disordered noises, and as soon as it
becomes active, it also makes disordered leaps. Let us remember that we said these
are the sources of music and gymnastics (II.672c1-7; cf. II.653d-e, II.664e).
Belfiore (1986, p. 427) explains, “These elements are anti-rational in that they are not in
themselves amenable to reason, but always oppose it. In the Laws, paradoxically, they contribute
to a well-ordered soul by means of their opposition to order and reason.”
Second, Belfiore (1986, p. 428) argues that in the Laws strife is fundamental to the virtues
of temperance and courage, while in the Republic these virtues are defined as a harmony, or an
absence of strife. To illustrate this, Belfiore points to Book IV of the Republic in which Socrates
describes the common view of temperance as “being stronger than oneself” as laughable (430e11).

that the disordered movements of the child's soul are purely undesirable and must be replaced by reason.
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Temperance, according to Socrates, is not battling and winning over your more primitive desires;
rather, temperance involves “friendship and harmony of these parts of the soul, when the ruler and
the ruled both agree that reason should rule and do not fight” (442c10-d1; cf. 432a7-9).
Belfiore (1986, p. 428) argues that this is not the account of virtue in the Laws. She argues
that in the Laws Plato describes temperance as “not only as a state of health after sickness has been
cured, but also as a somewhat precarious condition in which there is constant need for
rehabilitation.”46 Likewise, she points out that the Athenian defines courage as “combat against
fears and pains and also against desires and pleasures” (I.633c8-d3). Belfiore explains, “Only the
soul that successfully combats the cowardice within itself can be completely brave. Similarly, only
someone who has to struggle continually against pleasure and desire can become perfect in
sōphrosynē, defined not as harmony and agreement but ‘victory over oneself’.’“47
Third, Belfiore (1986, p. 428) argues that this account of health is implicit in the hydraulic
metaphor of Book VI of the Laws, which differs greatly from the “channeled stream” metaphor of
the Republic. At VI.773c, the Athenian explains that citizens should not marry individuals with
similar characteristics, but should seek to marry people with opposite dispositions. For instance,
the rich should marry the poor, those from powerful families should marry those from weak
families, and those with hasty dispositions (θάττους) should marry those with slower dispositions
(βραδυτέρους) (VI.773c). The Stranger illustrates his point with a metaphor: “a city should be
impure, just like a wine bowl: the wine, when poured in, is throbbing with madness, but under the
punishment of another, sober god [viz., water], it forms a noble partnership that creates a good and

46 For discussions on temperance in the Laws see Barker (1960, p. 343); North (1966, pp. 186-96); and
Stalley (1983, p. 54-8).
47 Belfiore (1986, p. 428, n. 26) points to I.626e2-6, I.636a6-b6, and I.647c7-d8. See also O'Brien (1967, p.
183); England (1921, ad loc. I.626c6-d2).
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measured drink (773c7-d4).”48 Belfiore (1986, p. 429) explains that “the madness of wine and the
soberness of water do not coexist harmoniously in the mixing bowl; rather, the battle against each
other—virtue and health is produced when the madness is successfully combated.”
Belfiore offers an interesting explanation; however, there are five problems with her
interpretation of the Laws. First and foremost, at I.682d2-4, the Stranger explicitly states that it is
a mistake to think that a sick body that is purged of disease is superior to the body that is in no
need of purgation. The Athenian’s point is clear, the person who exists in perfect harmony and
does not require catharsis is superior to the person who is only healthy after medical purgation.49
Second, although it is true that Plato thinks that the manic movements and cries of youth
are the source of music and gymnastics (II.672c-d), this does not entail that these disordered
movements are intrinsic to health. It is possible, and more likely, that these manic feelings are
merely instrumental to health because they inspire one to participate in the city’s songs and dances.
Third, it is not clear that Plato defines the virtues in terms of strife in the Laws.50 Although
it is true that the Athenian describes courage as “combat against fears and pains and also against

48 Plato's mixing bowl metaphor is closely tied to a traditional myth in which wine, represented by the child
Dionysus, is corrected by water, represented by his nurses, the Nymphs. The best known accounts of this myth are
Athen. 11.465a: Phanodemus 325 F 12 Jac., cited by Pickard-Cambridge (1986, p. 6). Belfiore (1986, pp. 430-1)
points out that similar accounts of mixing wine with water are given by Diodorus Siculus (4.3.4), Dio Chrysostom
(32.58), and Rufus of Ephesus, cited by Pigeaud (1981, pp. 498-9). Belfiore (1986, pp. 431-7) ties this mixing bowl
metaphor to ancient theories of medicine which describe health as a blend of various elements.
49 Belfiore (1986, p. 428) dismisses this passage arguing that the Laws is concerned with the “second best.”
Cf. Laws V.739e4, IX.875d3-4; Republic V.472.c4-d2. The problem with this response, however, is that even if Plato
thinks that the Laws deals with less than ideal citizens, it seems strange to think Plato would apply a lower standard
of health for these citizens than he would for ideal citizens; rather, it seems more reasonable that Plato would maintain
the same standard of health, but would adjust his expectations for whether or not certain citizens could reach it. In
other words, in the Republic, Plato does not apply one standard of health for the philosopher rulers and another
standard for the producers under which both are healthy. Instead, Plato applies one standard of health for humans and
measures all humans up to it.
50 Stalley (1983, p. 55) points out that the Athenian considers temperance, understood narrowly as selfcontrol, as worthless in itself. The broader account of temperance, which is the “mainspring” of the Laws “embraces,
not only self-control, but also order, harmony, moderation and self-knowledge.” Fundamentally, temperance in the
Laws is a matter of balance and harmony between reason and the emotions (I.626b-628b, II.652a-670e). See also
North (1966, p. 192): “As the Athenian stranger explains the value of the duly regulated symposium, he introduces
most of the psychological principles on which the Laws will be based...Each of these principles provides a reason for
Plato's emphasis of sophrosyne—the virtue that controls pleasure and produces order and harmony.”
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desires and pleasures” (I.633c8-d3), this description is misleading for two reasons. First, the
primary purpose of this passage is to get Kleinias and Megillus to recognize that courage is not
only a matter of enduring pain and fear of death, but concerns resisting pleasures and desires as
well. The use of the term “combat” is likely a rhetorical device to get the agreement of the
Stranger’s war-loving friends. Second, after this passage the Athenian explains that courage is a
matter of being both fearless of pain and being fearful of acting shamelessly in front of noble
individuals (I.647b-c). If courage is, in part, a matter of not fearing pain, then, strictly speaking,
courage is not a matter of combating pain, because the courageous person will not fear pain.
Likewise, if courage is a matter of not desiring shameful pleasures than the virtuous agent has
nothing to combat against, because the courageous individual will not desire vicious pleasures.
Fourth, Belfiore’s account does not accord well with Plato’s puppet metaphor (I.644d7645b1). This is damning because the Athenian introduces the puppet metaphor in Book I to explain
how drunkenness affects the soul:
Let us suppose that each of us living beings is an ingenious puppet of the gods—
whether contrived as a plaything of theirs or for some serious purpose, we do not
know. But this we do know, that these affections in us, like sinews or cords, draw
us along, and being contrary to each other, (i) pull one against the other to contrary
actions; and herein lies the dividing line between virtue and vice. For, as our
argument declares, (ii) there is one of the pulling forces which each person ought
always to follow and in no way abandon, thereby (iii) pulling against the other
sinews: this is the golden and sacred pull of calculation, called the common law of
the city. The other cords are hard and iron and have every sort of shape, while this
one is soft since it is of gold. (iv) With the finest pull of the law we should always
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cooperate; for since calculation is fine, but gentle rather than forceful, its pull needs
helpers to assure that the golden kind within us may always (v) vanquish the other
kinds (I.644d7-645b1, my emphasis).51
Although (i), (iii), and (v), make it clear that Plato thinks that the affections war against
each other—pulling and pushing towards opposite actions—towards virtue and vice, nothing in
this description suggests that this combat is fundamental to virtue. If anything, (ii) and (iv) suggest
that strife is not intrinsic to virtue, but actually threatens it. Additionally, (ii), (iv), and (v), indicate
that reason should always be ruling in the soul.
The fifth problem is that Belfiore’s account neglects the role that the symposiarch plays in
the symposium. Drunkenness arouses passions and temporally weakens self-control, but it does
this under the supervision of a wise, sober, and self-controlled leader. It is true that from the
internal perspective of the drunkard, the control of reason surrenders to the madness of wine;
nonetheless, from the external perspective, reason still rules insofar as the wise symposiarch is
governing the symposium. For these reasons, we must reject Belfiore’s claim that the anti-rational
elements and strife are intrinsic to health in the Laws.52
Although Belfiore’s account of the Laws is mistaken, I agree with her that in the Republic
vicious desires and false beliefs about ethical matters are permanently damaging to the soul, while
in the Laws they are not.53 However, it is a mistake to conclude from this that Plato changed his
51 Frede (2010, p. 116) suggests that “puppet” might be a misleading translation since it suggests that external
forces pull the strings. Frede suggests that Plato might have in mind a wind-up toy instead. However, it is unclear to
me whether this is correct; a wind-up toy suggests that the gods wind us up and then leave us alone. Surely, this is not
the impression that Plato wants to give since he is clear in Book X that deism is false. Nevertheless, Frede is correct
to point out that the metaphor focuses on one's internal forces and does not focus on external forces. Bobonich (2002,
p. 261, n. 77) argues that the puppet metaphor differs significantly from the metaphors Plato uses to describe the soul
in other dialogues. Bobonich argues that in every dialogue except the Laws, the soul is described as having various
parts, but this is not the case in the puppet metaphor. For a critical discussion, see Frede (2010). I will not take a stand
on this issue; however, I agree with Bobonich that in the Laws there is a stronger divide between cognitive and noncognitive elements than we find in other dialogues.
52 For an interesting discussion on what exactly the rule of reason means see Brown (2005)
53 Eric Brown has pointed out to me that if I am right about this, then it might be the case that Plato
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mind about what constitutes health and virtue. Instead, what we should conclude from this is that
Plato altered his view about how to bring about health and virtue. In the Laws, vicious desires and
beliefs can aid in the development of health and virtue, while in the Republic, they cannot.54 This
explains why Plato would permit intoxication in the Laws, but forbid it in the Republic. This idea
converges with and is supported by the claim that Plato thinks that akrasia is more robust and
pervasive in the Laws than in other texts.55 To be clear, my discussion of akrasia in the next section
should not be read as if I am giving a full-fledged defense of these claims—this is certainly not
my intent. Rather, I am merely showing that if Plato adopted a stronger view of akrasia in the Laws
than the Republic, then this supports and helps explain why Plato would adopt a different form of
training in the Laws than the Republic.

7. Akrasia
Akrasia is a moral weakness that is not due to a cognitive or intellectual mistake, but is the result
of having defective non-cognitive or affective states. In the Protagoras, Socrates famously denied
the possibility of akrasia, arguing that all moral failings are a result of cognitive or intellectual

changed his mind about causal principles, because in the Phaedo Plato seems to think that one thing cannot cause its
opposite, but can only produce itself.
54 One might object to my interpretation of the Republic by pointing out that the Plato maintains that when
men and women are no longer capable of procreation, they are turned loose from the “rigged sexual lottery” and can
have as much sex as they want (V.461b-c). I have two responses: first, nothing in Socrates’ discussion at 461b-c
suggests that there is positive value in the elderly experiencing erotic lust or irrationality. Additionally, if we take
Cephalus’ description of old age as a release and escape from erotic lust—the “savage beast of a master” (I.392c4)—
seriously, then it is unlikely that Plato anticipates that the elderly have strong sexual desires. After all, the whole
purpose behind giving older adults wine in the Laws is that old age has diminished their erotic and mad desires. This
indicates that the reason Plato turns the elderly loose in the Republic has more to do with Plato thinking that the elderly
will not desire sex than it does with the idea that erotic desires are instrumental to health and virtue.
55 See Bobonich (2002, pp. 644-5). Stalley (1983, pp. 50-2) points out that although Plato accepts the
possibility of akrasia in the Laws, he still accepts the claim that no one does wrong willingly. Stalley offers a way in
which these two claims can be reconciled. Recently, Wilburn (2012) has argued that Plato does not accept the
possibility of akrasia in the Laws. However, his arguments relies upon denying that the puppet metaphor endorses
akrasia. Because none of the evidence that I will discuss hinges upon the puppet metaphor, I am going to put Wilburn’s
concerns to the side.
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mistakes (352a-360e). However, the tripartite theory of the soul in the Republic opened the door
for the possibility of akrasia. The tripartite theory of the soul allows for there to be internal conflicts
between the various parts of the soul. For instance, it is possible that the reasoning part of the soul
judges correctly that you should φ, but for the appetitive part or spirited part to overrule this
judgment and decide that you should ψ (IV.439e-440a).
The account of akrasia put forth in the Laws, however, is more robust and poses a greater
threat to morality than the account of akrasia in the Republic. Consider the following three passages
of the Laws. The first occurs at III.689a-c in which the Athenian describes the greatest folly (ἡ
μεγίστη ἀμαθία) as a disharmony between reason and the emotions. The Greek word, ἀμαθία, can
mean “ignorance” or “folly.” “Ignorance” suggests a cognitive mental state to the extent that you
are ignorant when you have a false belief or have failed to grasp some truth.56 “Folly,” in contrast,
less directly suggests a cognitive mental state since it is possible to foolishly pursue ψ, even though
you believe you will be better off pursuing φ.
“Folly” is the better translation for ἀμαθία here because Plato is explicit that the ἀμαθία
under discussion at 689a-c is not a result of intellectual failing.57 For instance, he explains that the
greatest ἀμαθία occurs when you believe that something is fine and good, but you hate it instead
of loving it. Or, when you believe that something is bad, but you love and cherish it instead of
hating it (689a). The problem is that there is discord between what you find pleasurable and
painful, and what you judge to be good and bad (689a).58 This leads the Athenian to describe
“folly” (ἄνοιαν)59 as the phenomenon that occurs “when the soul quarrels with knowledge

56 This distinction is important because one can be ignorant of that p without having the false belief that notp to the extent that one might not have any beliefs about p whatsoever.
57 Cf. Stalley (1981, p. 51).
58 Cf. Eudemian Ethics VII.1237a5-10.
59 The Greek word, ἄνοιαν, is also ambiguous between ignorance and folly, but it is clear from the context
that the ἄνοιαν refers to non-cognitive or non-intellectual failing. It is also clear from the context that Plato is using
ἄνοιαν and ἀμαθία interchangeably.
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(ἐπιστήμαις) or belief (ἢ δόξαις) or reason (ἢ λόγῳ), its natural ruling principles” (689b2-4). The
fact that the Athenian says that folly can occur when you have knowledge (ἐπιστήμαις) reveals
that the moral failure is not a consequence of an intellectual mistake. The Athenian’s point is that
you might have a complete intellectual grasp about what you ought to do, but still fail to act
correctly because you find such an action painful (689b). This is why he says that the greatest
foolishness can occur “when the noble elements of reason (λόγοι) in the soul achieve nothing, but
indeed go contrary to these things” (689b5-7).
The second instance of akrasia occurs at IX.875a-c in which the Athenian rejects autocratic
rule for two reasons. First, most individuals do not “know” (γνῶναι) the true aim of politics (875a).
Second, even if someone “grasped” (γνῶναί) the art of politics, “he would never be able to adhere
to this conviction,” once he got control of the city (875b1-4). The problem is that his “mortal nature
(ἡ θνητὴ φύσις) will always urge him towards getting more than his share and towards private
business, irrationally (ἀλόγως) fleeing pain and pursuing pleasure, and putting both of these before
what is more just and better” (875b7-c1). The contrast the Athenian is drawing is simple: it is
between failing to rule because of ignorance and failing to rule because the lust for power and
pleasure dominates your soul.60
The third instance occurs at X.902a-b in which the Athenian considers and rejects two
different ways the gods might fail to be righteous. The first possibility is that the gods fail to act
rightly as a result of ignorance (ἄγνοια) (902a). The second possibility is that the gods “know

60 The Athenian does go on to note, however, that “if ever some human being who was born adequate in
nature, with a divine dispensation (θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθεὶς), were able to attain these things, he wouldn't need any laws
ruling over him. For no law or order is stronger than knowledge (ἐπιστήμης), nor is it right for intelligence to be
subordinate, or a slave, to anyone, but it should be ruler over everything, if indeed it is really free according to nature.
But now, in fact, it is so nowhere or in any way, except to a small extent” (875c-d). One might argue that this passage
undermines my interpretation because it says that nothing is more powerful than knowledge. Nevertheless, the agent
in the example not only has knowledge, but also a divine disposition, and this divine disposition might be responsible
for the agent’s ability to control her anti-rational passions.
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(γιγνώσκοντας) what should be done, and as the most worthless human beings are said to do, they
know (εἰδότες) it is better to act otherwise than the way that they are acting, but they do not do so
on account of certain weaknesses in the face of pleasure or pains” (X.902a8-b2).
Each of these examples suggest that in the Laws, Plato thinks that it is possible for an agent
to know that she should φ and yet fail to φ on account of having defective affective states. This
account of akrasia is stronger and more threatening to morality than the account of akrasia put
forth in the Republic insofar as nothing in the Republic suggests that akrasia is compatible with
knowledge; if anything the Republic suggests that knowledge is a bulwark against moral failure.61
This suggests that in the Laws, Plato no longer takes knowledge to provide the ethical stability that
he took it to secure in the Republic.62 Another way of putting this, is that knowledge of what to do
is not always sufficient to motivate right action because of the possibility of akrasia (cf. II.661d664a).
If this is right, then we have an explanation for why Plato might have changed his mind
about training in virtue. If Plato believes that knowledge is no longer able to completely control
the emotions, he might think that more training is required with respect to the emotions so that one
does not become overwhelmed when one confronts great pleasures. Likewise, if he thinks that
ethical knowledge is not always sufficient to motivate right action, he might take a more positive
attitude towards experiencing extreme pleasures and desires to the extent that these are strong
sources of motivation (cf. II.661d-664a).63

61 Cf. Dorter (2008, p. 16). Irwin (1995, pp. 223-4) argues that knowledge in the Republic gives you a kind
of counterfactual stability that true belief does not give you, cf. Meno 97e-98b; Williams (2013, p. 369, n. 31). For
discussions on akrasia in the Republic, see Bobonich (2002, pp. 235-58); Carone (2001, pp. 107-48).
62 This interpretation accords with the Athenian's description of injustice in the soul as not being a cognitive
failure, but rather as the “tyranny in the soul of spiritedness, fear, pleasure, pain, feelings of envies and desires, whether
they do some injury or not” (IX.863e6-864a1). The Athenian goes on to explain that even if one's beliefs about what
are choiceworthy “are in some way mistaken, one must be called entirely just” when one's life is ordered by these
beliefs (IX.863c-d).
63 In Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy, he accuses Socrates with ruining Greek culture. Nietzsche
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8. Conclusion
In sections one through four, I explained that in the Laws Plato has a more positive attitude towards
intoxication than he does in the Republic. In section five, I argued that this difference is the result
of Plato changing his mind about intoxication. In section six, I considered and rejected Elizabeth
Belfiore’s explanation that strife and the anti-rational elements are intrinsic to health and virtue in
the Laws, but are always damning in the Republic. I argued that Belfiore’s account of the Republic
is correct, but her account of the Laws is mistaken—the passages on drunkenness in the Laws only
support the weaker claim that the anti-rational elements are instrumental to health and virtue. In
section seven I argued that this difference might be the result of Plato changing his mind about the
ability of knowledge to control the passions and to motivate right action.
Before I close off my discussion of the Laws and move on to the Pheado, I need to address
one more issue. In chapter two, I argued that in the Republic, not only do non-philosophers benefit
from believing falsehoods, but philosophers themselves benefit as well. However, in both chapters
three and four, I have been relatively silent on whether Plato thinks philosophers benefit from false
beliefs in the Laws. One reason for this is that unlike the Republic, Plato does not clearly demarcate
between philosophers and non-philosophers in the Laws. Nevertheless, in light of the arguments I
have put forth in this chapter, I have a simple and quick answer to this question—Yes—Plato does,
indeed, think that philosophers can benefit from believing falsehoods in the Laws. This is evident
because Plato anticipates that all individuals over the age of forty can benefit from false beliefs

maintains that Pre-Socratic Greek culture balanced two forces: the Apollonian and the Dionysiac. The Apollonian
represents the drive towards self-control, reason, and individuality, while the Dionysiac represents the drive towards
excess, irrationality, and community. The clearest expression of Apollonian culture is Greek tragedy and the clearest
expression of Dionysiac culture is choral singing and dancing. Greek tragedy, according to Nietzsche, represents the
perfect synthesis of these two drives. Socrates’ insistence that life should be devoted to reason, destroyed the balance
of these two forces. Nietzsche asserts that Plato attempted to follow his hero, Socrates, in the destruction of Dionysiac
culture, I take this chapter to demonstrate that Plato is more sympathetic towards the Dionysiac forces than Nietzsche
thought.
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and anti-rationality. Because some of the individuals over the age of forty are philosophers, it
follows that there are some philosophers who can benefit from false beliefs and anti-rational
elements.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Death and the Limits of Truth in the Phaedo

Miss Naomi Faust: “Dr. Breed keeps telling me the main thing with Dr. Hoenikker
was truth.”
Jonah: “You don’t seem to agree.”
“I don’t know whether I agree or not. I just have trouble understanding how truth,
all by itself, could be enough for a person.” (Vonnegut, 2014/1963, ch. 25, p. 54)

1. Introduction
In the previous chapters I have argued that for Plato both non-philosophers and philosophers can
benefit from falsehoods. I have not, however, examined whether Plato thinks they can benefit from
defective forms of reasoning, such as wishful thinking. In this chapter, I explore this issue by
analyzing Socrates’ belief formation process in the Phaedo.
Socrates’ attitude towards pursuing truth is somewhat paradoxical in the Phaedo. At one
point Socrates seems to say that he is going to try to convince himself that his soul is immortal and
destined for a better place regardless of whether or not these claims are true, apparently because
believing these things has some sort of practical value (91a-b). However, he also appears to tell
Cebes and Simmias to relentlessly pursue the truth about the very same matter (91c). This raises
the question: Why might Socrates believe that he will benefit from believing things about death
irrespective of the truth, but that Cebes and Simmias will not? Why should they continue pursuing
the truth? This is especially puzzling since, presumably, these beliefs about death will have the

same practical benefits for Cebes and Simmias as they do for Socrates. Additionally, one might
worry that Socrates’ strategy undermines his general commitment to pursuing truth. Hence, I call
this interpretive problem the “epistemic vice puzzle.”
In this chapter, I first show how the epistemic vice puzzle arises in the text and then I offer
a solution to it. I argue that the relevant difference between Socrates and his friends is that Socrates
is a fully accomplished philosopher, while his friends are not. This, I argue, makes Socrates an
epistemic authority, and it is in virtue of being an epistemic authority that he is justified in not
pursuing the truth about death. Moreover, it is in virtue of his friends not being epistemic
authorities that they must pursue the truth about death. The upshot of this chapter, however, is not
that the life spent pursuing truth is unimportant. Rather, it is that sometimes the demands of living
well require that we abandon the pursuit of truth and knowledge. For Socrates, the value of
pursuing truth is limited in certain circumstances and facing death is one of these circumstances.

2. A Puzzle about the Pursuit of Truth
Throughout the Phaedo, Socrates maintains that he has “striven in every way” to become a
philosopher (69b3-4; cf. 66b-c), which involves a commitment to truth, knowledge, and wisdom
(66a-e, 84a, 91a). Nevertheless, at 91a-b, Socrates says some curious things that raise questions
about his dedication to truth.
Socrates has just offered three arguments in defense of the immortality of the soul: the
argument from opposites (70c-72e), the argument from recollection (72e-77b), and the simplicity
argument (77b-80c). Following this, Socrates offers a mythical description of the afterlife, in
which the quality of afterlife that one experiences is in proportion to the ethical quality of life that
one has lived. For example, those who have lived wickedly will experience the worst afterlife,
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while those who have lived philosophically will experience the best afterlife (80d-82b; cf. 107c115a). Call this idea the “proportionality thesis.”1
Cebes and Simmias are unconvinced by Socrates’ defense of the soul’s immortality;
nevertheless they are reluctant to object because they worry about distressing Socrates (84d).
Socrates, however, encourages them to offer their objections (85a-b). After hearing their
criticisms, Socrates warns them about the dangers of misology,2 or hating rational discourse and
thought.3 According to Socrates, misology arises in a similar way to misanthropy. Misanthropy
develops from a lack of skill in dealing with humans. It arises when one trusts humans when one
shouldn’t. Eventually, such a trusting person will be deceived in hurtful ways and will conclude
from this that all humans are wretched. This is regrettable because most people are decent and very
few are actually deplorable (89d-e).
Misology arises in a similar way. Without skill in reasoning, one will unjustifiably trust
arguments and such trust will lead one to waver between contradictory positions. Eventually, one
will become frustrated and fall into absolute skepticism, thinking that there is no sound position
whatsoever. Hating rational inquiry is a pity because it deprives one of “truth and knowledge of
reality” (τῶν ὄντων) (90d6-7, 90b-d). To overcome the dangers of misology, Socrates advises his
friends that rather than thinking there is something generally unsound about arguments or theories,
they should believe that it is themselves who are unsound, and that they must “take courage and
1 The “proportionality thesis” is not unique to the Phaedo, but is scattered throughout the corpus of Plato;
see especially, the Gorgias 523a-527a; the Phaedrus 246d-249b; the Republic X.614b-621d; the Timaeus 90a-92b;
and the Laws IX.870d-e, IX.872d-873a, IX.881, and X.903d-e.
2 “Misology” is not a common word for Plato. For examples of other uses see Laches 188c6 and Republic
III.411d7. Also, it is interesting to note that at 89d1-4 Socrates asserts that one could suffer no greater evil than
misology, but at 83c2-9 he maintains that the greatest of all evils is taking the sensible realm to be real.
3 Gallop (1975, p. 154) and Woolf (2007, p. 3) point out that the problem with using the word “argument”
to translate λόγος is that at 90b6-8 and 90c9, Socrates says that “arguments” can be true and false. This makes for an
awkward translation to the extent that arguments are not standardly understood as being true or false. However, this
worry might be anachronistic; Socrates often seems perfectly happy to speak loosely, according to which speech is
true or false; see Republic II.382e8. Additionally, Socrates infamously speaks of pleasures as being true and false, see
Republic X.582d-586e and Philebus, esp. 40c-41a.
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be eager to attain soundness” (90e3-4).
Immediately following this, Socrates says some curious things about his present state of
mind:
I am in danger at this moment (ἐν τῷ παρόντι)4 of not being philosophical towards
this very thing [viz., death], and of being like those who are quite uneducated (οἱ
πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι), as a lover of winning (φιλονίκως). For whenever they [viz., the
uneducated] dispute about something, they give no thought to the truth about the
subject of discussion,5 but are only eager that those present will accept the position
they have set forth. And it seems to me that in this present moment (ἐν τῷ παρόντι)
I shall differ (διοίσειν)6 from them only to this extent: I shall not be eager that what
I say seems true to those who are present, except incidentally, but rather I shall be
very eager that it seems so to myself (91a1-b1, my emphasis).7
In a few lines, Socrates has identified four ways of being unphilosophical. The first is
dealing with arguments without skill (i.e., the cause of misology). The second is hating rational
inquiry altogether (i.e., misology). The third is trying to convince others of claims without caring
about whether or not these claims are actually true (i.e., being a lover of winning or an eristic).8

4 Rowe (1993, p. 215) suggests that Socrates' assertion that he is in danger of being unphilosophical is a
reflection of his earlier performance (cf. 84b), which “contains more persuasive description than hard reasoning.” I
am quite sympathetic to this reading.
5 Literally, “How [the things] are in relation to which the argument (ὁ λόγος) may be”.
6 Rowe (1993, p. 215) takes this “I shall” to signify a “reversal” in which Simmias and Cebes take on the
role of philosophers. This reading is amicable to my interpretation and it is supported by Socrates’ encouragement at
91c1-5; cf. 107b, 115b-c.
7 Consider the difference between Socrates' attitude here and his attitude at Republic V.450e-451a, in which
he says, “But to speak, as I'm doing, at a time when one is unsure of oneself and searching for the truth, is a frightening
and insecure thing to do. I'm not afraid of being laughed at...But I am afraid that, if I slip from the truth, just where it's
most important not to, I'll not only fall myself but drag my friends down as well.” In the Republic passage, he is afraid
that the position he is defending might be false and that this might mislead his friends about the truth. In contrast, in
the passage I discuss here, Socrates is willing to defend a position that might be false and is not concerned or afraid
that in doing this he might mislead his friends. Rather, at 91c1-5, he tells his friends to be the philosophers.
8 Examples of this might be Callicles from the Gorgias and Euthydemus and Dionysodorus from the
Euthydemus.
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The fourth is trying to convince oneself of certain claims without caring for whether or not they
are actually true (i.e., being a self-directed eristic).9
Notice that the first two ways of being unphilosophical develop from a lack of skill with
arguments but do not necessarily develop from not caring about the truth. For instance, someone
might care greatly about the truth but lack the skills needed to understand arguments, and his lack
of skill might lead him to get so frustrated that he abandons rational inquiry altogether. In contrast,
the latter two ways of being unphilosophical do not necessarily develop from a lack of skill with
rational inquiry but instead from not valuing the truth. This seems to be why in Book VII of the
Republic, Socrates is concerned about teaching young guardians dialectic; the worry is that they
will develop skills in argumentation before they develop a firm and stable love for the truth. In
turn, they will become eager to win arguments without caring about whether or not the position
they are defending is true (539b). Despite these differences, all four of these unphilosophical
positions share the common feature that they are epistemically vicious and threaten the possibility
of obtaining truth and knowledge. By “epistemically vicious,” I mean a process that commonly or
likely results in falsehood, such as believing on the basis of little evidence.
What is interesting about 91a1-b1 is that immediately after noting that he is running the
risk of being unphilosophical, Socrates asserts that from this moment he will10 adopt the position
of a self-directed eristic who is eager to convince himself of certain things regardless of whether
or not those very things are true.11 Socrates goes on to explain why he is adopting such a position:
For I calculate, my friends—see how greedily I calculate! (ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς)—that

9 By “self-directed,” I mean that, unlike the full blown eristic, or traditional sophist, the self-directed eristic
is only trying to convince himself, and is not trying to convince others.
10 Notice the future of διοίσειν in the passage (καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων
διοίσειν) (91a6-7).
11 Dorter (1982, pp. 93-4) and Woolf (2007) share this interpretation. For an objection to Woolf (2007) see
Wood (2007).
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if what I say is true, it is a fine thing (καλῶς) to be convinced; if, on the other hand,
nothing exists after death,12 at least for this time before I die I shall distress those
present less with lamentations and my ignorance (ἄνοια) will not continue to exist
along with me—that would be a bad (κακὸν) thing—but will come to an end in a
short time (91b1-7).
Socrates is asserting that he is selfishly clinging to the claims that his soul is immortal and
destined for a good afterlife because he benefits from believing these claims whether or not they
are true.13 For instance, if Socrates believes these things about death and they turn out to be false,
Socrates still benefits from believing them because of the practical value of the belief. The practical
value of this belief is that it pacifies the fear of death and thus prevents him and his friends from
grieving and violently lamenting about his death. This idea accords with the fact that earlier in the
text, Socrates makes it clear that, if he did not believe that death was a good thing, he would “be
wrong not to resent dying” (63b5-9; cf. 68b-c, 84b, 88b-c).14 Moreover, even if these beliefs are
false, his ignorance will not remain with him long, but will cease when he dies. On the other hand,
if Socrates believes these claims and they are true, not only does he receive the practical benefits
already mentioned, but he also benefits from having a true belief about something important: the
nature of the soul and afterlife.15 That is to say, if such claims are true, then there are epistemic
benefits to believing them.

12 Literally, “Whereas if there is nothing for one who has died.”
13 See Rowe (1993, pp. 215-6).
14 Notice how Socrates' attitude towards death differs from his attitude in the Apology. In the Apology,
Socrates maintains that death is not a bad thing because either it is like a long dreamless sleep or it leads to a good
afterlife (40c-41c); see Austin (2010). In contrast, in the Phaedo, he maintains that if one does not believe that the
afterlife is good, one should resent death. Additionally, consider how it differs from that of the Gorgias, in which
Socrates says, “For no one who isn't totally bereft of reason and courage is afraid to die” (522e). I will not address
whether Socrates’ attitude towards death in the Phaedo can be reconciled with these other texts.
15 Additionally, if these claims turn out true, in the afterlife Socrates will, presumably, reap the rewards of
having lived philosophically.
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The table below is a visual representation of Socrates’ calculation.
Table 1: Socrates
S Believes Claims about
Death and the Claims are
True.
S Believes Claims about
Death and the Claims are
False.

Epistemic Value
High Benefits (True Belief
that Will Extend Into the
Afterlife)
Low Costs (False Belief, But
Only For a Short Duration)

Practical Value
High Benefits (Belief Assuages
the Fear of Death)
High Benefits (Belief Assuages
the Fear of Death)

Immediately after Socrates seems to defend the merits of being a self-directed eristic, he
encourages his friends to unrelentingly seek the truth like philosophers, saying:
If you take my advice, you will give but little thought to Socrates but much more
to the truth. If you think that what I say is true, agree with me; if not, oppose it with
every argument and take care in my eagerness I do not deceive myself and you, and
like a bee, leave my sting in you when I go (91c1-5; cf. 107b, 115b-c).
Socrates seems to be saying some rather uncharacteristic things in these passages and
because of this one might be tempted to resist interpreting him as a self-directed eristic. For
instance, one might argue that Socrates is merely being “ironic,”16 or that Plato is applying a future
more vivid construction, in which Socrates is merely acknowledging that he is in danger of being
unphilosophical, and if he were to act unphilosophically, this is how he would act. However, there
are subtle hints scattered throughout the Phaedo that suggest that Socrates is not being his usual
philosophical or “Socratic” self.17 There are three passages in particular that highlight this.

16 This is the route Rowe (1993, pp. 215-6) takes: “...although with his usual 'irony' he pretends to be [like
the eristic]. Rather, he is as complete a philosopher (see esp. 76b-c), and therefore as skilled in argument, as anyone
living. Something which appears true to him will therefore have passed the most exacting test available.” However,
the problem with eristics is not that they are unskilled with arguments—that is the cause of misology. Rather, the
problem is that they do not care about the truth of the position they are defending. The fact that they are usually good
at arguing can make them all the more dangerous. Gallop (1975, p. 155) maintains that Socrates is sincere when he is
says he is only concerned with trying to convince himself and not others and argues that this is the mark of a true
philosopher; see Charmides 166d. However, if we take Socrates at his word here, this is hardly the conclusion we
should draw because he is saying that he will act like the eristic; cf. 102d2-5.
17 Dorter (1982, p. 93) says, “Accordingly, throughout the Phaedo Socrates assumes the role of a partisan
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The first hint that he is pursuing “unphilosophical” or “non-rational” methods comes at the
beginning of the Phaedo, in which it is revealed that Socrates has been practicing poetry (60b61b). This comes as a great surprise to everyone, since Socrates has never written poetry before
(60d). Socrates explains that he has been pursuing poetry as a backup plan, just in case the gods
really wanted him to practice and cultivate poetry instead of philosophy (60b-61b).18
The second instance occurs immediately following the argument of recollection (72e-77b).
After hearing the argument, Cebes asserts that he is not persuaded that the soul continues after
death and wants to know why the soul does not dissipate when the body perishes (77a-b). In
response, Socrates jokingly accuses them of having the childish fear that their souls will blow
away in the wind when they die (77d-e). Cebes laughs at this, and says, “Assuming that we were
afraid, Socrates, try to change our minds, or rather do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps
there is a child in us who has these fears; try to persuade him not to fear death like a bogey” (77e37). Socrates responds:
You should sing a charm (ἐπᾴδειν) over him every day until you have charmed
(ἐξεπᾴσητε) away his fears...You should search for such a charmer...sparing neither
trouble nor expense for there is nothing on which you could spend your money to
greater advantage. You must also search among yourselves, for you might not find
people who could do this better than yourselves (77e8-78a9).

advocate rather than his more accustomed role of a disinterested inquirer.” Dorter (1982, p. 94) points out that Socrates
uses the terms “convince” and “conviction” more than fifty times in the dialogue, which is unusually high for Socrates.
18 Cf. Republic X.607b. Speaking on this, Nietzsche, in the Birth of Tragedy (1.14) says, “Finally, when in
prison, he agrees to play music for which he has so little respect, so as to unburden his conscience completely. In this
state of mind he composes a proemium to Apollo and versifies some Aesopian fables...Perhaps there is a kingdom of
wisdom from which the logician is banished? Perhaps art may even be a necessary correlative and supplement of
science?”. And in the next section (I.15), Nietzsche continues, “This is why the image of the dying Socrates, of a man
liberated from fear of death by reasons and knowledge, is the heraldic shield over the portals of science, reminding
everyone of its purpose, which is to make existence appear comprehensible and thus justified; and if reasons are
insufficient to achieve that end, then it must ultimately be served by myth.”
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What is particularly interesting about this passage is that Socrates considers the fear of death a
serious problem and he emphasizes that the cure for this ailment is not only philosophical inquiry
but enchantment as well.
One might object that in other texts, such as Charmides 157a-c and Republic X.608a,
Socrates is quite comfortable calling philosophical arguments “charms.”19 I have three responses
to this objection. First, in other texts, such as Laws II.659e, II.664b, II.665c, II.666c, II.670e,
VI.773d, VII.812c, and VII.944b, Socrates clearly uses ἐπᾴδειν and its cognates to describe myths
and non-rational means of persuasion.20 Second, that Socrates is using ἐπᾴδειν in the non-rational
sense at 77e8-78a9 is suggested by the fact that he is talking about persuading the child in us and
children are unable to understand reason.21 Third, Socrates uses ἐπᾴδειν in discussing the closing
myth of the Phaedo at 114d, which indicates that he has in mind non-rational enhancement. This
brings us to the third instance.
After Socrates responds to his friends’ objections, he describes the structure of the earth,
cosmos, and afterlife in the form of a myth (107c-115a). The myth includes both the particular
details of the physical structures of the world and cosmos, as well as a detailed description of the
afterlife, which includes a restatement of the proportionality thesis. Socrates concludes the myth
by saying that “because of the things we have enumerated one must make every effort to share in
virtue and wisdom in one’s life, for the reward is beautiful and the hope is great” (114c6-8).
Following this, Socrates says:

19 Perhaps this is also true at Laws X.903b.
20 For a discussion on non-rational persuasion in the Laws see Stalley (1983), (1994) and Morrow (1953).
For a response see Bobonich (2002, chap. 2).
21 See Republic III.401d-402b and Laws II.653b. I am not alone in thinking that the application of ἐπᾴδειν
and its cognates in the Phaedo indicate non-rational persuasion. For instance, Cobb (1977, p. 175) says “The problem
the dialogue addresses is an irrational fear, and, while reason alone can see that seeking wisdom is the only thing
worth doing, the child in us is apprehensive about where this may lead and does not speak the language of reason.
Hence it must be charmed.” See also Dodds (1951, pp. 212 and 226, n. 20) and Dorter (1982, pp. 93-4).
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It is not fitting for a man having intelligence (οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί) to insist
that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to
risk the belief (μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν)— the risk is
a noble one—that this, or something like it, is true about our souls and their
dwelling places, since the soul appears to be immortal (ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ
φαίνεται οὖσα), and a man should sing (ἐπᾴδειν) this to himself as if it were an
incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale (114d1-6).22
Here, Socrates is advocating the use of “non-rational methods” in order to motivate the belief in
certain things about “souls and their dwelling place,” even though there is insufficient evidence
for these claims. Because there is insufficient evidence for these claims, believing in them is risky.
Nevertheless, because the practical value one gains from believing these claims outweighs the
harms one suffers if they turn out to be false; it is “fitting for a man to risk the belief.”23
These three passages provide compelling reasons to take Socrates at his word and to
interpret him as actually being a self-directed eristic, in which he is attempting to persuade himself
of certain claims irrespective of the truth of those claims.24 If we interpret Socrates in this way an

22 Cf. Meno 86b-c; Timaeus 29c. Also note that this passage will be discussed in more detail in section four.
23 Wood (2007, pp. 21-2), in his response to Woolf (2007), argues that Plato is not advocating a full belief
in these claims. Rather, Socrates is merely recommending that one posit these claims as if they were true, as a kind
of “regulative ideal.” However, this is mistaken for three reasons. First, at 108-113c, when Socrates describes the earth
and the cosmos, he explicitly says that he is convinced or persuaded of the things he is about to say. Persuasion and
conviction suggest belief. Second, Socrates refers to this as an incantation and one does not religiously chant things
that one merely wishes to posit, or assume for the sake of the argument. Rather, one sings and chants that which one
wants to believe. Third, it is unclear how merely positing these claims as if they were true could assuage the fear of
death.
24 This is how Dorter (1982, p. 94) reads this passage: “Socrates has here abandoned his usual philosophical
role of a non-partisan examiner of things in favour of that of an advocate determined to make what he believes to be
true seem as true as possible. He believes that there is a meaningful sense in which we can be called immortal and he
is determined not only to give proofs of this (which could be compatible also with a non-partisan role) but also to
make it seem as likely as possible by unphilosophical means as well, and thus his love of victory here is contrasted
with the disinterested love of wisdom, philosophy.” Also consider Cobb (1977, p. 176): “Socrates explicitly drops
the role of the philosopher who seeks the truth for that of the advocate, the champion who seeks to defeat the enemy.
And the enemy is the philosophical minotaur, identified as misology.”
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interesting interpretive puzzle arises: Why might Socrates think that he is justified in
unphilosophically clinging to certain claims about the soul and death, but that his friends should
continue pursuing the truth of those very same claims? What makes this all the more puzzling is
that presumably his friends stand to reap the same practical benefits as he does in believing these
very things. For instance, if his friends believe in the immortality of the soul and the proportionality
thesis, then they will experience less sadness and pain in response to Socrates’ death. Furthermore,
such beliefs will allow them to fearlessly continue in the footsteps of Socrates—pursuing
philosophy—even if it leads to death, which is what Socrates wants them to do.
Thus, Socrates seems to have backed himself into an unhealthy dilemma in which: either
(a) Socrates’ attitude is unjustified, in which case he is right to advise his friends to seek the truth
and wrong to think that it is beneficial for him not to, or (b) Socrates’ attitude is justified, in which
case he is wrong to advise his friends to seek the truth and right to think that it is beneficial for
him not to. Both prongs of the dilemma are unattractive; the former makes Socrates look
psychologically unstable or cowardly,25 while the latter makes him a bad teacher and leader of his
friends. Let us call this puzzle the “epistemic vice puzzle.” In the next section, I examine possible
answers to the epistemic vice puzzle.

3. Epistemic Authority
What is the relevant difference between Socrates and his friends, such that Socrates is justified in
behaving like a self-directed eristic towards issues concerning death, while his friends are not?
One initially appealing response is that Socrates will die soon, but his friends will likely continue
living for a longer duration. Thus, one might argue that because Simmias and Cebes will continue

25 Cf. Laws XI.922c.

128

living the potential epistemic costs of having a false belief are greater for them. For example, if
they believe that the soul is immortal and this claim is false, then their ignorance will stay with
them. This is not the case for Socrates because if he believes that the soul is immortal and this
claim is false, his ignorance will perish when he dies, which is soon (91b1-7).
Undoubtedly, this is part of Socrates’ thinking; nevertheless, it cannot be the full story. The
problem with this explanation is that although the potential epistemic costs are greater for Simmias
and Cebes, so are the potential epistemic gains. For instance, if they believe that the soul is
immortal and this belief is true, then they will benefit from having a true belief for a long duration.
Additionally, they have strong practical reasons to attempt to convince themselves that the soul is
immortal; such a belief will encourage them to care for the condition of their soul and not to care
about money, honor, or the things of the body (cf. 61b-d, 63e-64e, 66a-e, 68b-c, 84a, 107c-d, and
114c).26 Therefore, this answer to the epistemic vice puzzle cannot explain why Socrates would
not want his friends to be self-directed eristics towards these beliefs concerning death.
A related but more plausible explanation is that because Socrates will soon perish, he does
not have time to develop epistemic vice, even if he acts in an epistemically vicious way before he
dies. However, because Simmias and Cebes will continue living, if they act epistemically vicious,
they seriously risk developing epistemic vice which could potentially ruin their lives. In other
words, given the unique circumstance that Socrates is in, he is not at risk for developing epistemic
vice and thus can act epistemically vicious without suffering any serious costs. However, because
Simmias and Cebes are not in the same circumstance, if they act epistemically vicious they face
very serious costs.

26 Dorter (1982, p. 94) argues that 107c-d and 114c suggest that Socrates believes that immortality is the
basis for morality. I agree with Gallop (1975, pp. 222-3) that these passages merely show that Socrates believes that
if the soul is immortal, then the wicked do not escape their wickedness (cf. 69a6-c3, 81d6-82d8). This does not mean,
however, that he believes that if the soul is not immortal, there is no morality or that everything is permitted.
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Although I think this explanation might capture part of Socrates’ rationale, it once again is
not the full story. The problem with this account is that it assumes that one’s epistemic vice cannot
extend into the afterlife. This assumption is problematic because one of the core claims that
Socrates is trying to convince himself of is the proportionality thesis, and in the proportionality
thesis living philosophically is the core criterion that determines the quality of one’s afterlife (80d82b, 107c-115a). Therefore, this answer to the epistemic vice puzzle cannot account for why
Socrates would believe that he is justified in applying an epistemically vicious process.
I argue that the relevant difference between Socrates and his friends is that Socrates is a
fully accomplished philosopher, while his friends are not. Socrates is an expert at pursuing truth,
knowledge, and wisdom (61b-d, 63e-64a, 66a-68b, 69b, 84a, and 91a), and because of this he is
an epistemic authority.27 Although Simmias and Cebes have a good deal of philosophical skill
and do, in fact, care about the truth, they lack the philosophical expertise of Socrates and thus are
not epistemic authorities. Being an epistemic authority affords Socrates two advantages over his
friends who are not epistemic authorities: first, he is a good judge of when it is to one’s advantage
to not pursue the truth. Second, because he has devoted his life to achieving truth and knowledge
(61b-d, 63e-64a, and 67e-68b), his epistemic dispositions are relatively stable. This means that
there is less of a chance that being epistemically vicious at a given time will infect and destroy his

27 One might worry that describing Socrates as an epistemic authority is incompatible with his disavowal of
knowledge. There are two reasons this description should not worry us. First, Socrates’ description of himself does
not necessarily represent his actual characteristics. Second, even if it is true that Socrates lacks knowledge of divine
things, it is still possible that he is better at reasoning and pursuing the truth than other human beings, and thus is an
epistemic authority.
Additionally, it should be noted that in Socrates' autobiography he admits to having abandoned research into
the natural sciences (96 ff.). However, the point of this passage is not that Socrates has abandoned the pursuit of
epistemic goods. Rather, it is that he has discovered that some truths are not worth pursuing, and that the road to
wisdom and real knowledge is not empirical, see esp. 100b-101a; cf. 68a-c. Woolf (2007, p. 1) argues that this
demonstrates that Socrates does not value truth for its own sake, but values truth “because its content expresses a state
of affairs that we value.” For instance, he says, “For he [viz. Socrates] acknowledges, in effect, that he will fight to
defend the thesis of the soul's immortality not out of a love of truth for its own sake but because of the value he places
on the state of affairs that would obtain if the thesis were true” (p. 1). For a response see Wood (2007).
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skill as a philosopher, or his love for truth, knowledge, and wisdom.
However, because Simmias and Cebes lack the same degree of philosophical skill, when
they act epistemically vicious they risk becoming habitual wishful thinkers, or worse yet,
completely self-deceived. This danger is very real; especially when one considers the fact that their
philosophical teacher will no longer be around to guide them. Without Socrates’ philosophical
prodding, his friends seriously risk falling deep into the unphilosophical life of valuing bodily
goods over the goods of the soul (i.e., truth, knowledge, and wisdom) (68b-c).
Thus, despite the fact that Simmias and Cebes might receive some immediate practical
benefits from believing that the soul is immortal without giving thought to the truth of this claim,
they will be better off in the long run striving to become philosophers—for philosophy is the best
guide to one’s life. This is why Socrates wants to avoid leaving his unphilosophical sting in them
when he dies (91c; cf. 107b, 115b-c). Therefore, Socrates is justified in not pursuing the truth
because he is an epistemic authority. In contrast, Simmias and Cebes should not deviate from the
philosophical path because they are not epistemic authorities, and such a move would be costly.28
In what follows, I defend my interpretation in two ways. First, I argue that the philosophical
and psychological ideas underlying it are plausible. Second, I argue that there is independent
textual support for this position found in the Republic.
My interpretation holds that one’s epistemic skills, in part, determine whether an epistemic
risk is appropriate or not. The more epistemic skill one has, the more risk it is appropriate to take;
in contrast, the less epistemic skill one has, the less risk it is appropriate to take.29 I call this position

28 An anonymous referee suggested that another possible reason Socrates might not want his friends to
unphilosophically cling to the immortality of the soul is that they will be ill-equipped to defend the view to others,
and if being refuted leads to misology, then they need philosophical practice in order to avoid misology later, or to
avoid causing it in others as a result of their philosophical ineptitude. This demonstrates another way in which it is
dangerous to act unphilosophically if one is not an epistemic authority.
29 Cf. Laws X.892d-893a.
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“Skill-Based Risk Assessment” (SBRA):
SBRA: Agent A’s skill in a given field F, in part, determines whether a risk is
appropriate or not for A with respect to F. The more skill A has in F, the more risk
it is appropriate for A to take with respect to F. The less skill A has in F, the less
risk it is appropriate for A to take with respect to F.30
I take SBRA to have great intuitive appeal. For example, the shot that is appropriate for a
skilled golfer, such as Arnold Palmer, is very different from the shot that is appropriate for Duffer
Hack, who is a novice. Arnold Palmer is capable of making difficult shots more often than Duffer
Hack. Moreover, because Arnold Palmer is a seasoned veteran on the course, he understands when
such difficult shots are worth attempting and when they are not. Since Duffer Hack lacks this
experience, he lacks the awareness of when it is appropriate to take difficult shots and when it is
not. In fact, if Duffer Hack were to make a difficult shot, this might actually hurt his overall
performance by giving him a false sense of confidence in which he thinks that he is capable of
making difficult shots all the time, when he clearly is not. For these reasons, Duffer Hack will be
better off playing the course safely and not attempting the difficult shots that Arnold Palmer often
makes. Now just as it is appropriate for Arnold Palmer to take risky shots that are inappropriate
for Duffer Hack to take, it is appropriate for Socrates to take epistemic risks that are inappropriate
for his friends to take.
In the Republic there is evidence that one’s epistemic skill determines whether telling
falsehoods is risky or not.31 In Book II of the Republic, Plato distinguishes between two kinds of

30 SBRA is an application of thinking of virtue as a craft, which is a common Socratic idea; see Laches 185de; Hippias Minor 275d-276b; Charmides 174e-175a; Euthydemus 291b-292d; and Gorgias 460b.
31 Support for SBRA is also found in Protagoras 350a ff., in which Socrates asserts that skilled divers are
the ones who dive boldly into wells.
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falsehood or lie, the “true” or “real” lie and the “impure” lie (382a-d). 32 The true lie involves
deceiving “the most authoritative part” (τῷ κυριωτάτῳ) of oneself about “the most authoritative
things” (περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα) and because of this everyone fears and hates the true lie (382a7-9,
382b1-5, 382c3-4). In contrast, the impure falsehood is a “kind of imitation in words (ἐν λόγοις
μίμημά) of the condition (παθήματος) in the soul, an image (εἴδωλον) that arises later” (382b9c1). Although the true lie is hated by gods and humans alike, the impure falsehood is not always
hated by humans, but is like a useful drug, which can be used for preventing the ignorant or mad
from doing bad (382c6-10).
Before I explain how this passage supports SBRA, it will be helpful to briefly comment on
Socrates’ cryptic distinction. This passage is not saying that all forms of deception, self-deception,
or ignorance constitute the true lie. Rather, this passage is saying that the true lie, the lie that is
hated and feared by all, involves being deceived about and ignorant of very specific content: the
most authoritative things. Hence, part of the reason why the impure lie can be beneficial is because
it does not mislead about the most authoritative things.33 This raises the question: What are the
most authoritative things that Socrates has in mind at 382a-d? Broadly speaking, scholars have put
forth two different answers: some have argued that they concern the Forms, while others have
argued that they concern ethical truths.34 Fortunately, for the purposes of this chapter we need not

32 At II.382a4-5 Socrates describes this as τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος and at II.382c3-4 he uses τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος;
it is clear from the context that he is using these terms interchangeably and is contrasting them with οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον
ψεῦδος, which literally means the “not entirely pure lie.” Hereafter, I shall simply refer to the former kind of lie as the
“true lie” and the latter kind of lie as the “impure lie.” Additionally, I should note that the ψεῦδος can mean “lie” or
“falsehood.” I shall use the term “lie,” although nothing important hangs on this translation. That Socrates is tolerant
of impure lies is evident in various places in the Republic, see I.331b-d, II.377e-378a, II.378c-d, III.414d-415c,
III.416e-417b, and V.459d-460c.
33 I say “can” because Socrates is clear that the mixed lie is not always beneficial, but is only beneficial in
certain circumstances.
34 For examples of the former see Simpson (2007) and Woolf (2009), and for examples of the latter see
Baima (forthcoming), Brickhouse and Smith (1983), Page (1991), and Reeve (1981, p. 210). I should also note that
there is some overlap between these views because for Plato ethical matters are related to the Forms. The most
thorough discussion of this passage is found in Woolf (2009). I hold that the true lie is a matter of being deceived
about what you ought to do, or propose to do, here and now. Hence, it is fundamentally a practical matter.
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settle this difficult issue here. Instead, one simply needs to keep in mind that at 382a-d Socrates is
not saying that all forms of deception (including self-deception) are always bad, but rather, he is
expressing concern about being deceived about very particular content—content which Socrates
does not appear to be attempting to make himself ignorant of in the Phaedo.35
In Book III, Plato asserts that just as only doctors should prescribe drugs, only the
philosopher rulers should tell lies in the city (389a-c).36 That is, only philosophers should utilize
the impure lie. The idea is that doctors know things about medicine and disease that patients do
not. For this reason, patients can benefit from the medical advice of doctors. However, because
patients are ignorant about medicine and disease, they should not be issuing medical advice
because such advice is likely to do more harm than good. Therefore, it is the doctor’s epistemically
superior vantage point that grounds her authority to prescribe drugs, and it is the patient’s
epistemically defective vantage point that disqualifies her as an authority for prescribing drugs.
Similarly, philosophers know things about goodness and ruling cities that non-philosophers
do not know. This includes having knowledge of when citizens can benefit from believing
falsehood, and thus, when it is appropriate to lie to citizens. For this reason, the citizens can benefit
from hearing the lies of the rulers. However, since citizens are ignorant about these matters, it is
dangerous for them to lie; especially, if they lie to the rulers. Therefore, it is the philosopher’s
epistemically superior vantage point that grounds her authority to prescribe falsehood, and it is the
non-philosopher’s epistemically defective vantage point that disqualifies her as an authority to
prescribe falsehood.37
To highlight the dangers of non-philosophers lying to philosophers, Socrates extends his

35 In fact, it seems to be just the opposite to the extent that in the Phaedo, Socrates is not trying to ignore the
Forms, but rather appears to be trying to convince himself of them in order to overcome the fear of death.
36 Cf. Laws XI.916d-917b.
37 Cf. Statesman 279d.
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medical analogy (III.389c).38 Suppose that a patient lies to a doctor about the present condition of
her health. This faulty information will lead the doctor to misdiagnose and mistreat the patient’s
disease. Consequently, the patient’s disease will not be cured and the doctor’s prescription might
actually harm the patient. Likewise, if a non-philosopher lies to a philosopher about her present
condition or the condition of the city, the philosopher will likely misjudge the non-philosopher’s
needs as well as the needs of the city. This faulty information will cause the philosopher to issue
the wrong prescriptions and the entire city will be harmed as a result.
Plato is not, however, making the implausible claim that a non-philosopher can never
benefit from lying to another citizen. There might be some particular circumstances in which nonphilosophers could receive some immediate benefit from lying.39 However, on the whole, this
practice is extremely dangerous because non-philosophers are likely to misjudge when it is
appropriate to lie. This danger is especially severe because, unlike philosophers, non-philosophers
have not been raised to hate falsehood and love truth. Thus if they are permitted to lie, they might
lie without restraint. In contrast, because philosophers love truth and hate falsehood (Rep. V.474b475c, VI.485c-d, VI.490a-c, VI.501d, and XI.591d-e), they will only lie when it is truly
beneficial.40
Obviously, these examples are not perfectly analogous. According to my interpretation of
the Phaedo, Socrates is making the point that a philosopher’s epistemic authority justifies her in
risking false belief in circumstances when a non-philosopher is not justified in risking false belief.
However, in the Republic, it is not the case that the epistemic ability of a philosopher justifies her

38 Socrates also uses the examples of athletic trainers and athletes, and captains and sailors to illustrate this
point (III.389c).
39 Cf. Republic I.331b-d.
40 Speaking on this point, Schofield (2007, p. 148) maintains that because philosophers hate falsehoods and
love truth, philosopher rulers will hate telling falsehoods. For similar points see Brickhouse and Smith (1983, p. 84),
Annas (1981, pp. 107, 166-7); cf. Phaedo 115e. Additionally, consider Plato's concern about imitation in the Republic,
see especially III.395.
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in risking false belief herself. Rather, it justifies a philosopher’s ability to tell falsehoods to others,
and thus to cause them to develop false beliefs. Nevertheless, both examples share the same general
principle that a philosopher’s epistemic ability justifies her in doing something epistemically
vicious, and that a non-philosopher’s lack of epistemic ability disqualifies her from doing
something epistemically vicious.41 Additionally, Plato’s conception of philosophers in the
Republic is similar to his conception of philosophers in the Phaedo in the important respect that in
both dialogues philosophers love truth, knowledge, and wisdom, and despise falsehood, wealth,
and the things of the body (Rep. III.416e-417a, V.474b-475c, VI.485c-d, VI.490a-c, VI.501d, and
IX.591d-e).
At this point, one might object that it is the non-philosophers, not the philosophers, who
benefit from being epistemically vicious in the Republic; after all, it is the non-philosophers who
benefit from believing false things in the Republic. However, this objection is founded upon a
mistake. It is certainly true that in the Kallipolis, non-philosophers benefit from the false beliefs
given to them by philosophers. It is also true that these false beliefs benefit non-philosophers
because non-philosophers are in some ways epistemically defective, and thus cannot grasp the full
truth. Nevertheless, it is not the case that non-philosophers develop these false beliefs through an
epistemically vicious process, such as through wishful thinking or self-deception. If anything it is
just the opposite: non-philosophers develop these false beliefs from trusting and listening to the
philosopher rulers who are epistemic authorities. That is to say, they trust an epistemically reliable
process.
On the other side of things, one might worry that on my reading philosophers, such as
Socrates, come across as excessive wishful thinkers about death. To be clear, I am suggesting that

41 For a discussion of why lying is epistemically vicious see Kawall (2002).
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some of the beliefs philosophers form about death might be a result of a kind of wishful or hopeful
thinking.42 However, I am not arguing that philosophers form all of their beliefs about death on
the basis of wishful thinking; rather, I am arguing that in very particular circumstances,
philosophers can benefit from believing things not grounded in sound evidence. Additionally, I
have tried to show that this kind of activity is not pernicious for philosophers because: (1)
philosophers understand when it is wise or fitting to act unphilosophically, and (2) this practice
will not affect their love for and pursuit of truth, knowledge, and wisdom.

4. The Epistemic Vice Puzzle Redux
In the previous section, I argued that the solution to the epistemic vice puzzle centers around one’s
epistemic skills. I argued that Socrates is justified in not pursuing the truth because he is an
epistemic authority, and that Simmias and Cebes lack such justification because they are not
epistemic authorities. However, a difficulty emerges for my interpretation at 114d1-6:
It is not fitting for a man having intelligence (οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί) to insist
that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to
risk the belief (μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν)— the risk is
a noble one—that this, or something like it, is true about our souls and their
dwelling places, since the soul appears to be immortal (ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ
φαίνεται οὖσα), and a man should sing (ἐπᾴδειν) this to himself as if it were an
incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale (114d1-6).
At first glance, one might think that Socrates is being inconsistent, since at 114d he is asserting
that everyone should try to believe certain claims about death irrespective of the truth, while at

42 For a discussion of hopeful thinking in the Apology see Austin (2010). Additionally, for a specific
discussion on what Plato thinks the dangers of wishful thinking are and are not see Vogt (2012, chap. 1).
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91a-c he defends this practice only for himself. However, a careful analysis of 114d will reveal
that there is no inconsistency.
First, notice that the claims that Socrates is trying to convince himself of at 91a-c are
different from the claims that he is recommending that everyone should try to convince themselves
of at 114d. At 91a-c, Socrates is interested in convincing himself of both the immortality of the
soul and the proportionality thesis. In contrast, at 114d, he is advocating that everyone should
strive to believe the proportionality thesis, including the specific details of what he thinks the
afterlife would be like under this description.
Relatedly, the risk involved in believing these claims differs because the evidence for these
claims is different in two ways. First, at 91a-c, Socrates has yet to provide strong arguments in
defense of the immortality of the soul.43 Thus, at 91a-c, Socrates is trying to form beliefs about his
soul and its destiny with very little evidence. However, by the time we reach 114d, Socrates takes
himself to have established firm reasons for thinking that the soul is immortal.44 This is reflected
in Socrates saying that the belief is worth risking because “this, or something like it, is true about
our souls and their dwelling place, since the soul appears to be immortal (ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ
ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα).”45 Socrates’ use of the causal conjunction ἐπείπερ demonstrates that one of

43 For instance, Gallop (1975, p. 103) says, “As the dialogue unfolds, the earlier arguments are criticized,
refined, or superseded until Socrates' belief in immortality is finally vindicated.” Dorter (1982, p. 33) disagrees,
arguing that the earlier arguments are not superseded by the arguments that come later. Nevertheless, even if Dorter
is right about this, it is still true that one has more reason to believe in the immortality of the soul at 114 than at 91,
because more arguments have been put forth and a more thorough discussion of this matter has ensued.
44 Cobb (1977) argues that the Phaedo should be read as not putting forth rational arguments for the
immortality of the soul. Rather, the philosophical arguments in the Phaedo are meant to persuade one's emotions and
strengthen one's confidence that the best life is the philosophical life. Although I am sympathetic to this interpretation,
I see no reason why the reader of the Phaedo is forced into an exclusive disjunction, in which either rational arguments
are put forth, or it is a non-rational defense of philosophy.
45 One might worry that this undermines the original epistemic vice puzzle because it suggests that Socrates
is not a self-directed eristic towards death. However, at 91a-c, Socrates has yet to defend the immortality of the soul
soundly, and thus during this time he is behaving as a self-directed eristic because he has insufficient evidence in
support of this claim. However, this changes at 114d because he takes himself to have soundly defended this claim.
In other words, the evidence has changed significantly for the claim that the soul is immortal between 91a-c and 114d.

138

the reasons why everyone should risk belief in the proportionality thesis is that he takes it to be
quite plausible that the soul is immortal and that there is an afterlife. This provides some evidence
for the proportionality thesis because at the very least this demonstrates that there is good reason
to believe in the afterlife. In contrast, at 91a-c, there was not much evidence for this claim.
Second, the risk involved in believing the immortality of the soul differs from the risk
involved in believing the details of the proportionality thesis because these claims differ in terms
of how strongly they can be established in this life. In this life, we might not be able to fully
determine the nature of the soul and whether it is immortal. However, we can offer arguments or
theories that shed light on the truth of this claim, and we can evaluate these arguments and theories
with some degree of confidence. Nevertheless, the exact nature of the afterlife is much different;
we can never be extremely confident about the particular claims we make about it. We can only
speculate through myth about the specific details of the afterlife.46 Now as I just explained,
Socrates believes that Simmias and Cebes are justified in believing that the soul is immortal at
114d. If Simmias and Cebes are justified in believing that the soul is immortal, then they are
justified in believing that there is an afterlife. However, given the mysterious nature of this subject,
they cannot be certain of the exact nature of the afterlife while they are living. Thus, if Simmias
and Cebes follow Socrates’ advice and believe that the afterlife is a certain way, they risk false
belief. But the risk primarily stems from the nature of the subject matter and not from some defect
in reasoning. Therefore, Socrates is recommending much riskier behavior for himself at 91a-b than
he is for everyone at 114d.

46 Cf. Gallop (1975, p. 224). To be clear, I do think the general idea of the proportionality thesis is subject
to rational inquiry. For instance, one can offer arguments in defense of a teleological afterlife. Nevertheless, the exact
nature of this afterlife is not as amenable to rational discourse. For instance, it does not seem that we can access
through reason whether there are rivers, demons, blue skies, and unicorns in the afterlife.
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5. The Limits of Truth
From this analysis, we see that there are three factors that determine whether Socrates thinks an
agent A is justified in trying to convince herself of a claim irrespective of the truth of that claim.
They are: (1) the epistemic benefits or costs in believing that p, (2) the practical benefits or costs
in believing that p, and (3) A’s epistemic skill. The greater A’s epistemic abilities are, the more A
can wager, so to speak.
On this model, the value of pursuing truth is limited to the extent that there are some
circumstances in which one’s life can go better by forming beliefs on the basis of insufficient
evidence. That is, there are some contexts in which being epistemically vicious will improve one’s
life, and in these circumstances the practical considerations of living well override the epistemic
concerns of reaching truth and achieving knowledge. As a philosophical thesis, we should not find
such a position that startling. After all, it is well-known that utilitarians prioritize practical
considerations over epistemic concerns.47 Thus, it should come as no surprise if a utilitarian argued
that one should sometimes sacrifice the pursuit of truth for the sake of practical gain. 48 However,
it is surprising that we find such a position defended by an author who maintains that “truth heads
the list of all things good, for gods and humans alike” (Laws V.730c1-2). Additionally, it is even
more paradoxical that such a position is defended in a story where the protagonist dies for the sake
of a practice that esteems truth and knowledge, and at times says things like, “nothing should be
done contrary to philosophy” (82d1-7).
From this, we might wonder if Socrates’ endorsement of being a self-directed eristic
undermines the value of truth. The answer is a no; throughout the Phaedo and his entire corpus,

47 Or, in the case of pragmatist, epistemic goods are defined by the practical.
48 For example, consider Sidgwick's (Methods, pp. 489-90) “government house utilitarianism” and
Williams’ (1985, pp. 108-9) critique of it. See also Driver (2001).
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Plato makes it clear that truth is the best guide to one’s life. After all, it is in part one’s love of
truth and skill in pursuing it that justifies one in engaging in epistemically defective forms of
reasoning. Hence, it might be the case that there are some contexts in which one can benefit from
not seeking the truth. Nevertheless, the majority of the time, one’s life will go best if one
relentlessly strives for the truth. This is why Socrates wants to avoid leaving his unphilosophical
sting in his friends at 91c and why Socrates reminds them of this again at the end of the text.
For instance, after Socrates tells his friends that they should risk false belief at 114d, Cebes
asks Socrates how his friends might please him most (115b). Socrates responds:
Nothing new, but what I am always saying, that you will please me and mine and
yourselves by taking good care of your own selves in whatever you do, even if you
do not agree (ὁμολογήσητε)49 with me now, but if you neglect your own selves, and
are unwilling to live following the tracks, as it were, of what we have said now and
on previous occasions, you will achieve nothing new, no matter how much or how
eagerly you agree (ὁμολογήσητε) with me at this moment (115b4-c10).
Socrates’ point is that even if Simmias and Cebes remain unconvinced about the
immortality of the soul and proportionality thesis, he wants them to continue hunting for the truth
and striving to become philosophers because this is the best life.50 However, this does not mean
that one should always seek the truth because sometimes the demands of living well require one
to abandon the pursuit of truth and knowledge. This demonstrates that the value of pursuing truth

49 Gallop (1975) and Fowler (1966) translate ὁμολογήσητε as “promise.” I agree with Grube (1997) and
Rowe (1993) that it should be translated as “agree.”
50 At 107b, Socrates offers similar philosophical advice to Simmias. For instance, in response to Socrates'
concluding arguments in defense of the immortality of the soul, Simmias expresses that given the importance of the
subject and his “low opinion of human weakness”, he still has “some private misgivings about what has been said”
(107a). Socrates responds “You are not only right to say this, but our first hypotheses require clearer examination,
even though we find them convincing. And if you analyze them adequately, you will, I think, follow the argument as
far as a man can, and if the conclusion is clear, you will look no further” (107b). Hence, just as he does at 91c and
115b-c, Socrates concludes his discussion at 107b by giving his friends philosophical direction.
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is limited in scope, such that in certain circumstances, practical considerations override the value
of truth. Accordingly, it seems fitting to conclude with Simmias’ speech at 85c1-d4:
“I believe, Socrates, as perhaps you do, that it is impossible or very difficult to
acquire precise knowledge about these matters in our present life, but he is a very
weak man, who does not examine in every way what is said about them and persist
until he is exhausted by examining them on every side. For he must achieve one of
these things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that
is impossible, he must take whatever human account is best and hardest to disprove,
embarking upon it as a raft, to sail through the dangers of life, unless someone
should make that journey safer and less risky upon a firmer vessel of some divine
account.”
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I have defended three general theses regarding the role that false beliefs play in
Plato’s ethical theory. First, there is the educational claim that what one is taught is in proportion
to one’s ability to properly understand it. The ramifications of this is that because some individuals
are incapable of understanding the truth about some subjects, they will be taught falsehoods that
motivate just actions. Evidence for this thesis is found in chapters one, two, and three. For instance,
in chapter one, I argued that even if it was true that the gods acted unjustly, Plato thinks that the
citizens should be taught that they always act justly because this will make the citizens behave
correctly. If the citizens were wiser, they would be taught the truth, but since they are epistemically
deficient they need to be taught a useful falsehood. In chapter two, I argued that, to some extent,
this holds true even for the philosopher rulers of the Kallipolis. I argued that the non-reasoning
part of the philosopher’s soul is unable to understand certain ethical truths and because of this it
needs to be taught falsehoods that will motivate it towards virtue. In chapter three, I argued that in
Magnesia, the unsophisticated citizens are given misleading reasons about why it is in their interest
to obey the law. Additionally, the unsophisticated citizens are taught religious myths because they
are unable to understand certain cosmological and theoretical truths about the soul and the gods.
Second, there is the claim that sometimes it is beneficial to be mistaken about what the
right action to pursue is. Evidence for this claim is found in chapter four. For instance, in the Laws,
the Athenian argues that the false beliefs and foolishness that occurs during symposium can be
instrumental to developing virtue, if it is applied correctly. I have argued that this claim is unique
to the Laws and is the result of Plato changing his view about moral psychology from the Republic.
Third, there is the claim that the more philosophical one is, the more one can engage in
epistemically vicious practices. Evidence for this claim is found in chapter five. As I argued in

chapter five, Plato defends this thesis in both the Republic and the Phaedo. In the Republic, this
idea is conveyed in the idea that only the philosopher rulers are permitted to tell lies in the
Kallipolis. In the Phaedo, this idea is conveyed in Socrates response to death—upon facing
imminent death Socrates abandons the search of truth and unphilosophically clings to beliefs that
will make his soul noble, while at the same time telling his friends to continue to seek the truth
and to let philosophy guide their lives.
These three claims establish that Plato took the false to be a useful substitute for the true in
certain circumstances. Falsehoods, for Plato, are a means by which humans can overcome their
limitations, either due to circumstance or ability, and flourish. I take this to establish that Plato
gives priority to practical considerations over theoretical considerations, such that one should
pursue truth and knowledge only insofar as it contributes to one’s well-being. This demonstrates
that Nietzsche’ accusation of Plato undervaluing falsehood is ultimately mistaken.
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Nietzsche’s complaint is accurate. Part of
Nietzsche’s criticism was that philosophers saw epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics
intertwined—the abstract world of intellect, which is objectively true and real, is the source of
goodness, while the world of subjective perceptions, the false, is a source of evil. Hence, the way
to live well is to abandon the false world of the sensations and to discover the true and real world.1
At times, Nietzsche locates the origins of this worry with Plato.

1 Consider the following passages from Beyond Good and Evil: “For all the value that the true, the truthful,
the selfless may deserve, it would still be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life might have to be
ascribed to deception, selfishness, and lust. It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of these good and
revered things is precisely that they are insidiously related, tied to and involved with these wicked, seemingly opposite
things—maybe even one with them in essence. Maybe! (1.2).
“The falseness of a judgment is not for us necessarily an objection to a judgment...The question is to what
extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating...To recognize untruth
as a condition of life—that is certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way: and a
philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil” (1.4), cf. 2.39; Birth of Tragedy
1.7; Dawn of Day 5.507; Gay Science 5.344, 5.347; for a discussion see Nehamas (1985, ch. 2).
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This charge is raised throughout the body of Nietzsche’s work. Let us take a brief sampling
of it. Consider a few passages from Nietzsche’s criticism in “the “History of an Error” in the
Twilight of the Idols:
1. The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he
lives in it, he is it.
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A
circumlocution for the sentence, I, Plato, am the truth’...
5. The ‘true’ world—an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even
obligating—an idea which has become useless and superfluous—consequently, a
refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bons sens and cheerfulness; Plato’s
embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits).
6. The true world—we have abolished. What world has remained? The
apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the
apparent one.
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; highest
point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA).2
In (1), Nietzsche not only attributes the origins of the distinction between the true world of
being and the apparent world of becoming to Plato, but also makes it clear that that the real world
is only accessible by the sage, the pious, and the virtuous man. In (5), Nietzsche critiques this
distinction, and then in (6) he abolishes it.
In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche raises a similar concern:

2 Cf. Will to Power 567, 583, 586.
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That which constrains these men [viz., philosophers], however, this unconditional
will to truth, is faith in the ascetic ideal itself, even if as an unconscious
imperative—don’t be deceived about that—it is the faith in a metaphysical value,
the absolute value of truth, sanctioned and guaranteed by this ideal alone (it stands
or falls with this ideal) (3.24).
Nietzsche’s point is that the philosopher’s desire for truth is ultimately grounded in an
unquestioned faith that truth has objective metaphysical value. Nietzsche makes it clear in the
Genealogy of Morals that Plato is the source of this error by citing a passage from the Gay Science,
which I referenced in the introduction:
But what I have in view will now be understood, namely, that it is always a
metaphysical belief on which our belief in science rests,—and that even we
knowing ones of today, the godless and anti-metaphysical, still take our fire from
the conflagration kindled by a belief a millennium old, the Christian belief, which
was also the belief of Plato, that God is truth, that the truth is divine...But what if
this itself always becomes more untrustworthy, what if nothing any longer proves
itself divine, except it be error blindness, and falsehood;—what if God himself turns
out to be our most persistent lie? (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 3.344).3
Was Plato guilty of this? Yes, he was; the ideal state, according to Plato, always involves
the convergence of knowledge and flourishing. This dissertation has shown, however, that when

3 At times in the Gay Science Nietzsche attributes the origins of this problem to the Eleatics, the Greek
Preoscratic philosophers from the ancient city of Elea, a Greek colony in Southern Italy. Parmenides was the founder
of their school; see 3.110. There are many other examples of this worry see also Beyond Good and Evil preface:
“Although it must certainly be conceded that the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far was a
dogmatic error—namely, Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the good as such,” and 5:191: “Plato...wanted to
employ all this strength—the greatest strength a philosopher had ever had at his disposal—to prove to himself that
reason and the instincts tend toward one goal, the Good, “God.” And since Plato, all theologians and philosophers
have been on the same track…” See also the preface, 1.43, and 3.448 of the Dawn of Day.
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this ideal state is not realizable, falsehoods can be used to approximate it. This is why in the
Republic at II.382a-e Socrates maintains that the “impure falsehood” is sometimes useful for
humans, but is never useful for God. The ideal—God—has no need for the false. Additionally,
notice that in the Phaedo it is Socrates’ human limitations that cause him to abandon pursuing the
truth about death and the soul.
So, Nietzsche’s interpretation is right to the extent that for Plato, truth, knowledge, and
goodness are inextricably bound together at the highest level. But does this commitment entail
overvaluing truth and undervaluing falsehood? This only follows if one has a radical attitude
towards truth and value, in which truth lacks intrinsic value. If one is not committed to such a
view, then the value of knowledge, truth, and goodness seem to be valued appropriately by Plato.
Plato, on my reading, valued truth instrumentally and intrinsically; nevertheless, he saw that the
value of truth is limited and can be overridden by other values.
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